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I Abstract 
Mr John George Russell holds a special place in New Zealand’s relatively brief tax history. He is a person who has 
challenged Inland Revenue’s authority and the taxing statutes more than any other individual. If Mr Russell had 
followed his father’s early advice and studied engineering he may have taken over the family farm on the outskirts of 
Hamilton and by now have been enjoying a peaceful retirement. Instead, his enjoyment of the accounting subjects taken 
at college, which he had enrolled into in error, ultimately led him to becoming a leading figure in the development of 
the then emerging New Zealand money market, and the managing director of the merchant bank Securitibank. Novel 
approaches to commercial issues and tenacity in litigation are the trademarks of Mr Russell, Auckland tax advisor and 
business consultant. 
Mr Russell is well known in New Zealand tax circles as the creator and defender of the ‘Russell tax template’, 
developed in the 1980s as a mechanism to turn the ‘water’ of taxable receipts into the ‘wine’ of untaxed gains. Template 
related issues are still being litigated some three decades later. There have been many cases related to the template 
covering both substantive and procedural issues. Mr Russell has had limited success on procedural grounds claiming his 
wins have been the result of good luck more than anything else. He strongly claims Inland Revenue have run a vendetta 
against him for many years. 
Inland Revenue have taken several different ‘Tracks’ when assessing various parties it considered received the tax 
advantage from the template. The ‘Tracks’ used to assess various parties are also regarded by Mr Russell as a vendetta 
tactic. Ultimately the litigation has led to ‘Track E’ with Inland Revenue personally assessing Mr Russell for tax, 
penalties and interest totalling in excess of NZD $200 million. A Court of Appeal decision found for Inland Revenue 
and confirmed Mr Russell’s personal tax assessment. Leave to the Supreme Court was not granted and Mr Russell has 
recently commented that a ‘Track F’ may now exist. 
Mr Russell has accused the Commissioner of Inland Revenue of fraud in respect of backdated assessments, and Inland 
Revenue have accused Mr Russell of fraud in relation to backdated documents. Mr Russell commented during one of 
our interviews when challenged about document backdating that “the only difference between an honest person and a 
dishonest one is often a date.”1 This thesis attempts to provide the reader with not only an overview of the litigation 
associated with Mr Russell, but also seeks to provide an insight into the person of Mr Russell. The Russell tax template 
was held to be a tax avoidance structure by the Privy Council in 2001. I did not intend to debate the merits of the 
Russell template with Mr Russell. 
One of the least known postures of Inland Revenue’s Compliance Model is that of the ‘game player’. It would appear 
that Mr Russell has many tendencies attributed to a person classified under this framework to be a classic game player. 
This thesis attempts to provide an in-depth overview of perhaps Inland Revenue’s most litigious taxpayer and asks 
whether Inland Revenue are now on ‘track’ to a conclusion. This thesis considers Mr Russell’s contribution to tax 
jurisprudence by looking at his journey over the last 30 years, giving the reader an insight into the life of Mr Russell. 
1 Interview with Mr John Russell, Subject of thesis, (the author, University of Canterbury, 28 July 2011) (filmed live 
in lecture with students). 
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There have been many cases relating to the Russell tax template, covering both substantive and 
procedural issues. Mr Russell has had limited success on procedural matters, claiming his wins have 
been the result of good luck more than anything else. Mr Russell still battles Inland Revenue after 
over thirty years, although some of his earlier optimism of substantive litigation success may now 
be fading. Although there has been limited litigation success for Mr Russell, one fact remains true: 
he has had an impact on the way Inland Revenue conduct themselves with taxpayers that challenge 
their authority.  
What is unique to the Russell template cases is not only the longevity of the litigation but also the 
different ‘tracks’ Inland Revenue have followed to assess income derived from various parties 
associated with the Russell template.  The multitude of ‘tracks’ to assess the income has no doubt 
added years to the litigation journey. 
Mr Russell officially ‘retired’ in 1999 but estimates that he still spends many hours every week on 
template-related issues. The personal strength required to prepare for and engage in ‘battle’ with 
Inland Revenue can easily be overlooked; there must be strong reasons to justify actions taken. Not 
many individuals would have continued such a long and drawn out engagement with a powerful 
revenue authority. Despite critics of his personal views of what constitutes tax avoidance or 
acceptable tax planning, Mr Russell has left an indelible mark on the Inland Revenue litigation 
landscape and it would be doubtful if a single individual in the future would surpass his efforts. In 
an interview2 shortly after the O’Neil Privy Council decision, Mr Russell admitted enjoying ‘the 
game’ of battling the tax authorities, describing it as ‘very intellectual.’ Certainly, no individual has 
taken up so much Inland Revenue time as Mr Russell, or been the target of so much tax litigation. 
2 Graeme Hunt, Hustlers, Rogues and Bubble Boys: A History of White-Collar Mischief in New Zealand,
(Raupo Publishing (NZ) Ltd, Auckland, 2001) at 73; O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] UKPC 17, 
[2001] 3 NZLR 316 (PC), (2001) 20 NZTC 17,051.  
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A The Early Years – “Dare To Be True” 
Mr Russell was born on 8 October 1934 and grew up on the outskirts of Hamilton. He was just a 
usual ‘country lad’ growing up on a farm in Rototuna.3 Academically he succeeded well at both 
primary school and Hamilton Technical College. The motto of Fairfield School where he attended 
was ‘Dare to be True’. Mr Russell stated that he has always remembered that motto and has 
endeavoured to take it on board personally throughout his life. 
Initially when enrolling at college he had intended to study engineering, with a view to take over the 
family dairy farm, as his father had envisaged.4 An enrolment error led to him attending 
introductory accounting classes which he enjoyed immensely. Although perhaps disapproving at 
first, his father ultimately agreed that he should continue studying the accounting discipline. Mr 
Russell became both a Chartered Secretary and a qualified accountant.5 Mr Russell had envisaged at 
one stage working for a large chartered accounting firm, but found the prospect of working in 
industry more attractive. He first worked as an accountant for RB Swan & Co,6 and then for some 
well-known New Zealand companies at the time, such as L J Fisher & Co. Ltd,7 Lamson Paragon 







In the early days John Russell would ride a horse to school. He enjoyed his school days and was involved in 
both music and drama classes. His love of music was founded from his involvement in the school music classes. John 
and his wife Melva both have a strong appreciation for the arts and attend plays or other cultural events 
whenever possible. 
John Russell’s younger brother, Barry, enrolled in engineering at college to his father’s delight. The two 
brothers were very close. John ended up doing the ‘books’ for the family farm. John was the dux of both Fairfield 
School and Hamilton Technical College. At school reunions sometimes twenty or thirty years later people 
would remember Barry, but not him. He recalls Barry’s notoriety being attributable to his early exploits of 
riding around Hamilton at speed on a fast motorcycle. John was known as ‘Barry Russell’s brother’ at such events. 
John Russell attended night school at Hamilton Technical College and finished his professional qualifying 
exams. This took about three years in total. He valued the benefit of mixing theory with the practical day to day 
experience he was gaining. Learning how it should be done with what was really being done in the world was 
invaluable to him. He was always very interested in cost accounting and became a member of the New 
Zealand Society of Accountants. 
RB Swan & Co was a large accounting firm, dealing mainly with farming clients. They had 19 branches with a 
very large branch in Hamilton where John Russell was employed. They had developed a type of mass 
production technique (all the cashbooks were pre-printed) in relation to preparing accounts, being able to 
produce a set of accounts for a farmer at the time for £11. John learned a lot from his time there and was 
employed for about two years. It was a time of over full employment (1949). John Russell was very competent at 
his job earning £5 a week at the time, stating it was twice the going rate.
John Russell was initially employed as a cost accountant, then accountant, and then took on the role as 
company secretary. L J Fisher & Co Ltd manufactured decramastic tiles for roofing applications. The 
decramastic roof tile had its origins from World War 2 when United Kingdom airfields were coated with a 
tar and camouflaged with different coloured ground up rocks to look like grassy fields. Ben Booth, who 
developed the process, met with Lou Fisher. Lou Fisher saw a wonderful opportunity for this type of 
application in the New Zealand building industry. The main products of LJ Fisher & Co Ltd were structural 
steel and aluminium windows, which were a very recent invention when Mr Russell started working 
there.  
Lamson Paragon (NZ) Ltd was a printing company using the latest types of printing techniques. The machines were a 
pre-runner to the modern computer. Mr Russell was the cost accountant. The business produced various 
sprocket punch stationery with no competition therefore being in a monopoly situation.   During our interview on 
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building and construction; printing; and food manufacturing. Mr Russell gained a lot of knowledge 
from his early employment and, on reflection, considered the printing industry to be the most 
fascinating.10 
Figure 1: Mr Russell, circa the Securitibank years (1966 to 1976). 
The promise of a very large pay rise saw Mr Russell relocate to Auckland and enabled him to marry 
Melva in 1956; together aged 20 and 21 respectively, they started married life in Onehunga, 
Auckland. Mr Russell’s chosen field of study had led him initially into a successful career of cost 
accounting; however, he then went on to become a leading figure in the formation of the emerging 
money market in New Zealand. 
B The Rise ... And Fall of Securitibank 
 “…what was happening really is we were stretching the rules…we were within the 
rules but they were really being stretched…without people doing that you don’t get any 
development…”11 
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his early working life Mr Russell mentioned that he had purchased one of the first calculators available in 
New Zealand and paid £1,500 pounds for it at the time. It was approximately 300mm by 600 mm in size with neon 
tubes for the figures. Mr Russell estimated it was about 98 per cent correct! 
Butland Industries Ltd was privately owned by the Butland family. One of their food lines was ‘the Crest’ brand. 
Many of the product lines were later sold to Unilever. The company had 120 salespeople. They produced both 
canned and packaged food items. Mr Russell was employed at Butland Industries Ltd for about 18 months gaining 
considerable experience both in the cost accounting and the insurance area. He decided to then look at employment in
the building industry.  
10  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
11  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
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In 1962 the short term money market was created by the government as an avenue for business 
firms to get interest on their money overnight.12 Short Term Deposits Ltd was established by an 
Auckland share broking firm,13 with Mr Russell being its first employee.14 
15 After receiving 
only minimal training for two weeks in Australia, Mr Russell began operating out of a small one 
room office in central Auckland, assisted only by a typewriter.  Short Term Deposits Ltd had a 
license from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the same type of license as a commercial bank. 
Initially people were cautious with regard to Short Term Deposits Ltd, being used to 
previously dealing only with established banks. 
Mr Russell travelled the length of New Zealand promoting the new business, competing with the 
banks for depositor’s funds, and taking on speaking engagements to promote the new business.16 
Short Term Deposits Ltd saw an opportunity of expanding into other instruments like Bills of 
Exchange. Another company, Secured Deposits Ltd, was set up for this purpose.17 During this time 
Mr Russell stated that what they were doing was “stretching the rules and that without doing that, 
there is really no development.”18
Securitibank Ltd (Securitibank) was then set up as a holding company. The shares in Short Term 
Deposits Ltd and Secured Deposits Ltd were transferred to Securitibank.  Securitibank then created 
their own bank,19 Merbank, to trade their Bills of Exchange. Securitibank expanded very quickly 
and in 1976 had approximately $100 million dollars in the bank bill market. Mr Russell considers a 
12  Mr Russell stated that in the 1960s the deposit taking industry was very much controlled by the banks, which were 
paying very low rates of interest and requiring funds to be deposited for a minimum of a month at a time. The 
government were one of the main beneficiaries of the short term money market as funds had to be invested in
Government stock. 
13
14  Mr Russell attributes being employed for this role due to having amassed a wide variety of experience prior in 
industries that would perhaps be the type of customers Short Term Deposits Ltd would want to attract. 
15
16  As a result a very big business was established. There were three other short term money market dealers in 
competition at the time. None of the other dealers actively promoted their business like Short Term Deposits Ltd did.
Mr Russell essentially would talk to ‘anyone that would listen’. Ultimately they were probably doing more 
business than all of the other competitors put together. 
17  This business was involved entirely in local body stock, being able to supply another source of funding to local 
bodies. Secured Deposits Ltd did not have any Reserve Bank backing so it would buy government stock either off 
Short Term Deposits Ltd or directly off the Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank was concerned about this practice. Mr 
Russell stated that they were only looking at purely the legal side of it. Mr Russell stated that ‘what we were doing 
was we were stretching the rules…we were within the rules but really stretching them’. (Interview with Mr 
John Russell, Subject of thesis, (the author, University of Canterbury, 27 July 2010).  
18  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 17. 
19  At the start of setting up Short Term Deposits Ltd there was a lot of opposition from the banks, as essentially it was 
competition for them. The banks at the time would not transact with Short Term Deposits Ltd so they created their 
own bank. 
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bill market essential for any modern economy and credits what they (Securitibank) did as getting it 
started in New Zealand. People in the business community could borrow money from Securitibank 
rather than going to their bank.  Securitibank became very exposed in a falling property market and 
this ultimately led to its collapse in 1976.20  
The shareholders of Securitibank voluntarily placed the company into liquidation, with liquidators 
appointed.21 Ultimately every creditor was paid in full, with a surplus distributed to some of the bill 
holders by way of a Court order.22 Mr Russell was 41 years of age at the time of the collapse.    
Securitibank was located in central Auckland. Mr Russell claimed he worked up to an estimated 
100 hours a week, indicative of his personal stamina. Merbank,23 the company initially named and 
registered by Mr Russell, was one of the companies in the Securitibank Group connected
20
21  The Securitibank collapse was complicated and politically sensitive. The government, through the State Insurance 
Office and the Government Life Insurance Office, held 22 per cent of Securitibank’s shares, giving many of the 
5,000 investors the impression the company was ‘safe.’ Securitibank’s problems were due in part to government 
regulations – a ceiling on interest rates that had encouraged the merchant bank to skirt the rules and use Bills of 
Exchange to borrow from the public. Graeme Hunt, Hustlers, Rogues and Bubble Boys: A History of White-Collar 
Mischief in New Zealand, (Raupo Publishing (NZ) Ltd, Auckland, 2001) above n 2, at 70.
22  The Bill holders felt disadvantaged. As a Bill holder there is no interest on the Bill. Other types of security would
have interest accrue. It was felt fair to distribute the surplus to the Bill holders rather than follow the normal legal 
procedure of distributing it to the shareholders. All Securitibank creditors were paid in full with a bonus to some. 
There were high interest rates at the time of the liquidation and as Securitibank realised its assets it could take 
advantage of this. Mr Russell felt that there was a huge amount of money wasted through the process of this 
liquidation. He estimated that the liquidators may have spent $10 million unnecessarily.
23  Mr Russell stated during an interview in January 2010 that ‘Merbank’ was simply an abbreviation for ‘merchant
bank’. Interview with Mr John Russell, Subject of thesis, (the author, Kawakawa Bay, 27 January 2010). 
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to the Privy Council decision in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd,24
a major contributor to New Zealand tax avoidance jurisprudence at the time.  
Figure 2: Former Securitibank Office Building, Auckland
It took 10 years and some 50 High Court cases to sort out the liquidation.25 All external depositors 
were paid in full, thanks to out of court settlements with shareholders and the auditor.26 
Shareholders, including major institutional shareholders such as NZI Insurance, paid $1 million in 
settlement of allegations that Securitibank paid dividends out of capital. Auditor Barr Burgess & 
Stewart paid $4.3 million in settlement of negligence claims while denying liability.27    
Mr Russell did not regret what happened at Securitibank, excepting that had he known in advance 
what would have happened he certainly would not have had so much of the investments in 
property.28 Mr Russell still thinks that property is one of the best investments to have in New 
Zealand. Mr Russell stated that in spite of the fact that Securitibank eventually failed, it was a 
success in the sense that it created a new bill market which has been developed since. It also 
24  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd [1987] AC 155 (PC); [1986] 2 NZLR 513 (PC); 
(1986) 8 NZTC 5,219 (PC). 
25  Securitibank owed $31.5 million to outside creditors. 
26  Mr Russell is said to have contributed $100,000 to the $1 million collective out of court settlement by former 
Securitibank directors. The $100,000 amount was confirmed by Mr Russell during an interview in July 2011. 
27  “John Russell took novel approaches” The National Business Review (online ed., New Zealand, 8 May 1998) at 61. 
28  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
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loosened up the financial system which was totally in the grips of the banks and advanced New 
Zealand substantially in an economic sense compared to what it was before.29 
After the well-publicised Securitibank collapse, being the largest corporate collapse in New Zealand 
history at the time, Mr Russell claimed it was difficult to have any employment opportunities and 
this led him to start Commercial Management Ltd, initially run out of a small office in Upper Queen 
Street, central Auckland, and ultimately run out of his family home in Pakuranga. 
Mr Russell stated:30
There was no point really in applying for a job anywhere…while you are successful you are a 
financial genius, if you are unsuccessful you are a crook…that is basically the way you are 
looked at in New Zealand.  
Mr Russell further stated that he had “quite a few people come along to me and want me to rescue 
their businesses and all that sort of thing…”31 He considered that if half the businesses that came his 
way could be turned around and saved, that was a very good percentage.  
On 11 May 1977, the day he left Securitibank, Mr Russell went into business32 with his own 
company, Commercial Management Ltd, as a management consultant/adviser “helping the small 
businessman who can’t afford the full gamut of professional services.”33 In a rare newspaper 
interview at the time Mr Russell claimed the venture was financed by $30,000 from the sale of a 
property, as he personally had more than $50,000 locked up in Securitibank, and his extended 
family had $120,000 invested in the merchant bank.34  
Commercial Management Ltd35 began with just a few clients and experienced rapid growth.36 Over 
the years 1972 to 1977 Mr Russell was also regarded as being in business on his own account in 
29  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
30  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 23. During the 1970s Mr Russell would occasionally give lunchtime
addresses to the Auckland business community. His speeches were well received at the time. 
31  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 23. 
32   When he was employed at Securitibank Mr Russell carried out some accountancy and business advisory work on his 
own account. The Court of Appeal in Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] NZCA 128 at [13] stated 
that “We do not need to resolve the dispute as to the nature and extent of that work. It seems that while working for 
Securitibank the appellant earned consulting income personally and paid tax on that income.”  
33  Hunt, above n 2, at 72. 
34  At 72. 
35  Commercial Management Ltd was incorporated on 1 April 1977. Mr Russell was a director of the company, along 
with his wife. Mr Russell was the company secretary. Mr Russell held 9,999 shares in the company. It had a share 
capital of 10,000 ordinary $1 shares and the other share was held by another company controlled by Mr Russell, 
Money Market Securities Ltd. Money Market Securities Ltd was incorporated on 21 May 1964. Commercial 
Management Ltd was regarded by Wylie J as Mr Russell’s alter ego: Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(2010) 24 NZTC 24,463 (HC) at [124(a)]. 
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addition to being employed by Securitibank. In Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,37 Wylie 
J stated that “It is helpful to consider the way in which Mr Russell traded prior to 1985.”38 Mr 
Russell consistently had described himself in his tax returns during this time as an accountant. His 
letterhead recorded his professional accountancy qualifications and he derived professional fees 
earned in his capacity as an accountant, in addition to his salary from Securitibank Ltd. Mr 
Russell’s professional fees earned in his capacity as an accountant and his salary from Securitibank 
are detailed below.39 
Table 1: Mr Russell’s personal income sources: 1972 to 1977 (Source: Russell v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (2010) 24 NZTC 24,463 (HC) at [121].) 
In a report prepared for the court on the liquidation of Securitibank, it was noted that staff at 
Securitibank were from time to time engaged in private work for Mr Russell; this included 
Securitibank accountants who undertook work for Mr Russell’s clients for which Mr Russell 
personally collected fees.40  
36  It should be noted that companies could not hold themselves out as being chartered accountants, or trade as such. To 
the extent that they did so, they were committing an offence under s 32 [Improper use of terms implying 
membership of Society] of the New Zealand Society of Accountants’ Act 1958. Membership of the Society was 
confined to registered persons, and the Act made it clear that admission was only open to real persons, and not to 
corporate entities. See: s 14(1) [Qualifications for membership of the Society], New Zealand Society of Accountants 
Act 1958. Mr Russell may have preferred to trade through a corporate structure to avoid any personal liability but in 
doing so he breached New Zealand Society of Accountants Rules in force at the time.
37   Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35. 
38   At [120]. 
39   At [121]. 
40  At [121].
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In an Auckland Star article dated 15 April 1977, Mr Russell was quoted as saying that he had had 
private clients for some time, and that there were a lot of small businesses that were sticking with 
him. He had stated that he hoped to be off to a flying start with his new business, Commercial 
Management Ltd.41 This business was described as one which would concentrate on providing 
financial and management consultant services, particularly advice on investment opportunities.42 
Wylie J, in Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue43  was referred to a passage in evidence by 
Mr Simon Judd, counsel for Mr Russell.  Mr Russell asserted that he was “merely doing tax returns 
and the like for friends and family members”44 while he was at Securitibank. Wylie J considered 
this assertion did not and could not stand if reference was made to the documents and statements 
made by Mr Russell at the time. The contemporaneous materials showed that Mr Russell’s personal 
accountancy business was not insignificant. The income he had earned, as shown in Table 1, as a 
percentage of his then declared income, was not insubstantial.  
The Taxation Review Authority (TRA) had concluded that Mr Russell was in business as an 
accountant/business advisor/financial consultant over the period 1972 to 1977. Judge Wylie agreed 
with that finding and in his Honour’s view it was clear that this personal business provided the 
springboard for the years 1978 to 1984.45 
In 1979 Mr Russell wrote a letter to a firm of accountants advising that he had been asked to 
provide taxation and consulting services, including the preparation of accounts and taxation returns, 
on behalf of some individuals and a company they were associated with. The letter was signed by 
Mr Russell as managing director of Commercial Management Ltd, and it was addressed on 
Commercial Management Ltd letterhead. The letter resulted in a complaint being made by the 
accountants concerned. They considered that Mr Russell was a director of, and a shareholder in, 
Commercial Management Ltd, and that Commercial Management Ltd was carrying on the business 
of accounting, in breach of the New Zealand Society of Accountants Rules in force at the time.  The 
Society commenced disciplinary proceedings against Mr Russell in October 1979. The Disciplinary 
Committee found against him, with Mr Russell appealing the decision. The appeal was dismissed 
by the Appeal Committee in February 1980.  
41  At [121 (e)]. In the article, Mr Russell referred to commencing a new business to be named CM Ltd, which was 
described as one which ‘would concentrate on providing financial and management consulting services, 
particularly advice on investment opportunities, and it was not likely to deal in money as such.’ 
42  Mr Russell considered that he was in the business of advancing money at the time. He sought to write off losses 
made in that regard against his income and he argued this point before the Taxation Review Authority (TRA) in 
Case E31 (1981) 5 NZTC 59,204 (NZTRA) and in the High Court on appeal in Russell v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (1984) 6 NZTC 61,753 (HC). 
43  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35. 
44  At [122]. 
45  At [124].
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The Disciplinary Committee imposed costs of $500 against Mr Russell, and the Appeal Committee 
imposed further costs of $250. Mr Russell paid the costs orders, and then claimed a tax deduction 
for the same, as well as legal expenses totalling $1402.60. The claim was disallowed by the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Commissioner) with Mr Russell then unsuccessfully challenging 
the Commissioner’s decision by way of case stated.46  
Mr Russell established himself as an insolvency specialist, which is ironic considering that at 
Securitibank, he presided over what was then the largest corporate failure in New Zealand history. 
He has also become well known in the New Zealand tax community as the creator and defender of 
the ‘Russell tax template’, developed in the 1980s,  and described as a mechanism to turn the 
‘water’ of taxable receipts into the ‘wine’ of untaxed gains. Template-related issues are still being 
litigated some three decades later although it would appear that now in late 2012 the end of the 
litigation is in sight. 
46  At [124]. 
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C Overview of Thesis 
Initially the likely outcome of this thesis was a ‘black letter’ law analysis of Mr Russell’s most 
relevant litigation from a jurisprudential perspective. I had tried for several months to contact Mr 
Russell without success. On the last day of the 2009 working year I tried once again from my office, 
but only got the Commercial Management answer phone message. I headed home that afternoon for 
the Christmas break and thought I would give it ‘one more try’ from home. To my delight Mr 
Russell answered the phone. I introduced myself briefly and told him about my research idea 
which focused on his life and asked whether he would be interested to meet.
It was a lovely early Christmas present when without hesitation Mr Russell agreed and a time to 
‘meet and greet’ was arranged for early 2010. It was from the first meeting that I have enjoyed 
many times with Mr Russell including being his host in Christchurch in July 2011. I had organised 
for Mr Russell to be a guest at a lecture which was thoroughly enjoyed by students and staff. 
Figure 3: Mr Russell and the author at Mr Russell’s Kawakawa Bay home, 27 April 2010. 
This thesis not only captures aspects of ‘black letter’ law, but also captures the time in which certain 
events happened. The tax avoidance environment was undoubtedly different in the 1970s compared 
to what it is now in a post Ben Nevis47 environment. 
47  Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 115, [2009] 2 NZLR 289. 
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This thesis is a unique attempt at blending legal analysis and sociological aspects of tax compliance 
behaviour together. The thesis analyses the cases considered to best reflect Mr Russell’s legal  
journey, as well as providing the reader with a taste of how Inland Revenue perceived Mr Russell in 
the early 1990s, and why they were so concerned about the impact he could have had on the New 
Zealand tax base. Tax as a discipline is clearly multidisciplinary and this thesis attempts to capture 
the thoughts of Mr Russell as he has discussed aspects of his life in a very personal way. A socio-
legal approach, as discussed in the methodology section, was the one considered appropriate for this 
thesis. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter I provides an introduction and overview of the thesis 
topic. Chapter II discusses and supports the methodology chosen, as well as a review of tax specific 
methodology literature. This section also discusses the interviews held, both from their recording 
and transcription phases. Chapter III considers what is meant by the term ‘compliance’ in a tax 
context, with a brief discussion of the Inland Revenue Compliance Model and a focus on the ‘game 
player’ posture within this framework.   
This thesis attempts to capture a legal journey that transcends over three decades. It is recognised 
that times change, therefore an historical background to New Zealand tax avoidance law is provided 
in chapter IV, with a focus on the context of the 1980s, the time at which the Russell template was 
invented and marketed. Chapter V introduces the perceptions of Inland Revenue towards Mr 
Russell and illustrates in part why they were concerned for the New Zealand tax base as a result of 
Mr Russell’s activities. 
The so called Russell tax template may appear relatively straightforward diagrammatically. Chapter 
VI discusses how the template was first discovered by Inland Revenue, indirectly by way of a 
Department of Justice warrant issued for files located at Mr Russell’s Pakuranga property. 
Available tax losses were an integral part of the template scheme. The majority of losses utilised 
came from one source briefly referred to. In addition this chapter looks at a couple of cases that 
tested aspects of the template, referred to as ‘pre-template’ cases. The remainder of chapter VI 
introduces the first two template cases, both known as ‘Track A’ assessment route cases where the 
profit company was initially assessed, but with the ‘cupboard being bare’. In essence the company 
was stripped of its assets. 
The ‘Track B’ cases, also discussed in Chapter VI, where the shareholders of the profit company 
were to be taxed are discussed next. The most well-known ‘Track B’ case is that of the Miller and 
O’Neil family and their clothing manufacturing business based in Auckland. Mr Russell personally 
knew many of the template participants and the Millers and O’Neil’s were no exception. 
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Ultimately the template was held to be ‘blatant’ tax avoidance. 
After having limited success in assessing under the ‘Track A’ and ‘Track B’ route, Inland Revenue 
then embarked on a new approach claiming the ‘the whole thing is a sham’. Unfortunately for 
Inland Revenue the officers giving evidence on the Commissioner’s behalf had different ideas as to 
what ‘Track C’ was actually assessing. Chapter VII introduces a summary of the different track 
routes. This is a complicated part of the thesis with some litigation still on-going.   
Chapter VIII introduces perhaps the most controversial topic, that of whether Inland Revenue as an 
organisation have been conducting a vendetta towards Mr Russell purely motivated to destroy him, 
both by way of monetary penalty and public shame. Unreasonable requests for information, 
backtracks on settlement even years after the parties thought they had legitimately settled, and 
accusations of the wrong witnesses put on the stand to give evidence solely to frustrate Mr Russell’s 
case and add to the time and cost of litigation are considered in this chapter.  
Although Mr Russell is not alone in accusing Inland Revenue of abusing their power, he is perhaps 
unique in having the same Authority hear so many of his cases. When ‘Track E’, his personal 
assessment case was heard in the TRA by the same Authority as the substantial number of his 
client’s cases, he claimed that the outcome could be ‘predicted now’. Chapter IX considers the legal 
merits of judicial recusal in the insular New Zealand tax environment.    
Chapter X, the discussion chapter, considers Mr Russell’s impact on jurisprudence, both substantive 
and procedural. Being an investigative analysis it is clearly impossible to refer to all incremental 
contribution, in essence global comments are made. This chapter also considers Mr Russell’s 
impact on the general policy and procedure of Inland Revenue. 
This thesis discusses two distinct tax avoidance arrangements, as determined by the courts, namely 
the Russell tax template, and the related but yet distinct tax avoidance arrangement in relation to Mr 
Russell personally, specifically the ways the income attributed to Mr Russell’s group of companies 
was dispensed.  In no way was it intended to argue the merits of what may or what may not 
constitute tax avoidance with Mr Russell. The Privy Council confirmed in 2001 that the Russell 
template was blatant tax avoidance.48 
This thesis not only traces some of the legal journey that Mr Russell has endured, but also seeks to 
capture and understand what drives a person to continue for so many years in litigation. Often the 
48  This phrase was used in Case R25 (1994) 16 NZTC 6,120 (NZTRA) and confirmed in O’Neil v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
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drive comes from a person who truly believes in their ‘cause’; otherwise the stamina to continue 
would soon be exhausted. Why did Mr Russell not just ‘walk away’ from it all several years ago to 
enjoy a more peaceful retirement? It is easy to dismiss Mr Russell as someone who has just ‘tried it 
on’ with tax laws and lost, but this thesis reveals that his story is just not that simple. Rather, it
reveals that he was a person who invented his template in a time prior to any significant tax 
avoidance litigation and even though this is no excuse, it is easy to see how a tax structure designed 
in a pre-Challenge49 environment was initially justified by Mr Russell. 
Chapter XI sought to capture Mr Russell’s concluding reflections, and whether he held any regrets. 
Chapter XII documents future research topics that have become apparent as a result of this 
investigative thesis. Finally chapter XIII provides a brief conclusion. 
A Bibliography and Appendices conclude the thesis, with a redacted copy of the template 
documents that have been the source of so much litigation. The template documents were 
essentially the same for all applications.  
49  See Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 2 NZLR 513 (HC); (1984) 6 NZTC 
61,807; (1984) 8 TRNZ 1; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 513 
(CA); (1986) 8 NZTC 5,001 and Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd, above n 24.  This 







This thesis essentially adopts a ‘black letter’50 analysis of several of the more prominent cases 
surrounding the ‘Russell template’. The cases selected are the ones that illustrate Mr Russell’s legal 
‘journey’ most clearly and are relevant to be included in a thesis of this nature. It is not an in-depth 
chronological condensation of all of his cases. 
A black letter discourse of the cases and any incremental jurisprudential development alone would 
not provide the richness that is found by including the views of Mr Russell on the events discussed.
It is recognised that the narrative is from Mr Russell’s perspective in many places. This has been 
‘balanced’ by both internal Inland Revenue documents and case law. 
Mr Russell was interviewed by way of a series of semi-structured interviews where generally a few 
specific questions were asked and then followed Mr Russell’s ‘tangents of thought’ with 
interviewer probes. Mr Russell was initially interviewed at his home in Kawakawa Bay, in part to 
have him at ease in his own surroundings, but also to be able to see him by fitting in with his
busy litigation schedule. He was also able to locate various documents from his home office that 
I was hoping to have access to such as the template documentation, 
 The initial schedule of questions is contained in the appendix of this thesis; 
however, the digital voice recordings of the interview (held on file) show that many tangents were 
taken at times. 
I sought to capture Mr Russell’s oral history by way of narrative, getting him to express his personal 
experiences and feelings related to him growing up from a young age, through his early career, the 
Securitibank days, the interaction with Inland Revenue over the years, and the toll that the litigation 
has taken on him and his family. As can be appreciated a tremendous amount of material obtained 
during the interviews is well beyond the scope of this thesis and will be used in further research.  I 
was also fortunate to be able to interview Mr Russell formally in a recording studio at the 
University of Canterbury in July 2011.51 
50  A ‘black letter’ approach is typified by the systematic process of identifying, analysing, organising and synthesizing 
statutes, judicial decisions and commentary. 
51  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1.  Even with all the best of intentions in planning Mr Russell’s visit to the 
University of Canterbury unfortunately due to heavy snowfalls in Christchurch Mr Russell had to spend hours 
patiently waiting at the Auckland Domestic Airport terminal. Although our interview time
was shortened essentially by one full day, the time in Christchurch with Mr Russell was very fruitful.  
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A difficulty with this research was that I had the transcripts from conversations with Mr Russell and 
then, due to the huge number of cases, I had to locate the most relevant cases to tell the story and 
relate back to the transcript. Initially, and somewhat optimistically, it was thought that an overall 
synopsis of Mr Russell’s litigation, although a big task, would be quite manageable. Anything 
concerning the Russell litigation is anything but that. The inability to access any information from 
Inland Revenue, due to s 81 Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA 1994) secrecy provisions, meant 
that care had to be taken to confirm any statements or claims made during the interviews with a 
court case to verify what was claimed. Mr Russell has been very forthcoming in his conversations 
with me and every issue referred to in the transcripts has been able to be verified to some degree
by way of triangulation, either by reading through the relevant court cases or other documentation.  
Another difficulty with this thesis has been the on-going nature of the litigation.52  Some case
issues have been complex and although procedural issues have not been thoroughly examined 
in this thesis; nevertheless procedural issues have permeated many of the substantive tax cases 
considered. By way of example in the FB Duvall litigation there were seven interim 
judgments issued by Baragwanath J on various procedural matters.  It has been a deliberate choice
to confine much of the case law mentioned to explain the ‘story’ of the tax template from a 
substantive tax perspective. 
Due to the vast number of cases centered on Mr Russell’s tax activities, this thesis has attempted to 
provide the reader with an understanding of the ‘story’ of Mr Russell and the tax template. It is 
simply not feasible to consider every Russell related case in its entirety.  
Probably the biggest difficulty with this thesis has been to limit the content. The first draft version 
written contained in excess of 100,000 words and still more and more was being uncovered during 
discussion with Mr Russell and analysing the cases, as well as the on-going litigation. It seemed that 
every time I asked one question of Mr Russell his answer would sometimes raise five more
questions to be considered. My principal supervisor was amenable to the thesis word count 
exceeding 70,000 words due to the richness of the material that was forthcoming.  
A highlight has also been to attend several court hearings, (both the High Court and Court of 
Appeal), and hear Mr Russell present his case clearly and calmly.
53 
52  By way of illustration in August 2012 the statutory criteria for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was not 
established by Mr Russell in Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] NZSC 73, (2012) 25 NZTC 20,140. 
This was the latest case in the Track E litigation spanning tax years from 1985 to 2000. In late December 2011 in FB 
Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2011) 25 NZTC 20,101 (HC), a judicial review case, where FB 
Duvall were held to have established grounds for judicial review with the Commissioner ordered to reconsider their 
refusal to accept late GST objections from FB Duvall Ltd. Her Honour Ellis J reserved leave to the plaintiffs in 
respect of a s 99(4) ITA 1976 matter. The FB Duvall litigation stemmed from GST periods dating back to 31 August 
1987. In December 2012 in Douglas v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] NZCA 486, the Court dismissed an 
appeal in template related litigation addressing amended assessments dated back to 1993. 
53
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 Appendix 1 contains the 
initial letter sent to Mr Russell in 2010 by the author. Appendix 2 contains the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics approval for this research. 
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B Conducting Legal and Tax Research - A Review of the Literature 
Lamb54 argues that tax is not a discipline in itself but rather a multidisciplinary field of research, or 
clustering of research interests. Tax is a social construct that can be studied through many and 
various disciplinary lenses. In seeking to understand almost any aspect of taxation, we need to bear 
in mind that it is much more than the study of the revenue law itself.  A socio-legal approach is 
supported by Cane and Kritzer.55  
Legal researchers may be well qualified to study the meaning of the ‘letter of the law,’ but find that 
they are not so well equipped to study how people respond to the law.56 Doctrinal research is the 
traditional or ‘black letter’ approach, whereas on the other hand, non-doctrinal research according 
to Pearce et al, is research ‘about law’ rather than ‘in law’.57 Pearce et al contend that non-doctrinal 
research conduct and design should be more consistent with approaches used in other disciplines 
and that data should not be limited to traditional legal resources.  
Salter and Mason58 support the existence of a distinction between doctrinal and non-doctrinal legal 
research, and argue that the two approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive. The existence of 
more than one acceptable approach to research within the discipline of law can provide 
opportunities for researchers to design and conduct research that makes a worthwhile contribution 
to the body of knowledge.  
A particular reason justifying the research approach to this thesis is supported by Salter and 
Mason.59 They state that students considering alternatives to the adoption of a purely black letter 
approach to the conduct of dissertation research might want to explore the implications of Professor 
Roger Cotterell’s claim that: 60 
54  M Lamb, “Interdisciplinary Taxation Research – An Introduction” in M. Lamb, A. Lymer , J. Freedman and S 
James (eds), Taxation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) as cited 
in Margaret McKerchar, Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting, (Thomson Reuters/Lawbook 
Co., Sydney, 2010) at [1.50]. 
55  Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) at 1018. 
56   McKerchar, above n 54, at [1.50]. 
57  D. Pearce, E. Campbell and D. Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth 
Tertiary Commission (AGPS, Canberra, 1987) at 309 as cited by McKerchar, above n 54, at 9 describes doctrinal or 
typical ‘black letter law’ research as ‘typified by the systematic process of identifying, analysing, organising and 
synthesising statutes, judicial decisions and commentary. It is usually a library-based undertaking, focused on 
reading and conducting intensive, scholarly analysis as good lawyers are aptly trained to do.’  
58  M. Salter and J. Mason, Writing Law Dissertations, An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal Research, 
(1st ed, Pearson Education Ltd, Essex, 2007) as cited by McKerchar, above n 54, at 9. 
59  M. Salter and J. Mason, Writing Law Dissertations, An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal Research, 
(1st ed, Pearson Education Ltd, Essex, 2007) at 40. 
60  Roger Cotterell, Law’s Community (Oxford: OUP, 1995) at 296,314 as cited in M Salter and J Mason, above n 59, at 
119.
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All the centuries of purely doctrinal writing on law has produced less valuable knowledge 
about what law is, as a social phenomena, and what it does than the relatively few decades of 
work in a sophisticated modern empirical socio-legal studies…Socio-legal scholarship in the 
broadest sense is the most important scholarship presently being undertaken in the legal world. 
Its importance is not only in what it has achieved, which is considerable, but also in what it 
promises.  
Furthermore, Hutchinson61 asserts that the discipline of law is changing to a more outward-looking 
focus encompassing interdisciplinary approaches to research. As a methodological approach, 
doctrinal research is typically based on the ‘black letter’ (or literal analysis) of formal legal rules 
and principles. It tends to rely on a distinctly deductive form of legal reasoning and on the 
researcher’s ability to develop arguments and provide reasoning’s that are based on the law (which 
includes case law).62 This is achieved by providing ‘a detailed and highly technical commentary 
upon, and systematic exposition of, the content of legal doctrine’.63 In spite of the fact that doctrinal 
legal research is still regarded as the norm by many legal researchers, there is evidence of the 
softening of the traditional boundaries.64 This is attributed to a growing recognition that law is a 
social construct and does not exist in a doctrinal vacuum.65  Hutchinson describes jurisprudence, the 
theoretical, philosophical approach to legal research, as lacking relevance to the real world.66 
Research is about discovery. McKerchar writes that “[research] is rarely about truth, because 
realistically there is no single absolute truth.”67 It is virtually impossible to find unambiguous 
explanations for human behaviour. McKerchar concedes that “perhaps the one absolute truth is that 
people are very complex beings.”68 Research shapes who we are and the society we live in. While 
research in tax, law and accounting can still be scientific, it would perhaps more accurately fall into 
the category of social science since tax, law and accounting are social constructs rather than 
elements of nature.69 
61  T. Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters/Lawbook Co., Sydney, 2010) at 11 as 
cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 9. 
62  McKerchar, above n 54, at 115. 
63  M. Salter M and J. Mason, above n 59, at 49. 
64  McKerchar, above n 54, at 116. 
65  T. Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (3rd ed, Lawbook Co., Sydney 2010) at 7 as cited in McKerchar, 
above n 54, at 116. 
66  At 116. 
67  McKerchar, above n 54, at 11. 
68  At 11. 
69  At 14. 
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The traditions of research theory are neither uniform, universally accepted nor fixed.70 Legal 
positivism is well recognised within the discipline of law as contributing to jurisprudence or the 
understanding of the philosophy of law.71 Doubts about positivism have been expressed by both 
accounting72 and law researchers. In respect of the law, researchers have argued that positivism fails 
to address the moral power of law to make people obey the obligations so created.73 Therefore, 
while positivism is relevant to doctrinal or black letter law, it is perhaps inappropriate for socio-
legal research which requires an understanding of people’s behaviour.74 McKerchar writes that it is 
true that the body of literature on research design is focused heavily on the sciences and social 
sciences and is considerably less relevant to the discipline of law. In terms of paradigms, 
McKerchar states that it is reasonable to posit that legal research could be anywhere on a continuum 
from the objectivity of positivism to the subjectivity of interpretivism.  
In terms of methodological approach, a case study generally involves a researcher undertaking an 
in-depth exploration of a program, an event, an activity, or a process concerning one or more 
individuals. The case is usually bound by time and activity and the researcher collects detailed 
information using a variety of data collection procedures.75  
This thesis is an extensive case study comprising of several in-depth interviews with Mr Russell in 
his home, at the University of Canterbury when Mr Russell was flown to Christchurch, and an in-
depth analysis of documentation, 
A case study allows a researcher to perform a comprehensive analysis of a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context. Case studies are the ideal method for the ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
type research questions asked in this research.76 From an ontological perspective the author agrees 
that reality is socially constructed, rather than objective and external to the subjects and the 
researcher.77 It is impossible to be separated from the subject under study, and reality can only be 
objectified through human interaction when people engage and ascribe meaning to it. From an 
70  At 67.
71  J. Coleman, “Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism” (2009) 22(3) Ratio Juris 359 and S. Perry, “Beyond the 
Distinction Between Positivism and Non-Positivism” (2009) 22(3) Ratio Juris 311 as cited in McKerchar, above n 
54, at 72. 
72  Gaffikin argues that positivism and its reliance on scientific method restricts (rather than extends) the search for 
knowledge, particularly in the development of theory. See M. Gaffikin, “Being in Accounting for a Time”  in J. 
Baxter and C. Poullaos, Practices, Profession and Pedagogy in Accounting (Sydney University Press, Sydney, 2009) 
as cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 73. 
73  S. Perry, “Beyond the Distinction Between Positivism and Non-Positivism” (2009) 22(3) Ratio Juris 311 as cited in 
McKerchar, above n 54, at 73. 
74  McKerchar, above n 54, at 73. 
75  J. Cresswell, Research Design (2nd ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2003) at 15 and F. Fowler, Survey Research Methods 
(2nd ed, Sage, Newbury Park, 1993) at 11 as cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 102.
76  R.K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3rd ed, Sage Publications, Beverley Hills, 2003) at 26. 
77   Wai Fong Chua, “Radical Developments in Accounting Thought” (1986) 61 The Accounting Review 601. 
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epistemological perspective it is the author’s belief that the researcher is part of the knowledge 
discovery process. Consequently, the author believes that the knowledge created is based on the 
researcher's own subjective interpretation of the social world as coloured by the researchers
own views, personal experiences, existing knowledge and beliefs. 
Narrative research examines the experiences of individuals as told in stories.78 Clandinin and 
Connelly describe narrative research as a way of understanding the world based on the view that life 
is ‘filled with narrative fragments that are enacted in storied moments of time and space.’79  
Narrative research seeks to interpret or make meaning of an individual’s life experience, both over a 
period of time and as a whole.80 Where stories are told in person, the relationship between the teller 
and the researcher is very important. The teller, in this case, Mr Russell, places a great deal of trust 
in the researcher who, in turn, assumes a great deal of responsibility. 
McKerchar states that a story told in narrative research has three important characteristics that need 
to be understood. First, the story as told to the researcher may contain elements of both fact and 
fiction as it is recollected from the perspective of the teller and may possibly be ‘muddled’.81 
Secondly, the story is usually told in a specific social context and for a particular purpose.82 It is not 
necessarily the ‘whole truth and nothing but the truth’. It is ‘truth’ as perceived (or at least 
conveyed) by the teller and to a lesser degree what is interpreted by the researcher in the exchange.  
McKerchar writes that “even if there does appear to be evidence (implicit and/or explicit) of causal 
relationships in the story told, given these two important characteristics, the researcher needs to 
exercise care in the formulation of meaning”.83 Thirdly, the story told is effectively retold by the 
researcher, so the end result is a collaborative piece of work that combines views from the life of 
the individual (or subject), as the story is relived, with those of the researcher.84 In retelling the 
story the researcher needs to be mindful of any relevant ethical considerations, including the 
sensitivity of the story and who may be hurt in the telling.85 
78  P. Liamputtong, Qualitative Research Methods (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005) at 111 as cited 
in McKerchar, above n 54, at 112. 
79  D.J. Clandinin and F.M. Connelly F. M, Narrative Inquiry: Experience and Story in Qualitative Research (Jossey-
Bass, San Francisco, 2000) at 17 as cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 112. 
80  At 112. 
81  At 113. 
82  J. Elliott, Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Research (Sage Publications, London, 
2006) at 15 as cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 113. 
83  McKerchar, above n 54, at 113. 
84  D.J. Clandinin and F.M. Connelly, Narrative Inquiry: Experience and Story in Qualitative Research (Jossey-Bass, 
San Francisco, 2000) at 71 as cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 113. 
85  At 113. 
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It is important to mention my own personal bias limitation in this thesis. In the telling of events to 
me I have interpreted what has been said naturally with my own bias. I have sought to clarify every 
statement made where a legal case has been referred to, to analyse the material from more than one 
source. I have developed a friendship with Mr Russell, and appreciate his sense of humour. I have 
attempted to always balance what has been said to me by Mr Russell with factual material such as 
case law, or other documentation. I have attempted to maintain professional distance. 
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C Interviewing Mr Russell 
“…once a story is told, it cannot be called back. Once told, it is loose on the world. So 
you have to be careful with the stories that you tell. And you have to watch out for the 
stories that you are told.”86
Minichiello et al87 explain the primary focus of an in-depth interview is to understand the 
significance of human experience, as described from the interviewee’s perspective and interpreted 
by the interviewer. Patton88 describes this as finding out what is going on in someone’s mind. Some 
of this interpretation will be based on what was said, but the researcher has to also observe and 
interpret what was not said, using clues such as body language, eye contact, reactions, innuendo and 
so forth. Liamputtong and Ezzy89 describe a good interview as resembling a good conversation with 
a two way flow of dialogue where the interviewer asks questions, actively listens, responds and 
encourages the interviewee to open up and share more of their experiences.  
The planning of the interviews with Mr Russell was restrained by distance with Mr Russell being 
based outside of Auckland, increasing travel costs for the interviewer. The initial interviews were 
conducted at Mr Russell’s home where he was more likely to be relaxed in situ, as well as having 
access to material that he may wish to refer to. The interviews were quite lengthy time wise, usually 
recordings were for well over an hour, with upwards of five to six hours per day, although Mr 
Russell at numerous times stressed that he was fine with that. The first interview was a ‘meet and 
greet’, building trust for the subsequent interviews. The interviews at Kawakawa Bay were recorded 
by way of voice recorder; the later interviews at the University of Canterbury were in a more formal 
setting and recorded on DVD.  
A formal style of interview, as advocated by Patton,90 is where the interviewer builds rapport, but 
remains neutral in respect of the content of what is being discussed. Fontana and Frey91 argue that 
neutrality is not only unnecessary, but almost impossible for the interviewer to achieve.  
86  T. King, The Truth about Stories: A Native Narrative (Anansi Press, Toronto, 2003) at 10. 
87  V. Minichiello, R. Aroni and T. Hays, In Depth Interviewing (3rd ed, Pearson Education, Sydney, 2008) at 11 as 
cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 154. 
88  M.Q. Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3rd ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2002) at 341 as cited in 
McKerchar, above n 54, at 154. 
89  P. Liamputtong, and D. Ezzy, Qualitative Research Methods (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005) at 
55 as cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 154. 
90  M.Q. Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3rd ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2002) at 365 as cited in 
McKerchar, above n 54, at 157. 
91  A. Fontana and J. Frey, “The Interview: From Neutral Stance to Political Involvement” in N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln 
(eds), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2005) at 696 as cited in 
McKerchar, above n 54, at 157. 
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I have enjoyed the time I have spent with Mr Russell, both initially interviewing him at his home in
Kawakawa Bay, but also having him come to Christchurch for the formal interviews and being a 
guest lecturer in a third year Advanced Taxation class. I have also spent time with Mr Russell in the 
Court of Appeal92 ‘Track E’ case, purely as a passive observer. It is only natural as a concomitant of 
spending time in this manner that one sees the impact of the on-going litigation on Mr Russell. 
Consequently, one can hardly remain neutral in relation to the personal toll.
There are clearly different approaches to questioning in an interview. Patton93 identified 
different types of questions that could be asked in an interview, including those about 
experience and behaviour, those about opinion and values, and questions about the background 
and demographics that may help the researcher understand the situation of the interviewee. Patton 
explains that it may be useful to consider how the dimensions of time (past, present and future) 
may intersect with several types of questions: how the interviewee felt in the past; how they feel 
now; and how they might feel in the future.94 This type of questioning flowed from the 
interviews with Mr Russell naturally. Mr Russell emphasized certain aspects in our interviews
and cases that he considered important, issues such as the alleged vendetta, the impact of the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 and s 6 TAA 1994, where he felt he had made the most contribution to
legal jurisprudence. 
Liamputtong95 emphasizes the importance of setting the scene and building trust for the interview 
and to allow the interviewee to talk at length and to choose where to begin and which parts of 
the story to emphasize. This came naturally with Mr Russell. It was also prudent to reflect back
after the substantive interviews and check that the main responses and interpretations were 
understood. Mr Russell was very patient and clear in telling his story. 
A semi-structured interview can be challenging for a researcher, to simultaneously listen to what is 
said (and what is not said), observe what is seen, make notes that capture the essence of the data, 
and still ‘manage’ the conversation.96 Analysing qualitative data is as much an art as it is a 
science.97  
92   Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 32. 
93  M. Q. Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3rd ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2002) at 348 - 351 as 
cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 157. 
94  The other questions identified by Patton included those about knowledge and the senses, such as what the 
interviewee sees or hears. 
95  P. Liamputtong, Qualitative Research Methods (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 2009) at 47 and 52 as 
cited in McKerchar, above n 54, at 157. 
96   McKerchar, above n 54, at 195. 
97  At 212. 
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Narrative analysis is used to present a chronologically linked chain of events in which one or more 
individuals have had an important role. It is used to extract a story from qualitative data.98 There are 
three tools used in narrative analysis: path dependency, periodisation and historical contingency. 
These tools help the researcher decide how to make sense of the data and present the story in a 
meaningful way. Path dependency is used to explain a chain of events (such as tax reform 
or jurisprudence over time, both of which are applicable to the Russell story) where one event 
has triggered another. It usually begins with an outcome and then traces backwards to demonstrate 
how one event affected another. 
Periodisation is a tool often used by historical comparative researchers who, in order to tell their 
story, group data into what they regard as significant and distinctive time periods in the context of 
the development of a particular theory or concept. Historical contingency is a tool of narrative 
analysis whereby a unique and unexpected historical event is studied to understand why it occurred. 
These tools are both useful in the context of the Russell story. The prevalence of mass marketed tax 
avoidance schemes is an example of where historical contingency qualitative analysis would be 
useful and periodisation is a useful tool to see the changing attitudes to tax avoidance since the early 
1960s to the present day.   
This thesis has attempted to capture Mr Russell’s story from his early beginnings, to his success and 
the ultimate failure of Securitibank, then the journey from the start of Commercial Management to 
the final days of template related litigation some three decades later. All the while attitudes to tax 
avoidance underwent a sea change since the pre-Challenge days. 
Mr Russell was subsequently interviewed and professionally filmed at the University of Canterbury 
in late July 2011. The recordings are going to form part of a DVD that will be used in future third 
year, and Honour’s university programme classes. Although there was a formality to the recordings 
being under professional conditions, the rapport previously built up with Mr Russell made for the 
interviews to flow well from the outset, in a relaxed and informative fashion. I have spent many 
hours listening to these professionally recorded DVDs.  
A copy of the draft questions for the 2010 Kawakawa Bay interviews are in the appendix of this 
thesis as Appendix 3. 
98  W. Neuman, Social Research Methods (6th ed, Pearson education, Boston, 2006) at 476 as cited in McKerchar, 
above n 54, at 231-232. 
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D The Transcription of the Interviews  
The interviews conducted at Mr Russell’s Kawakawa Bay home were all digitally audio recorded 
and I personally transcribed the recordings upon my return to my office. To provide an insight into 
the length of the interviews, the Kawakawa Bay interviews alone once transcribed were in excess of 
92,000 words. This took a substantial amount of time; however, it also allowed me to reflect once 
again on what Mr Russell had told me. It also provided the platform to base further questions. It was 
invaluable to be able to do this as so much was covered in each interview. Liamputtong99  describes 
the in-depth interview as an exciting method for undertaking strong and valuable research.  
A semi-structured interview has its main strength is its flexibility, in that the questions are not fixed 
and there is the opportunity to probe and clarify meanings. It must always be remembered that the 
interviewer is being told what the interviewee wants to tell the researcher and care has to be taken 
that for various reasons, what is told may not always be true. With regard to Mr Russell I validated 
his comments made during the interviews with reference to relevant case law or other documents 
where appropriate. 
As part of my research I also attended a High Court hearing Russell v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue100 (Track E litigation) before Wylie J in the Auckland High Court in late July and early 
August 2010. Mr Russell was unable to attend this particular hearing due to being in hospital 
recovering from back surgery. I was fortunate to be able to spend time talking to Inland Revenue 
counsel, as well as Mr Russell’s legal advocate, Mr Simon Judd.101 In February 2012 I was able to 
attend the ‘Track E’ Court of Appeal case Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue102 where Mr 
Russell presented his own case calmly and clearly. It has been noted that Mr Russell is very affable 
in the courtroom. 
Qualitative research is not about seeking one absolute truth, but a portrayal of an experience, culture 
or phenomenon that is acknowledged as subjective. In this thesis it is the experience of a taxpayer 
and his interaction with a powerful revenue authority (Inland Revenue) over a period of thirty years. 
I have sought to get a taxpayer perspective. 
99  P. Liamputtong, Qualitative Research Methods (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 2009) at 61 as cited in 
McKerchar, above n 54, at 161. 
100  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35. 
101  Mr Russell has been represented initially by Mr Bruce Grierson, then by Mr Gary Judd QC, and latterly by Mr 
Simon Judd, Gary Judd’s son. 
102  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 32. 
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E Limitations 
A clear limitation with this thesis is that Mr Russell’s cases span three decades and he has been 
involved in a substantial volume of litigation. 
 Mr Russell has (so far) been denied leave to the New Zealand Supreme 
Court. A difficulty with this thesis has been to consider the sheer volume of cases which are related 
to Mr Russell. 
Since 2005 there has been a significant amount of litigation headed towards a conclusion. It has
been difficult to consider which cases best tell Mr Russell's ‘story’, with so many cases to not
only choose from but also consider in detail. Getting the balance right over what to emphasize 
and expand on has been a challenge. Mr Russell has regarded aspects of the alleged vendetta 
towards him by Inland Revenue to be of significance, although the courts have held consistently 
that no vendetta has been established. I have therefore attempted to allow adequate coverage of 
issues raised during the interviews and have attempted to balance them as I have seen appropriate.  
Perhaps a limitation that became apparent as the thesis progressed was the continuing nature of the 
litigation. By way of example the FB Duvall litigation, which is still on-going, had its origins with 
tax periods audited by Inland Revenue in 1987. A significant amount of litigation has been based on 
minor procedural matters and it has been a mammoth task to say the least to separate the ‘wheat 
from the chaff’ at times in relation to certain litigation. The substantive ‘Track’ litigation, 
commencing with a court case under ‘Track A’ in 1990 is still on-going with ‘Track E’ finding 
somewhat of a conclusion in 2012, although Mr Russell has recently hinted at a ‘Track F’. The 
thesis has felt like a ‘moving target’ at times.  
One aspect that I particularly noted during the Christchurch interviews in July 2011 was that Mr 
Russell’s memories of earlier events were on occasion hard to recall, which is understandable due to 
not only the time that has passed, but also the large number of events that have transpired between 
him and Inland Revenue. I was surprised at how well Mr Russell could in fact recall earlier events. 
It is important to note that Mr Russell is now aged in his late 70s.  
On a personal note the toll of the Christchurch earthquakes has had a marked impact on this thesis 
from the perspective that in pre-earthquake days my office contained all of my research material for 
this thesis in one place. In February 2011 the Commerce Building where our offices were 
located had to be immediately evacuated with all material unable to be accessed for several
months. When the building had to be cleared it was scheduled to take place in the first week of the 
commencement of the second semester just prior to the start of our third year law course. All office 
material had to be hastily packed away with some material held in storage and some material 
simply packed in boxes and stored at home.  It is true to say that at times I have spent an inordinate
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amount of time simply just looking for material previously packed away, or having to source the 
material afresh. 
This thesis has survived a period of teaching in tents, Saturday morning tax lectures, ‘hot desking’ 
for several months, an open plan office for well over 12 months, and two colleagues being either 
seconded to other roles or on sabbatical/study leave. It has survived the absence of an academic 





III  Compliance 
A Introduction 
Mr Russell has been involved in a long running dispute with Inland Revenue for many, many years, 
perhaps longer than any other single Inland Revenue litigant. In fact, his litigation history with 
Inland Revenue spans more than three decades. Although this thesis has a distinct ‘black letter’ law 
component, it would not be complete unless the Inland Revenue Compliance Model103 was 
introduced, and an analysis of it considered in respect of Mr Russell and his unceasing motivation 
to keep battling with Inland Revenue. A question that ‘black letter’ analysis would fail to provide an 
answer to is an attempt to understand what it is that drives a person for so many years to remain in 
conflict with such a powerful regulatory body. However, first a definition of what is ‘compliance’ 
should be established. 
B What is Compliance? 
There is no universal definition of compliance104 in a tax context although it is usually cast in terms 
of the degree to which taxpayers comply with the tax law. This is not an easy concept to measure 
but one suggestion is that the degree of non-compliance may be measured in terms of the ‘tax gap’.
This represents the difference between the actual revenue collected and the amount that would be 
collected if there were one hundred per cent compliance. The basic concept of the ‘tax gap’ for non-
compliance has been held to be inadequate with both the definition and its measurement being far 
too simplistic for practical policy purposes as a successful tax administration requires taxpayers to 
cooperate in the operation of the tax system. 
Richardson and Sawyer105 considered the definition of compliance, referring to an earlier seminal 
review of the tax compliance literature at the time by Jackson and Milliron,106 who adopted the 
103 The Inland Revenue Compliance Model is based on the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) Compliance
Model. Originating in the Cash Economy Task Force (1998), the Compliance Model drew on the work of
regulatory scholars at the Australian National University (ANU) as well as on the vast literature on tax compliance. 
Consistent with this literature, the Task Force urged the ATO to better understand not only the business profiles 
of taxpayers but also the nature of the industry they belong to, the economic factors that impinge on that 
industry and society more broadly, and the psychological and sociological factors that frame taxpayers’ decisions or 
non-decisions about the actions they will take to meet their tax obligations (Valerie Braithwaite, “A New Approach 
to Tax Compliance” in Valerie Braithwaite (ed), Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
(Ashgate, Hants and Burlington, 2003). 
104  Rebecca Chieh Wu, “A Study on the Appropriateness for adopting ‘Universal’ Definitions for Tax Compliance and 
Non-Compliance: A New Zealand Case Study Approach”, (Master of Commerce thesis, University of Canterbury 
2012). 
105  M. Richardson and A.J. Sawyer, “A Taxonomy of the Tax Compliance Literature: Further findings, problems and 
prospects” (2001) 16 ATF 137 at 142. 
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definition of a compliant taxpayer as one who files an “accurate, timely and fully paid return 
without IRS enforcement efforts.”107 Richardson and Sawyer write that “although this definition 
allows for both intentional and unintentional compliance, it does not clarify whether the taking of an 
aggressive tax position on an ambiguous issue represents noncompliance if the revenue authority or 
courts fail to accept the treatment at a later date.”108 It could be assumed that Mr Russell, when 
filing his tax returns either for himself or on behalf of his clients, was taking a position, although 
aggressive, was not at that stage determined as non-compliance either by the revenue authority or 
by the courts. 
Roth, Scholz and Witte,109 provide a definition of compliance, which takes this issue into account: 
Compliance with reporting requirements means that the taxpayer files all required tax returns 
at the proper time and that the returns accurately report tax liability in accordance with the 
Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court decisions applicable at the time the return is 
filed. (emphasis added) 
The Roth, Scholz and Witte definition of compliance is favoured in many studies. James and 
Alley110 questioned whether ‘compliance’ refers to voluntary or compulsory behaviour. If taxpayers 
‘comply’ only because of dire threats or harassment, or both, this would not appear to be proper 
compliance even if one hundred per cent of tax was raised in line with the “tax gap” concept of non-
compliance. 
James and Alley rather optimistically suggest that it might be argued that successful tax 
administration requires taxpayers to comply willingly, without the need for enquiries, obtrusive 
investigations, reminders, or the threat or application of legal or administrative sanctions. They state 
that a more appropriate definition could therefore include the degree of compliance with tax laws 
and administration without the actual application of enforcement activity. 
James and Alley also discuss tax compliance in terms of tax evasion and avoidance, distinguishing 
the two in terms of legality.111 The authors write that ‘if taxpayers go to inordinate lengths to reduce 
106 B.R. Jackson and V.C. Milliron, “Tax Compliance Research: Findings, Problems and Prospects”, (1986) 5 Journal 
of Accounting Literature 125 at 130. 
107 M. Richardson and A.J. Sawyer, above n 105, at 142. 
108  At 142. 
109 JA Roth, JT Sholtz and AD Witte (eds), Taxpayer Compliance: An Agenda for Research, (Vol. 1, Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989a) at 21. For a general discussion of key tax compliance variables, see BR 
Jackson and VC Milliron, above n 106, at 126 - 146; M Richardson and AJ Sawyer, above n 105, at 145 - 150; and 
LM Tan and AJ Sawyer, “A Synopsis of Taxpayer Compliance Studies- Overseas Vis-à-Vis New Zealand” (2003) 
9:4 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 431 at 433 to 437. 
110 S. James and C. Alley, “Tax Compliance, Self-assessment, and Tax Administration in New Zealand – Is the Carrot 
or the Stick More Appropriate to Encourage Compliance?” (1999) 5 NZJTLP 3. 
111  At 3. 
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their liability this could hardly be considered ‘compliance’ either, suggesting such activities as 
including engaging in artificial transactions to avoid tax, searching out every possible legitimate 
deduction, and using delay tactics and appeals wherever this might reduce the flow of tax 
payments’.112 It is true that some taxpayers are very skilled at delaying the collection of tax through 
various appeals that can be lodged quite legitimately, such as judicial review. 
Even if these activities are within the letter of the law, James and Alley state that they are clearly 
not within the spirit of the law. They suggest that compliance might therefore, be better defined in 
terms of complying with the spirit, as well as the letter of the law. This definition would clearly be 
favoured by revenue officials; however, it is not a view shared by everyone and especially by those 
who believe there is almost a moral duty to avoid paying tax. James and Alley refer to Lord Clyde 
in Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services v CIR113: 
No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so to arrange his legal 
relations to his business or to his property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest 
possible shovel into his stores. 
James and Alley’s final definition of compliance was suggested to be: “the willingness of 
individuals and other taxable entities to act in accordance with the spirit as well as the letter of tax 
law and administration, without the application of enforcement activity”.114 James and Alley 
conclude that to the extent that there is such uncertainty in a tax system, it follows that tax 
compliance should follow the spirit of the law.  
112  At 9.
113  Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1929) 14 TC 754 at 763; 8 ATC 531. 
114  S. James and C. Alley, above n 110, at 8. 
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C The Inland Revenue Compliance Model 
115 
The Compliance Model used by Inland Revenue is based on a concept developed by regulatory 
scholars from the Australian National University,116 as well as on the vast research literature on tax 
compliance. Responsive regulation is a concept that entails administration of determinate law by 
officials who tailor their regulatory behaviour according to the compliance posture adopted by 
individuals subjected to the relevant  law.117  There  are  five  motivational  postures  that  
have  been  identified  as  being   important   in   the   context   of   taxpayer  compliance.   These   
are the deference postures of commitment and capitulation;118  and  the  defiance  postures  
of resistance,  disengagement  and   game   playing.119   At   an   individual   level,   compliance   
is  not a static, uncomplicated phenomenon. 
115 
116 Australian National University located in Canberra, Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Australia.
117 Burton, M., “Responsive Regulation and the Uncertainty of Tax Law – Time to Reconsider the Commissioner’s 
Model of Cooperative Compliance?” (2007) 5 eJournal of Tax Research 71. The fulcrum of the ‘responsive 
regulation model’ of tax administration is the proposition that tax law is determinate, such that ‘complying’ and 
‘non-complying’ taxpayers may be segregated and treated accordingly. Burton argues that this dichotomous model is 
problematic in at least some tax contexts, and considers the implications of legal indeterminacy for the 
cooperative compliance model. 
118 Commitment reflects beliefs about the desirability of tax systems and feelings of moral obligation to act in the 
interest of the collective and pay one’s tax with goodwill. In other words taxpayers are ready, willing and able to 
comply, are committed to meeting their obligations, have accepted that they have a responsibility to comply, 
consider there is a moral or ethical obligation to comply, and regulate their own compliance. Capitulation reflects 
acceptance of the revenue authority as a legitimate authority and the feeling that the revenue authority is a benign 
power as long as one acts properly and defers to its authority. This posture can relate to the ‘try to, but don’t always 
succeed’ attitude to compliance as taxpayers in this category do not actively resist the system, often require 
additional assistance to meet their obligations, try to get things right but often, through a lack of skills or knowledge, 
inadvertently get things wrong, and acknowledge that, if they cooperate with the revenue authority, the authority 
will try to assist them as much as they can. Valerie Braithwaite, Friedrich Schneider, Monika Reinhart and Kristina 
Murphy, “Charting the Shoals of the Cash Economy” in Valerie Braithwaite (ed), Taxing Democracy, above n 103, 
at 93, 97. 
119 Resistance reflects doubts about the intentions of the revenue authority to behave cooperatively and benignly towards 
those it dominates and provides the rhetoric for calling on taxpayers to be watchful, to fight for their rights, and to 
curb tax office power. This posture relates to taxpayers that ‘don’t want to comply’ and may hold an attitude that 
actively resists the self-regulatory system, try to avoid meeting their compliance obligations and believe that the 
revenue authority is actively pursuing people to ‘catch them out’ rather than helping them. The least pervasive 
postures in the community are disengagement and game playing. Both postures are regarded as reflecting a degree 
of generalised contempt for taxation or as Braithwaite (1995) states disenchantment with goals, not merely 
processes. Disengagement is the posture that is the least commonly endorsed. Past research in this area would also 
support the proposition that it appears to be the most difficult for regulators to manage. In contrast game playing 
demands engagement but not in a way welcomed by authority. Game players remain a small segment of the 
population, probably because the resources required to use the letter of the law to circumvent the spirit of the law are 
accessed through relatively elite groups. Valerie Braithwaite, Friedrich Schneider, Monika Reinhart and Kristina 
Murphy, ‘Charting the Shoals of the Cash Economy’ in Valerie Braithwaite (ed), Taxing Democracy, above n 103, at 
93, 97. 
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McKerchar writes that over the last 30 or so years a considerable body of literature has developed in 
the area of taxpayer compliance. Despite a great deal of research emanating from a wide variety of 
disciplines, very little is known about why people do, or do not, pay their taxes.120 People can move 
in and out of compliance, often through ignorance and apathy, rather than calculative design. The 
role of regulators is to keep taxpayers more ‘in’ than ‘out’. The Inland Revenue Compliance 
Model121 (see Figure 4) is a tool used to assist in this on-going process. 
Figure 4: Inland Revenue Compliance Model122 
A ‘cooperative compliance’ approach is a more modern way to ‘relate’ to taxpayers and is regarded 
generally as the approach adopted by Inland Revenue, where interaction is encouraged at each step 
of the process (in a dispute or audit interaction) in an attempt to find agreement or consensus and 
closure within legal parameters. The Compliance Model adopted by Inland Revenue in essence 
mixes both an economic deterrence model123 and fiscal psychology model124 together addressing tax 
enforcement in a least costly way. 
120  Margaret McKerchar, “Why Do Taxpayers Comply? Past Lessons and Future Directions in Developing a Model of 
Compliance Behaviour” (2001) 16 ATF 99. 
121  The Compliance Model is used by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) as well as other tax jurisdictions. 
122  The Compliance Model is also referred to as the ‘Compliance Triangle’ or ‘Compliance Pyramid’ due to its shape. 
Source: Inland Revenue Compliance Focus 2013-2013, www.ird.govt.nz. 
123  For further reading on the economic deterrence model see: M.G. Allingham and A. Sandmo, “Income Tax Evasion:
A Theoretical Analysis” (1972) 1 Journal of Public Economics 323; M.J. Graetz, J.F. Reinganum and L.L.Wilde, 
“The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement” (1986) 2 Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization 1;  S. Scotchmer and J. Slemrod, “Randomness in tax enforcement” (1989) 38 Journal 
of Public Economics 17;  J.C. Baldry, “Income Tax Evasion and the Tax Schedule: Some Experimental
Results” (1987) 42 Public Finance/ Finances Publiques 357. See also McKerchar, above n 120. 
124 For further reading on fiscal psychology models see: Y.D. Song and T.E. Yarbrough, “Tax Ethics and Taxpayer
Attitudes: A survey” (1978) 38 Public Administration Review 442;  A.D.Witte and D.F. Woodbury, “The Effect of 
Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance”  (1985) 38 National Tax Journal 1; R. Kidder and C. 
McEwen, “Taxpaying Behaviour in Social Context: A Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance” 
in J. Roth & J. Scholz (eds.) Taxpayer compliance (Vol. 2, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1989);  
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These definitions all are considering tax compliance from the position of the taxpayer, i.e. their 
filing and other legal obligations. What about the perspective of the taxpayer in relation to tax 
compliance? 
 Inland Revenue acting within the ‘spirit 
of the law’ would be interlinked with s 6 TAA 1994 with respect to taxpayer perceptions of the 
integrity of the tax system. There are several instances in this thesis where it may be questionable 
whether Inland Revenue were acting within the ‘spirit’ of the law to the best of their abilities. 
E. Kirchler, E. Hoelzl and I. Wahl, “Enforced versus voluntary compliance: The “slippery slope”
framework” (2008) 29 Journal of Economic Psychology 210.  See also McKerchar, above n 120.
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D The ‘Game Player’ 
125
1 Introduction 
 It is virtually impossible to find unambiguous explanations for human behaviour. 
As mentioned previously, perhaps the one absolute truth is that people are very complex beings.126 
The game player in a tax context would be no exception. 
127
Braithwaite’s128 theory has a fifth posture that is absent from having its own category in the 
Compliance Model. This posture is referred to as the ‘game player’. A ‘game player’ can sit 
anywhere along the Compliance Model continuum and is a subcategory within the four main 
attitudes. In other words, a customer (taxpayer) can be fully complying but, if the customer’s 
attitude is one of ‘winning’ against the tax system, then the customer may be considered to be a 
‘game player’. 
The attitudes that represent a ‘game player’ are customers/taxpayers that enjoy the challenge of 
‘winning’ against the ‘tax man’, do not necessarily think they are doing the wrong thing, often 
believe that they are fulfilling their social obligations, often operate within the bounds of the law, 
and, think they are good citizens. Game players are a unique group in that they can sit anywhere 
along the left side of the Compliance Model. Braithwaite states that game playing has not been 
125
126 McKerchar, above n 54, at 11. 
127
128 Valerie Braithwaite, “Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and Noncompliant Actions” in Valerie 
Braithwaite (ed.) Taxing Democracy, above n 103, at 15, 23. 
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examined in other regulatory contexts, emerging instead from discussions about posturing with tax 
officials and taxpayers. A person must have the ability to play the game, and have a masterful 
knowledge of tax law. 









131  In broad terms the assets possessed by the taxpayer at the beginning of the period under review is ascertained, the 
increase in assets (assets less liabilities) in each of the subsequent years is ascertained, and the taxpayer’s estimated 





Ambiguity surrounding what it means to comply with tax law, together with social divisions over 
the morality of taxation,135 has allowed the motivational posture of game playing to flourish. This 
posture is not easily managed by regulators because it focuses on the grey areas of tax law, areas 
where tax administrators are uncertain and taxpayers see opportunity. Taxpayers who game 
authorities, find clever ways of complying on strictly technical grounds while visibly thumbing their 
nose at the spirit of the law, hence, with tax avoidance which is a ‘grey’ area there is a natural 
tension between the regulator and regulatee.136 
In theory, a well-functioning regulatory pyramid would ‘nip the game playing posture in the bud’, 
through providing regulators and regulatees with opportunities for deliberation and clarification 
about what the law means at the pyramid base. Undoubtedly shared understandings of rules come 
about in other regulatory domains through such dialogic practices. Taxation, however, does not 
appear to have been so blessed. Braithwaite states that this is not the case with tax systems where 
legal complexity can befuddle even the most sophisticated players.137 Tax law is not only complex, 
but also unclear. The grey areas of law create confusion and uncertainty as well as opportunity for 
risk takers. Exploiting loopholes and avoiding obligations with some claim to legal protection is not 
captured in the motivational postures of commitment, capitulation, resistance or disengagement. 
These relationships lie beyond the bounds imposed by law, authority and expectations of 
compliance. This relatively new form of defiance tax authorities are grappling with internationally 
is reflected in a game playing posture. Braithwaite reflects:138   
Game playing can be seen in the court room with counsel not just arguing points of law but 
also challenging the authority of the other party, trying to make the other side look just a little 
less special, less influential, taking the ‘wow’ factor out of the opposing counsel. There is a 
real power struggle that will go on, they are always being deferential to the judge which kind 
of always fascinates me, the way that lawyers have a wonderful sense of authority and how to 
manipulate it actually. 
135  M.T. Crowe, “The Moral Obligation of Paying Just Taxes” [1944] The Catholic University of America Studies in 
Sacred Theology, No. 84 as cited in R.W. McGee, “Is Tax Evasion Unethical? (1994) 42 (2) University of Kansas 
Law Review 411. 
136  In a New Zealand context an example of tax avoidance cases that have complied on strictly technical grounds would 
include Ch’elle Properties (NZ) Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2004] 3 NZLR 274 (HC); 
Ch’elle Properties (NZ) Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2007] NZCA 256, [2008] 2 NZLR 342 (CA); 
Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 47; Accent Management Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2005) 22 NZTC 19,027 (HC); Accent Management Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue [2007] NZCA 230, (2007) 23 NZTC 21,323. 
137  Interview with Valerie Braithwaite, Professor at ANU, (the author, Canberra, 4 December 2008). 
138  Interview with Valerie Braithwaite, above n 137. 
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In relation to game playing in a court room context Mr Russell is regarded as an able advocate. 
139
140
Braithwaite141 states that regulators have caved in to embracing a mind-set that values compliance 
with the letter of the law, while ‘dropping the ball’ on maintaining standards of compliance with the 
spirit of the law.  
Braithwaite’s comment on ‘dropping the ball’ by regulators was also confirmed by His Honour 
Baragwanath J in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue142 In this case, his Honour referred to 
adhering to both the spirit and letter of the law by officers dealing with the Russell related issues. 
His Honour referred to an Inland Revenue staff member who had written a minute containing the 
words “[it] may not be entirely legal but may help stem the flow”143 referring to an allusion to 
attempt to deter accountants from involving their clients in the use of the Russell template business 
structure. His Honour noted that “such an attitude within the system of administering the legislation 
is troublesome” and that the author of the correspondence had “done a disservice to other officers 
who adhere to the spirit and letter of the law in performing their difficult task. The temptation to 
over react against conduct seen as anti-social must be curbed.”144 
Whereas commitment, capitulation and resistance involve acceptance of the authority of the tax 
authority, game playing, like disengagement, does not. Game playing differs from disengagement in 
allowing individuals to transcend feelings of alienation and powerlessness. When individuals are in 
game playing mode they are making an assault on the tax system and they expect to win. Game 
139
140
141 Interview with Valerie Braithwaite, above n 137. 
142 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1997) 18 NZTC 13,001 (HC) at 90. 
143 At 90. 
144 At 90.
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playing involves an appreciation of the intricacy of the tax law and delights in finding ways to 
circumvent its intentions. There is a commitment to the law above and beyond that made by most 
citizens, but the commitment is to the literal reading of the rule, not to the social goals that the law 
is meant to serve. Game playing involves a rejection of the citizen role in favour of the 
individualistic role of a defiant winner. Mr Russell has repeatedly stated that Inland Revenue and 
the courts should look at the words of the tax statutes, discounting judge made law.   
Game playing is not unique to the taxpaying context. It will be found in any situation where playing 
with the law is rewarding for individuals or groups.145 In the short term, game playing with 
authorities may yield positive results through educating and sharpening the skills of those charged 
with the responsibility of drafting legislation. But the costs are considerable. Once an authority has 
game playing in its backyard, it cannot allow itself to be too distant or aloof from those being 
regulated. Intelligence becomes vitally important to both sides as they try to outwit each other. 
146 147
Game playing may keep a regulatory authority ‘on its toes’, but it is also capable of inflicting 
enormous social damage. It is the very fact that the game is in play, not the winning or losing of the 
game that threatens the heart of a regulatory authority. Game playing is endless, bearing less and 
less relation to the problems that the legislature wants resolved, and focusing more and more on the 
technical details of the rules as they are created and recreated. Reversing or stopping the game is 
difficult because the game is so exclusionary; to understand ‘the play’ one must have the technical 
competence to work outside the traditional institutional square. This is true in respect of the Russell- 
related litigation as it has spanned over three decades with many issues argued solely on procedural 
grounds.  
Perhaps the greatest harm of game playing is to democracy itself. Game players create a protected 
and social vacuum for themselves that frees them from responsibility for the broader social 
consequences. Game playing is morally justified on the grounds of individuals asserting their 
freedom. Passing the tax burden to those less able to avoid it is tacitly endorsed as an acceptable 
practice. There are good reasons why game players segment their activities from those of 
citizenship. Game playing ‘jars’ with democratic goals and process. As such, game playing 
threatens the sustainability of the tax system at a fundamental level. 
145 Doreen McBarnet, “When Compliance is not the Solution but the Problem: From Changes in Law to Changes in





Braithwaite stated that it was unclear in the early subject discussions for her research whether or not 
game playing the system was a ‘pleasure or a curse’ for the taxpayers involved.149 Mr Russell, for 
example, has spent a large proportion of his time defending the template as being a valid tax 
structure. The research by Braithwaite made it apparent that for game players, voicing discontent 
with the system was unnecessary. Game playing was the posture of those whose sights were set on 
winning in their interactions with the tax system. The voice of discontent belonged to those who 
had lost or feared losing the competition.  
Multiple postures for a taxpayer can be validly held. Likewise postures can change. Braithwaite 
states that: 150 
There is evidence that those that are persistently resistant can go towards being disengaged or 
game players. They don’t start out as being disengaged or game players, but a grievance such 
as ‘they’ve got a vendetta against me’ may facilitate the change in posture. At some level a 
taxpayer does care that the tax authority have pursued him in this way, so there’s the 
resistance, there’s the component of resistance, but combined with that there’s something else, 
so with those postures of game playing and disengagement there’s often big ideological ideals 
and particular attitudes to that authority and I know what it is in the tax context and that is that 
it is driven by a desire to win at all costs, now in my more colourful moments I have called it 
narcissism, because I have sort of hinted at it in my own mind as something that is a bit, you 
know, a bit off.  That was wrong, that was prejudiced. (emphasis added)
Braithwaite has drawn on research that is highly quantitative to confirm the theories of posturing. 
Most people generally do not think that much about taxation. Responding to revenue authority 
requests is something that people do not spend time pondering over, they just get on with it and do 
it, or not, as the case may be. Perhaps the situation is different for Mr Russell as he has devoted 
about half of his time engaged in tax matters with Inland Revenue in recent years. 
All narratives of defiance are social. To justify defiance, a person will compose their narratives so 
that they are not villains. When a person practices defiance publicly, as has been the case of Mr 
Russell, they are inventing an identity that is attractive to them and to others; the defiance needs to 
be couched as strength of character or competent insight; such as standing up for a principle or the 
ability to foresee a disaster. In the process of self-legitimisation, people draw on shared norms and 
148
149 Interview with Valerie Braithwaite, above n 137. 
150 Interview with Valerie Braithwaite, above n 137. 
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values to make their defiance understandable to others, they want ‘public acceptability’, and ‘want 
to look right’. A fight against injustice is not an uncommon theme among those wishing to excuse 
or justify defiance and enrol sympathy for their cause. 
Mr Russell has stated very vocally that Inland Revenue are running a vendetta against him and has 
openly stated that he finds fighting Inland Revenue irresistible. When defiant individuals work to
establish their credibility in their own and others eyes, authorities work to strip those who are 
defiant of any justification for their action. Braithwaite writes that there are some institutions that 
almost everyone ‘loves to hate.’ Defiance can then come out of the closet, in some contexts even 
assuming heroic proportions.151 Such an institution learns to live with defiance in their communities 
of influence. Such an institution is taxation. In short, resistant defiance in the context of taxation is a 
cry for attention from the government, whereas dismissive defiance is a call for the state to look the 
other way, and accept the individual’s right to use ingenuity to circumvent tax law.  
Although Mr Russell claimed he had not seen the Inland Revenue Taxpayer Compliance Model 
prior to my first interview in 2010,152 it is evident that Mr Russell sees himself in a 
different position on the Compliance Model as opposed to that taken by Inland Revenue. 
Mr Russell, when questioned as to where he considered he sat on the Compliance Model’s attitude 
continuum, clearly without hesitation stated that he saw himself as ‘willing to do the right thing’ but 
considered Inland Revenue staff would have had a separate category for him well above the 
‘have decided not to comply’ category. When discussing the ‘pointy’ end of the 
Compliance Model Mr Russell adamantly stated that he would never condone evasive action in 
the tax environment by any of his clients.153   
One aspect of the Inland Revenue Compliance Model that became relevant when speaking with Mr 
Russell was that the Compliance Model fails to capture a taxpayer’s view of where they sit on it. 
151
152
153  Tax practitioners play an important role in tax compliance. Tax literature shows that they assist the government to 
enforce the law when it is unambiguous but assist taxpayers to exploit tax law when it is ambiguous. See L M Tan, 
“Taxpayers’ preference for type of advice from tax practitioner: A preliminary examination” (1999) 20 Journal of 
Economic Psychology 431. 
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The Compliance Model currently assigns a taxpayer with an ‘attitude to compliance,’154 with the 
appropriate strategy then assigned to the taxpayer. 
In the author’s opinion (after spending many hours with Mr Russell both in interviews and a court 
setting) Mr Russell does not display narcissistic tendencies, as one may have expected; rather Mr 
Russell appears to firmly believe in his tax positions taken and viewpoints on the legal merits of tax 
avoidance. It is important to note that a game player in this context is not necessarily a derogatory 
term. A game player can sit anywhere along the left hand side of the continuum of the Compliance 
Model.155 
Mr Russell’s reputation is clearly important to him. This may be why he seeks vindication that his 
template is justified. 
156
 Mr Russell was not prepared to let what he saw as an affront to his character 
pass without a fight.157   
154  The four attitudes to tax compliance are: ‘having decided not to comply’; ‘don’t want to comply; ‘try to, but don’t 
always succeed’; and ‘willing to do the right thing’.
155  The left hand side of the triangular diagram in the Compliance Model. 
156
Interview with Mr John Russell, subject of thesis, (the author, Kawakawa Bay, 29/ 30 April 2010). 
157  Hunt, above n 2, at 73.  
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There is limited research into the ‘game player’ in a tax context with reference to a particular 
person. There is no directly comparable taxpayer in Australia158 that would claim a vendetta has 
been run against him over many years like Mr Russell has in New Zealand. Indeed, it is difficult to 
record the exploits of actual game players in a revenue context. In part this is due to the secrecy 
laws surrounding taxation and unless reported in the media the ‘games’ are internally played 
between the relevant parties. 
158  One person perhaps regarded as an Australian extrovert game player is Mr Peter Clyne, a tax lawyer and financial 
consultant remembered as the man who took on the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). Mr Clyne was
regarded as Australia’s first tax ‘rebel’ with the Australian Taxation Office declaring ‘war’ on him and seeking to 
prove that he was evading tax, not simply minimising it. Mr Clyne stated to the Sydney Morning Herald that he 
had written 19 books, 14 of which were on the subject of tax avoidance, including one titled ‘New Adventures in 
Tax Avoidance’. Chapter 27 of this book explained that one might delay payment of tax by using the 
appellate courts. The Commissioner of Taxation sent Mr Clyne a tax bill of $1,242,037.58 for income tax payable 
for the years 1977 to 1980. Mr Clyne said “I indulged my sense of humour in sending in the 58 cents”. Mr Clyne 
also stated “sooner or later, the Commissioner, being immortal, may well get me.” Article about Mr Clyne in 
Sydney Morning Herald, August 3 1982 at 2. 
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Chapter IV 
Tax Avoidance – An Historical Perspective
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IV Tax Avoidance – An Historical Perspective 
A Background to Tax Avoidance in New Zealand 
Tax avoidance is in many ways a legally opaque topic. Avoidance of tax provisions is an outcome 
of the infinite struggle between the principles of legal certainty on one side and freedom of business 
activity on the other: between the legal form of the commercial operations and the substance of the 
aims pursued by taxpayers.159 The broad language used in s BG 1 ITA 2007,160 gives this provision 
an extremely wide theoretical ambit, which could lead to unintended consequences if it was 
interpreted literally.161 A natural uncertainty has existed in respect of some tax avoidance concerns 
but the courts have made it clear in Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue162 that ‘the courts should not strive to create greater certainty than Parliament has chosen 
to provide’. 
Paying taxes is almost antediluvian in nature, and likewise tax avoidance. In a New Zealand context 
the first reported income tax case on the anti-avoidance provision was the Timaru Herald Company 
Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes.163 The Commissioner lost and did not have recourse to the section 
again before the courts until the mid-1960s. Until relatively recently avoidance was not such a 
serious problem from the Commissioner’s point of view and he was content to rely on specific 
provisions designed to cover particular forms of tax avoidance. The upsurge in tax planning dates 
from the 1950s and was a product of higher tax rates which, with increasing affluence and inflation, 
were felt by more and more taxpayers as ever increasing reliance was placed on income tax, both as a 
generator of government revenue and as a means of serving wider and at the same time specific 
economic and social policies. 
The tax burden and the design of the tax system together provided a positive incentive for tax 
planning, and from the late 1950s, tax advisors set to work with enthusiasm. Faced with tax losses 
to the revenue, the Commissioner relied on new specific provisions. Within a span of 12 years, from 
the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, s 108 Income Tax Act 1954 (ITA 1954) (which later became s 99 
ITA 1976, then s BG 1 ITA 1994, 2004 and 2007) was argued four times in the Privy Council 
(the first being Newton v Commissioner of Taxation164 and in some 50 court cases and Board of 
Review (forerunner to the TRA) decisions in New Zealand. 
159 Marco Greggi, “Avoidance, Evasion and abus de droit: an (also linguistic) issue under European tax law”, (paper 
presented to Tax Research Network Conference, Sheffield, 2007) at 1. 
160  The general anti-avoidance provision s BG 1(1) ITA 2007 provides: ‘A tax avoidance arrangement is void as against 
the Commissioner for income tax purposes.’ The Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 contains a similar provision 
contained in s 76. 
161  New Zealand Taxation: Principles, Cases and Questions (Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at 1066. 
162  Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 47, at [112]. 
163  Timaru Herald Company Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes [1938] NZLR 978 (CA). 
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Tax avoidance is a problem for all modern tax systems. Wherever there are tax laws, it seems that 
people will find ways of manipulating those rules to reduce their tax liability. In order to combat tax 
avoidance, many countries have general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) that allow tax authorities to 
collect the amount of tax that would have been payable but for the existence of an avoidance 
arrangement.165 Section BG 1 is a general anti-avoidance provision. New Zealand has had a general 
anti-avoidance provision of some form in its tax legislation since 1891.166 Tiley regards the general 
anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) as a confession of failure.167 Tiley further states that ‘more 
specifically, it was difficult to see how a GAAR could deal with avoidance structured around 
specific rules and definitions.’168 This really is at the heart of the Russell template transactions, the 
actual words of the statute itself, tensioned with the spirit of the statute. Tiley continues, saying that 
“some see a GAAR as a way of shortening the statute book.”169  
Whether a GAAR exists or not in a tax jurisdiction, tax avoidance is dealt with by the tools 
available to the revenue authority. The Income Tax Act 2007 (ITA 2007) tax avoidance provision 
BG 1 (1) states that ‘a tax avoidance arrangement is void as against the Commissioner for income 
tax purposes.’ Part G ITA 2007 allows for reconstruction170 where the Commissioner may 
counteract a tax advantage that a person has obtained from or under a tax avoidance arrangement.  
Before voiding a tax avoidance arrangement two questions must be considered; firstly how is ‘tax 
avoidance’ defined, and secondly what is a ‘tax avoidance arrangement’? 
The definition of ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax avoidance arrangement’ both feature in this
thesis when considering the ‘Track’ litigation, especially ‘Track E’ where Mr Russell has 
claimed he personally received no tax advantage from the transactions considered. 
164  Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1958] AC 450 (PC). 
165  R. Prebble, “Tax Avoidance, Common Law & Civil Law: Comparative Approach” (2005-2006) 2 IJOTALFIPA 1. 
166  Section 40 of the Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1891 provided that any covenant or agreement that 
purported to alter the nature of an estate or interest in land for the purpose of defeating the payment of tax was void 
and of no effect. Section 40 of the Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1891 was based on s 62 of the Land Tax 
Act 1878, and was designed to prevent land owners from shifting the burden of tax onto their tenants.  Accordingly, 
s 40 was based on a transaction tax and was ‘exported’ into the first Income Tax Act, yet was an entirely 
different form of tax. 
167  J. Tiley, “Managing Tax Avoidance: Recent UK experience”, (Annual Lecture, Melbourne, August  2007).
168  At 1. 
169  At 1. 
170 GA 1 (2) The Commissioner may adjust the taxable income of a person affected by an arrangement in a way the 
Commissioner thinks appropriate, in order to counteract a tax advantage obtained by the person from or under the
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The legislative definition of tax avoidance is as follows:171 
tax avoidance includes – 
(a) directly or indirectly altering the incidence of any income tax:
(b) directly or indirectly relieving a person from liability to pay income tax or from a
potential or prospective liability to future income tax:
(c) directly or indirectly avoiding, postponing, or reducing any liability to income tax or any
potential or prospective liability to future income tax
This definition has been regarded as ‘deeply flawed’ and that the flaws are indicative of the elusive 
nature of the idea of tax avoidance and the consequent difficulty of legislating against it.172 A ‘tax 
avoidance arrangement’173 means: 
‘an arrangement, whether entered into by the person affected by the arrangement or by another 
person, that directly or indirectly –  
(a) has tax avoidance as its purpose or effect; or
(b) has tax avoidance as 1 of its purposes or effects, whether or not any other purpose or
effect is referable to ordinary business or family dealings, if the tax avoidance purpose or
effect is not merely incidental.’
Richardson J in BNZ Investments Ltd174 summarised the three key elements of s BG 1 ITA 1994 
(now ITA 2007) at 17,115: 
Line drawing represents the legislature’s balancing of the relevant public interest 
considerations. In terms of [s BG 1], that line drawing is directed to three elements, each of 
which contains its own limits. There must be an arrangement coming within the section. The 
arrangement must have a more than merely incidental purpose or effect of tax avoidance. And 
where those two ingredients are present, the assessable income of any person affected by the 
arrangement is adjusted so as to counteract any tax advantage obtained by that person from or 
under that arrangement. 
This thesis will indicate how difficult the ‘line drawing’ can be, both in a legislative sense, as well 
as a practical sense. The ‘Track A’ litigation attributed profit to companies stripped bare, so the 
advantage was assigned to the original company shareholders. Income was attributed to Mr Russell 
personally as also being a person affected by an arrangement, although he claimed he had not 
171  Section YA 1 ITA 2007. 
172 Sandra Eden and Judith Freedman, “Editorial: Special Issue on Overseas Judicial Anti-avoidance Developments” 
[2009] BTR 159 at 170. 
173  Section YA 1 ITA 2007. 
174 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 450 (CA); (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103 (CA). 
arrangement.  See also GA 1 (3), (4), (5), (6).  For all other purposes, an arrangement that is set aside for tax 
purposes is still valid between the parties to the transaction and any third party who is affected by it.
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personally benefited from the arrangement. Regardless of how tax avoidance is addressed in a 
jurisdiction, whether with a GAAR or without, it remains a heavily litigated area.175 
A number of New Zealand tax cases have been heard by the Privy Council (on appeal from the 
Court of Appeal).176 Their Lordships have in several instances overturned the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal decisions, including Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd177 
(Challenge). Challenge was the first New Zealand tax case that involved an arrangement that 
deliberately sought to take advantage of two specific provisions in the ITA 1976, which governed 
the carry forward and offsetting of tax losses between groups of companies. Previous cases 
essentially involved family arrangements and the general core provisions in the ITA 1976, which 
governed the calculation of allowable deductions and assessable income.178  
175 Tiley, above n 167, at 14. 
176 The Privy Council was described by Thomas J in a dissenting judgment at [70] in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
BNZ Investments Ltd, above n 174 as providing a ‘fecund breeding ground’ for dubious schemes to avoid tax, 
stating that the glosses, concepts, distinctions and doctrines had been exploited and had created a commercial 
environment in New Zealand in which tax avoidance had become a significant feature.  He considered the Privy 
Council had inhibited the Courts in examining the substance of a transaction. Peterson v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [2005] UKPC 5, [2006] 3 NZLR 433 (PC) was a 3:2 majority decision in favour of the taxpayers. 
This demonstrates the difficulty for the Court with addressing tax avoidance cases. Often the judgment is not 
unanimous. 
177 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 49. 
178 D. Dunbar, “Judicial Techniques for Controlling the New Zealand General Anti-Avoidance Rule: The Scheme and 
Purpose Approach, from Challenge to Peterson” (2006) 12 NZJTLP 324 at 343. 
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B The Challenge Case 
“But what can be seen is that in this most difficult area of tax law, what is and what is 
not acceptable to Inland Revenue can change over time.”179 
In an oblique way Mr Russell was connected to the Challenge tax avoidance litigation. This case 
has its own place in New Zealand tax jurisprudence, as it was one of the first cases where tax 
avoidance was analysed by New Zealand courts and subsequently by the Privy Council. The Court 
of Appeal finding for the taxpayer, the Privy Council overturning that decision with a judgment180 
that has been regarded as a ‘gut response’ by the Law Lords.181 
Mr Russell’s connection to the Challenge case is that he had registered and set up a company called
Merbank Corporation Ltd (Merbank), the company at the heart of the Challenge transaction.  
Merbank was a member of the Securitibank group. The Securitibank group was in liquidation with 
the liquidator seeking advice from a tax advisor182 to the group about the possibility of finding a 
buyer for a company with large tax losses,183 considering it may be attractive to a prospective 
purchaser.184 After approaching a number of major public companies without success, eventually 
interest in a purchase was kindled with Challenge Corporation. 
179 Brendan Brown, “The moving goalposts of tax avoidance” (24 February 2012) New Zealand Lawyer 15. 
180 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd, above n 24. 
181 The Challenge Privy Council decision was a 4:1 judgment. The majority judgment was a ‘pure gut’ response. There 
was very little detailed analysis, and the court paid little attention to the grounds and analysis in the decisions in 
favour of the taxpayer at the High Court and Court of Appeal. All cases referred to were United Kingdom cases. 
There was no discussion of the New Zealand cases including previous Privy Council decisions on the predecessor to 
s 99 ITA 1976. 
182  Mr Wilson of Barr, Burgess and Stewart. 
183  Challenge Corporation Ltd knew the group of companies it owned would achieve a substantial profit for the income 
year about to end on 31 March 1978.  Securitibank had collapsed spectacularly in 1976 and in 1977 Mr William 
Wilson, a chartered accountant and at the time a partner in the firm Barr, Burgess and Stewart, was acting as a tax 
advisor to the then liquidator of the Securitibank group. The liquidator advised Mr Wilson that one of the companies 
involved in the Securitibank collapse, Kelmac Property Consultants Ltd (Kelmac), had incurred a substantial loss for
the year ending 31 March 1978. Mr Wilson was asked to investigate whether the shares in Kelmac might attract a 
buyer on the basis that, although Kelmac was insolvent, its large tax loss might be an attraction to a purchaser.  
184  Mr Wilson readily acknowledged in evidence in the High Court that Kelmac Property Consultants Ltd (Kelmac)
had enjoyed no previous association with Challenge and that Kelmac was dormant at the date of the transaction. 
Utilising tax losses in this manner and the correspondence showing approval from Inland Revenue supports the 
proposition that this practice of loss utilisation was commonplace at this time in New Zealand.   
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The principal difficulties foreseen by the tax advisor to the then liquidator of the Securitibank 
group was in the negotiations related to ss 188 and 191 of the Income Tax Act 1976 (ITA 
1976), the legislation in force at the time. Mr Wilson, the tax advisor, wrote to Inland 
Revenue expressing concerns over the transaction but received a reply giving comfort to the 
transaction that the tax losses would be available for carrying forward for tax purposes.185 
However, there was perhaps a change brewing in the tax avoidance ‘environment’ as to what 
was acceptable in tax planning and what was not.  
  This may have 
led to the deeper investigation and ultimate court challenge by Inland Revenue as there was 
clearly a change in the tacit acceptance previously enjoyed by companies selling tax losses.    
The ‘mechanics’ of the Challenge transaction was relatively simple, especially in comparison to 
some of the complications apparent in more recent tax avoidance structuring. 
Challenge Corporation187 purchased all the capital of a loss company known as Perth Property 
185 Mr Wilson wrote to the District Commissioner of Taxes in Auckland on 28 November 1977, setting out the basis of 
the proposed transaction and seeking his comments.  Kelmac Property Consultants Ltd (Kelmac) had sold a 
property, the Knox Plaza, located in Wellington and had sustained a loss in the order of $5 million which Mr Wilson 
sought to have regarded as an income loss and not a capital loss for reasons advanced in his letter to the District 
Commissioner. The proposal was that, before 31 March 1978, Kelmac would increase its share capital by $5 million,
Merbank Corporation Ltd (a Securitibank subsidiary and a shareholder of Kelmac) would subscribe for the new 
capital and pay the call, whereupon Kelmac would repay its liability to Merbank of $4,962,759 and would pay 
certain other creditors. Merbank would then have, as an asset, the shares in Kelmac. The loss that would have been 
available to Merbank as a bad debt became available to the purchaser of the Kelmac shares. In a letter dated 3 
March 1978, the senior examiner of Inland Revenue at Lower Hutt, Mr Paganini, advised Mr Wilson that the loss on 
the Knox Plaza would be treated by Inland Revenue as deductible and that, if matters eventuated as described in Mr 
Wilson’s letter, the loss would be available to his client for carrying forward for tax purposes.  
186
187  Challenge Corporation Ltd had its origins in the rural sector with Levin and Co., a drapery business which was 
founded in Wellington in 1841. This company grew and spread to service rural communities as a stock and station 
agency. The stock and station agents coordinated buying and selling, exporting grain and other produce and 
importing commodities not manufactured in New Zealand. Fletcher Challenge Ltd was formed in January 1981 
when two of New Zealand’s largest companies – Fletcher Holdings Ltd and Challenge Corporation Ltd merged with 
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Developments Ltd (Perth).188 It was apparent there was no commercial justification for the 
transaction primarily because at the time of the transaction Perth was a dormant company that was 
not trading, and after the sale Perth did not engage in any form of business activity. It was never 
envisaged that Perth would undertake any activity within the Challenge group of companies. In 
addition to the dormant state of Perth, it owned no valuable assets of any kind, apart from the 
available tax losses. 
The company tax rate at the time was 45 cents in the dollar and Challenge were to pay on 
settlement, after the income tax position was finalised, an amount equivalent to 22.5 per cent of the 
tax loss available to be deducted from the assessable income of Challenge Corporation Ltd, less 
$10,000 already paid. Challenge was also to pay interest to the extent that any deferral of tax 
benefited Challenge Corporation. 
189
190
In the High Court191 Barker J found for Challenge Corporation Ltd. Inland Revenue proceeded to 
the Court of Appeal and a 2:1 judgment again found for the taxpayer.192 The Privy Council in a 4:1 
decision193 overturned the Court of Appeal decision essentially stating that apart from the risk of 
losing $10,000 the Challenge group never risked anything, never lost anything, and never spent
Tasman Pulp and Paper Company Ltd, a company which they controlled jointly. (Fletcher Challenge Archives, 
http://www.fclarchives.co.nz/companies.php (Accessed on 31/3/2010).  
188  The agreement between Challenge Corporation Ltd and the liquidator of Merbank was recorded in a document dated 
28 February 1978. Merbank sold its shares in Kelmac to Challenge Corporation Ltd. Kelmac’s name at this time had 
been changed to Perth Property Developments Ltd. The agreement recited, inter alia, that Perth was indebted to 
Merbank in the sum of $5,804,040 and that share capital of Perth was to be increased by this amount by means of 
the issue of $5,804,040 fully paid shares to Merbank in satisfaction in the equivalent amount of Perth’s liability to 
Merbank. Merbank would also procure from a minority shareholder shares not owned by it, and on-sell them to 
Challenge. A similar transaction was entered into affecting all the shares of another Securitibank company, Security 
Real Estate Ltd. Security Real Estate Ltd was in liquidation but had incurred the lesser income loss for the year of 
$484,319.00. In the ordinary or conventional sense neither company had any commercial value at the time of the 
transaction, nor did they have any prior association with Challenge Corporation Ltd. 
189
190
191 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 49. 
192 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd, above n 49. The Court consisted of Woodhouse P.
(dissenting), Cooke and Richardson JJ. 
193 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd, above n 24. 
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anything but were claiming to deduct a loss of $5.8 million. Challenge had not practised tax 
mitigation because the Challenge group had never suffered the loss of $5.8 million which would 
entitle them to a reduction in their tax liability of $2.58 million.  
The financial executive director of Challenge Corporation at the time, Mr Ian Small, stated that ‘any 
company acquired for the purposes of utilising tax losses had to be ‘clean’194 at the date of the 
transaction. This comment also would indicate that the utilising of tax losses in this manner and the 
correspondence showing approval from Inland Revenue for this type of transaction supports the 
notion that the loss selling was commonplace and accepted practice at the time. Mr 
Russell commented that Inland Revenue had been approving this type of transaction for 
many years prior to the Challenge transaction being ‘challenged’.
The Challenge decision led to the Commissioner publishing a Practice Statement (CPS) on s 99 
ITA 1976 on 8 February 1990.195 There was also subsequent legislative amendment to overturn the 
Challenge method of loss usage.  
194 ‘Clean’ at the date of the transaction referring to no outstanding liabilities. 
195  The Commissioner’s Policy Statement (CPS) addresses the interaction between specific tax provisions and the 
general anti-avoidance provision, s 99 ITA 1976 [now s BG 1 ITA 2007]. 
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C Carrying Forward Tax Losses – A New Zealand Historical Overview 
The ability of a taxpayer to carry forward losses first arose under the Land and Income 
Tax Amendment Act 1922. Losses could only be allowed to be carried forward for business 
income for a period of three years. In 1936, a continuity of shareholding was required 
with reference to the last day of the income year. A limitation of business profits was 
removed in 1945 and in 1953 a three fourths continuity requirement was changed to two 
thirds. In 1968, losses were allowed to be offset without time limit. In 1971, the 
shareholding continuity test was changed to 40 per cent. Section 188 [Losses incurred 
may be set off against future profits] ITA 1976 was in this state at the time of the 
Challenge arrangement. Section 191 [Companies included in Group of Companies] ITA
1976 provided one of the few examples in the ITA where the strict rule of separate 
corporate personality did not apply.  
New Zealand’s companies’ legislation clearly supports that a company is a separate 
person independent of its shareholders.196 Section 15 of the Companies Act 1993, and its 
predecessor section in the Companies Act 1955, entrenched the principle laid down by the 
House of Lords in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd.197 This case established the ‘veil of 
incorporation’ and this was reaffirmed in New Zealand law by the case Lee v Lee’s Air 
Farming Ltd.198 Although the Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd principle applies in New
Zealand in a corporate context, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue is not constrained by 
the rule, the taxing statutes empower the Commissioner to make an adjustment if warranted. 
Section 99(2) and (3) of the ITA 1976 required the Commissioner to counteract any tax advantage. 
Subsection (3) read ‘…the assessable income of any person affected by that arrangement 
shall be adjusted in such manner as the Commissioner considers appropriate so as to counteract 
any tax advantage obtained….’ (emphasis added). Inland Revenue can pierce the corporate veil for 
taxing purposes in certain circumstances.199
 196 Companies Act 1993 section 15 [Separate Legal Personality] states that a company is a legal entity in its own right 
separate from its shareholders and continues in existence until it is removed from the New Zealand Register. 
Refer also to s 27(3) Companies Act 1955 (now repealed).  
197 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL). Salomon was a shoe manufacturer who formed a private 
company, sold his business to the company and was the managing director. The company was ultimately placed into 
liquidation. The creditors argued that Salomon and Salomon & Co Ltd were in reality one and the same, bearing in
mind the specific circumstances leading up to the company incorporation. The House of Lords stated that 
Salomon & Co Ltd was an entity, a person separate from Salomon himself, despite his domination of it, and that
the company’s debts were not Salomon’s debts personally. (Andrew Beck and Andrew Borrowdale, 
Guidebook to New Zealand Companies and Securities Law, (6th ed, CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland, 1998) at 
section 102. 
198  Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] NZLR 325 (PC). 
199 The legislative purpose of section HK11 (or its equivalent provision) was first enacted in 1937 to stop gold mining 
companies from distributing all of their capital via dividends before they were assessed for income tax. The speech 
of the Minister of Finance in 1991 amending section 276 of the ITA 1976 made reference to asset stripping and 
depletion. This is supported by the decision of the High Court in Spencer v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(2004) 21 NZTC 18,818 (HC) which had also made a reference to depletion of assets. There must be an 
arrangement that results in the company being unable to pay its tax. There must be something about that 
arrangement which produces that result. That “something” must involve the depletion of assets. The stripping or 
depletion of assets must be to the benefit of the director who could be assessed under section HK11. Section HK11 
is not a general recovery provision. The current ITA 2007 section is HD15 [Asset stripping of companies].
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The concept of grouping companies for tax loss purposes was introduced in 1968. Losses incurred 
by one of a number of companies in a group for an income year in question may be grouped. 200 It is 
important to note, however that an amendment to the law in 1980, which had no application in the 
Challenge case, required that the continuity of shareholding requirement exist for the whole period 
from beginning of the year to the end of the year to which it is claimed to carry that loss forward.201  
The Commissioner could apportion losses to part of the year where the shareholding requirement 
was met for part of the year.202 A new s 191(8) was enacted in 1980. This was an anti-avoidance 
provision extending the operation of the existing provisions to arrangements covering any shares in 
a loss company or any other company. At the same time a grouping deduction was not permitted 
unless the companies involved were included in some group of companies for the income year for 
which the loss or part of the loss was incurred. The loss offsets in the Challenge case, where the 
profits being offset were from the 1978 income year, could not have been made if the 1980 
amendment had been in force at the time. Section 188 and 191 were complex, but essentially 
offered relief from the general principle that liability to tax is calculated annually for each 
individual taxpayer. 
200  Where two or more companies have common voting and market value interests that are at least 66 per cent they may 
be treated as a group for tax purposes (s IC 3 ITA 2007). The common grouping of at least 66 per cent by these 
companies allows a loss offset between companies in the group in the same year (s IC 1 ITA 2007). This is achieved 
by way of subvention payment or by election. 
201  As enacted in 1968, s 141 ITA 1954 required that the prescribed proportions of paid up capital, nominal value and 
allotted shares of voting power be held at any time during the income year in question. In 1969 the section was 
altered so that the requirement had to be met at and only at the end of the income year in respect of which grouping 
was being sought. An anti-avoidance provision was also introduced at that time. From 1969 onwards and at the 
material time of the Challenge transaction the test of common shareholdings, voting power or entitlement to profits 
was satisfied on a particular day – at the end of the income year.  
202  Under the ITA 2007, a company can only carry forward a tax loss component of a loss balance if at all times during 
the period from the beginning of the year of loss to the end of the year of carry forward (the continuity period) a 
group of persons holds an aggregate of at least 49 per cent of the minimum voting interest in the company. When 
shareholder continuity has been breached part way through an income year, any net loss incurred by the company 
which is attributable to the part period of the year after the change in shareholding is a loss balance that can be 
carried forward by the company (assuming the 49 per cent continuity requirement is satisfied from the date of 
ownership change until the end of the carry forward year). 
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D Context of the 1980s 
1 New Zealand 
There has been a changing environment faced by tax administrators over the last few decades.  The 
template transactions were promoted between 1980 and 1986, with the tax effect continuing for 
many years after. It is important to make a comment, albeit brief about the context of the 1980s. 
There has been significant litigation since the introduction of the template, as well as the 
introduction of the new penalties regime with the penalty of abusive tax position introduced in 
1997.203 The continuing problem of tax avoidance was acknowledged by 204
 205
 The era of 
over full employment post World War II and the growing economy perhaps lent credence to the 
prospect that tax avoidance was simply a minor aspect of the tax environment in New Zealand. The 
comments above in respect of tax loss sales being commonplace support this notion. 
The High Court decision206 in Challenge found that the purpose of the agreement was to reduce the 
liability to income tax of the Challenge group of companies to the extent that its effect would enable 
the tax loss of Perth to be deducted from the Challenge group’s assessable income. Perth gave 
notice of an election under s 191 ITA 1976 transferring its losses to the Challenge group of 
companies. The Commissioner contended that the arrangement was void against the Commissioner 
under s 99. The taxpayer contended that notwithstanding s 99, it was entitled to treat the agreement 
as valid against the Commissioner because s 191(5) allowed losses to be transferred in certain 
circumstances between members of a group of companies. The High Court agreed with the taxpayer 
that s 99 cannot apply in circumstances where comprehensive provisions in the statute itself cover 
203  The Compliance and Penalties Regime in the TAA 1994 came into effect on 1 April 1997. 
204
205
206 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 49. 
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the particular topic, such as tax losses and grouping, and where the taxpayer complies with such 
provisions, which include anti-avoidance provisions. Mr Russell repeatedly maintains that he has 
also complied with statute law.207 In Challenge the Court of Appeal agreed with the lower 
court. Ultimately, as discussed above, the Privy Council begged to differ. The tide was beginning to 
turn on previous tax avoidance acceptance. 
The mid-1980s also saw the emergence of the transaction at the centre of the ‘Winebox’208 Inquiry, 
although the ‘Winebox’ documents themselves were not tabled in Parliament until 1994. The 
‘Winebox’ documents evidenced methods of business involving dealings in promissory notes. In 
the Magnum Corporation Ltd (‘Magnum’) transaction, one member of the European Pacific 
group paid tax of $881,582 on behalf of another member.  Contemporaneously another member 
issued and sold to the Cook Island Property Corporation a promissory note (for $10,000,000 plus 
interest) for the consideration of $10,881,582. Contemporaneously yet another member of the group 
bought the same note from the Cook Island Property Corporation for $10,050,000. The 
Cook Islands government issued a tax credit for $881,582 which was utilised against New 
Zealand income tax. All of this was prearranged. In the result all of the tax paid was in substance 
repaid but the Cook Island Property Corporation made on behalf of the Cook Islands 
government a profit of $50,000. The arrangements were evidently not disclosed to the New 
Zealand Commissioner of Inland Revenue.209 
207 In Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 61-62, the plaintiffs advanced the argument that s 
191(in the amended form enacted in 1980 following the Challenge decision) 
 provided a code distinct from s 99 
The plaintiffs emphasized in particular that the new subsection (7C) (to be read with (7(D)) gave the Commissioner 
a limited anti-avoidance power in the context of the grouping of accounts. His Honour Baragwanath J in Miller did 
not read the amended legislation as having any effect on the Commissioner’s success in Commissioner of
Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd, above n 24. 
208  Winston Peters brought the documents at the centre of the allegations to Parliament in a wine box. The Winebox 
Inquiry was an inquiry undertaken to investigate claims of corruption and incompetence in the Serious Fraud Office 
(SFO) and Inland Revenue. The full name of the Inquiry was the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Matters 
relating to Taxation. It became popularly known as the Winebox Inquiry.  
209 For more on the ‘Winebox’ see Controller and Auditor-General v Davison [1996] 2 NZLR 278; [1996] NZAR 145
and Brannigan v Davison [1996] 2 NZLR 278; [1996] 2 NZLR 338; [1996] NZAR 145 (CA). 
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2 Australia 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was an unprecedented challenge to the integrity of the 
Australian tax system. Mass marketed tax avoidance and evasion schemes were aptly described as 
‘blatant, artificial and contrived’.210 The tax schemes ‘era’ began in Australia in the early 1970s. 
After a slow beginning, schemes took off in 1976. By 1982 promotion of the last of them had 
stopped. 
A name that had become a household name was that of a stockbroker, Mr Charles Curran who got 
the High Court of Australia211 to agree that, for tax purposes, bonus shares had a cost equal to their 
face value. Curran had developed a dividend-stripping scheme that was so widely copied that 
Curran became a household name. The case was heard in 1974 with the transactions taking place in 
1969. On 8th February 1989212 the High Court in Canberra took the unusual step of overruling the 
previous High Court decision, which had paved the way for many of the tax avoidance schemes that 
operated during the 1970s. By applying a strict legal interpretation of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 to the Curran scheme, the Barwick Court in 1974 gave a green light to
many of the tax avoidance schemes in the late 1970s, including the infamous bottom-of-the-
harbour schemes.213 The Court found the reasoning in the previous High Court decision to be 
defective, arguing that account had to be taken of the diminution in value of the original shares 
caused by using the large dividends to create new bonus shares. Five of the six judges said that by 
not taking into account the loss in value a false picture was being created.  
Many tax avoidance decisions are not unanimous, which clearly demonstrates the difficulty the 
courts have in relation to the topic of tax avoidance.214 Further, it is not uncommon for a higher 
210 Income Tax Assessment Bill 1978, 7 April 1978, Second reading speech as end-noted in T.P.W. Boucher, Blatant, 
artificial and contrived: tax schemes of the 70s and 80s (1st ed, Australian Taxation Office, 2010). 
211 Curran v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1974) 131 C.L.R. 409 (HCA). The High Court bench composed of 
Chief Justice Barwick and Justices Menzies, Gibbs and Stephens. 
212 In John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417 the majority took the view that the precedent 
decision that they were invited to overrule (the Curran decision) was what might be called an outlier, sharing no 
basis in principle with other cases that, at first glance, might have appeared similar to it.  For further reading see M. 
Harding and I. Malkin, “Overruling in the High Court of Australia in Common Law Cases” (2010) 34 MULR 519. 
Also see “High Court changes tax avoidance ruling”, The Sydney Morning Herald, (Sydney, February 9, 1989). 
213  Essentially a company would be stripped of its assets and accumulated profits before its tax fell due, leaving it 
unable to pay. Once assets were stripped the company would be sent, in a metaphorical sense, to the ‘bottom of the 
harbour’ by being transferred to someone of limited means and with little interest in its past activities. The 
company’s records were also often lost. The Australian Taxation Office, being in the same position as other 
unsecured creditors in the case of an insolvent company, would end up with nothing. In 1980 the Crimes (Taxation 
Offences) Act 1980 (Cth) made it a criminal offence for any person to make a company or trust unable to pay tax 
debts, or to aid or abet any person or company doing so.   
214 By way of example the Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd, above n 24 was a 4:1 
decision; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd, above n 174 was a 4:1 majority decision;
Peterson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 176 was 3:2 decision. 
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court to overturn a lower court decision in the area of tax avoidance. This was the environment at 
the birth of the template created by Mr Russell. The Barwick Court applying a strict legal
interpretation to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, essentially giving a ‘green light’ to tax 
avoidance schemes 
3 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom over the last 75 years there has also been an attitudinal shift by the courts as 
to what constitutes tax avoidance. The often quoted Duke of Westminster case215 shows the 
early twentieth century focus by the courts to adopt a strict interpretation of taxation laws,
essentially by way of the proposition that taxpayers have the right to arrange their affairs in such 
a way so as to pay the least amount of tax. Until the early 1980s the Duke of Westminster216 
case was precedent and the United Kingdom Inland Revenue217 was rarely successful in 
challenging tax avoidance schemes in the courts. 
In 1981, the House of Lords took a completely different view of an avoidance scheme. In W T 
Ramsay Ltd v IRC218 an artificial scheme was used to create a large capital loss. The company had 
realised a capital gain and intended to set the artificially generated loss against the capital gain to 
avoid paying tax on the gain. The scheme was artificial because it was made up of a series of 
preordained steps which were to be carried out in rapid succession. The scheme required that all 
steps be completed once the first one had been made. At the end of the series of steps the taxpayers 
would be in the same position as they had been at the beginning and any loss created would not be a 
real financial loss, just a loss on paper. The only real losses which had been suffered were the 
professional fees which were paid for the scheme’s operation.  
The House of Lords decided that although each step in the scheme was a separate legal transaction, 
it was possible to view the scheme not as a series of separate legal transactions, but as a whole, by 
215 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1 (HL). 
216 In this case servants were not paid wages but instead received an income from a deed of covenant. A deed of 
covenant produces a tax deductible amount for the person extending the deed and is valid only if no valuable 
consideration is provided by the recipient in return. However, the Duke of Westminster and his servants had an 
understanding, that so long as the deed of covenant operated the servants would not claim the wages due to them. 
The scheme enabled the Duke to claim tax relief for the amounts paid to his servants whereas payment of wages to 
servants would not have been an allowable deduction from income tax. Today such a scheme could not be used 
because payments made under deeds of covenant are no longer tax effective when paid to individuals. However, at 
the time, the House of Lords found for the Duke, declaring that they would only consider the legal nature of the 
transaction.  (Andrew Lymer and Lynne Oats, Taxation: Policy and Practice (14th ed, Fiscal Publications, 
Birmingham, 2008) at 397. 
217  A new department was formed on 18 April 2005 when Inland Revenue merged with HM Customs and Excise to 
form Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). 
218 W T Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1981] STC 174 (HL). 
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comparing the position of the taxpayer in real terms at the start and finish of the scheme.219 When 
this was done no real loss was incurred and the scheme was self-cancelling.220   
The so-called Ramsay principle was extended in Furness v Dawson221 where the House of Lords 
decided that a scheme that was not circular or self-cancelling should still be set aside for tax 
purposes as the scheme required a series of artificial steps to be carried out in quick succession just 
to save tax rather than with a real business purpose in mind.222 Towards the end of the 1980s the 
Ramsay principle was limited by the House of Lords in Craven v White223 where the House of 
Lords refused to view a series of transactions as a whole and this particular scheme was successful 
in reducing tax liability.224 
Caution must be taken when comparing different tax jurisdictions where, although tax avoidance 
has similar traits, the ‘toolbox’ to address the avoidance issue may be of a different construction.225 
The United Kingdom has no general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) as is present in the
Australian, Canadian and New Zealand legislation.226 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) in the United Kingdom deal with tax avoidance by way of specific legislation to specific 
transactions and more recently, manage their tax risk by way of requiring disclosure of tax 
avoidance schemes by promoters.227 
219  Lord Wilberforce explained the decision by stating: “While obliging the court to accept documents or transactions, 
found to be genuine, as such, it does not compel the court to look at a document or a transaction in blinkers, isolated 
from any context to which it properly belongs. If it can be seen that a document or transaction was intended to have 
effect as part of a nexus or series of transactions, or as an ingredient of a wider transaction intended as a whole, 
there is nothing in the doctrine to prevent it being so regarded; to do so is not to prefer form to substance, or 
substance to form. It is the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature of any transaction to which it is sought to 
attach a tax, or a tax consequence, and if that emerges from a series, or combination of transactions, intended to 
operate as such, it is that series or combination which may be regarded.” 
220  Lymer and Oats, above n 216, at 398. 
221  Furness (Inspector of Taxes) v Dawson [1984] AC 474 (HL). 
222  The objective was to defer capital gains tax by using an intermediary company based in the Isle of Man. 
223  Craven v White [1989] AC 398 (HL). 
224  Similar to Furness v Dawson an intermediary company in the Isle of Man was used to defer a capital gains tax 
liability. The key difference between Craven v White and Furness v Dawson was that when the shares were 
transferred to the Isle of Man based company; their final disposal had not been agreed. Hence no preordained series 
of steps existed at the time that the first transaction was undertaken. Craven v White had significance in the United 
Kingdom for tax avoidance schemes generally as it addresses the planning aspect of tax avoidance schemes. If 
transactions are undertaken before a final step is known with certainty there is a greater likelihood of the scheme 
being successful if challenged by HMRC as a tax avoidance activity.  
225  For a robust discussion on recent judicial anti-avoidance developments see Eden and Freedman, above n 172. 
226 A G Hodson, ‘Sticks and Stones’ – The Social Cost of New Zealand’s First Two Supreme Court Tax Avoidance 
Decisions: Is a Scheme Disclosure Provision the Way Forward for New Zealand?,  (Working paper presented at the 
Tax Research Network Conference (TRN), Cardiff University, September 2009). 
227 There is no general anti-avoidance provision in the United Kingdom tax legislation. Rather, the approach to tax 
avoidance has been to deal with specific transactions by specific legislation introduced to curtail new schemes. The 
UK introduced scheme disclosure provisions in the Finance Act 2004 to manage the risk of tax avoidance, evasion 
and fraud. These provisions require those who market tax avoidance schemes and those that use them to make 




employment products. In 2006 the provisions were extended to the whole of Income Tax, Corporations Tax and 
Capital Gains Tax. It now also covers National Insurance Contributions (since 2007), Stamp Duty Land Tax (further 
extended in 2010 and 2012) and Inheritance Tax (effective from 2011). HMRC provide guidance for the disclosure 
of tax avoidance schemes on their website, see HM Revenue and Customs (UK), www.hmrc.gov.uk (Accessed on
10/12/2012). 
228  Rossminster was a private bank that had funded many sophisticated tax avoidance schemes. For further reading see 
Nigel Tutt, A History of Tax Avoidance (Wisedene Ltd, London, 1989).  This book discusses the use of charitable 
companies as part of a tax avoidance arrangement. Under s 20C of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (UK), statutory 
authority was given for the entry and search of premises, and seizure and removal of materials relevant to a 
suspicion of an offence of fraud having been committed. In R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte 
Rossminster Ltd [1980] AC 952 (HL) the breadth of this power was challenged and although condemned by Lord 
Denning in the Court of Appeal, was upheld as lawful by the House of Lords, provided the requirements of the 
statute were met.  Andrew Watt, “Taxman goes on warpath” The Independent (online ed., United Kingdom, 21 May 
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A ‘verging on fraud’ comment was made in relation to Mr Russell and a receivership. In 1992 Mr 
Russell was ordered to pay $550,000 damages over the receivership of Auckland business Glen 
Eden Motors. Mr Russell’s company, Downsview Nominees, appointed Mr Russell as receiver after 
Downsview had bought out a first ranking bank debenture over Glen Eden Motors. Mr Russell 
ignored protests by second debenture holder First City Corporation, about the conduct of the 
receivership. Mr Russell spurned attempts by First City Corporation to pay off the Downsview 
debenture. The Privy Council criticised Mr Russell’s performance as a receiver, saying he 
continued the receivership in bad faith, his conduct verging on fraud.234 
By early 1992 the Russell template and template cases had become a serious issue within Inland 
Revenue. The following chapter seeks to provide an understanding of Inland Revenue’s perceptions 
of Mr Russell before discussing the template and various track assessments.  235 



















242 The Taxpayer Compliance, Penalties, and Disputes Resolution Bill was introduced into Parliament in October 1995 
and passed in July 1996. Fundamental defects in the areas of sanction meant that taxpayers who wished to “play the 
system”, could do so, usually without risk of loss. However, under the compliance and penalties rules interest would 
be charged from the original due date.  IRD Tax Information Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 7, (October 1996) at 3 stated “The 
interest provisions have adopted a commercial approach, together with safeguards to ensure that Inland Revenue is 




Although Inland Revenue have very robust information collection powers,245 a difficulty can clearly 
arise if Inland Revenue are not aware of documents pertinent to a transaction. 
243 The High Court was established in 1841 and known as the Supreme Court until 1980. It is not to be confused with 
the current Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Act 2003 established in New Zealand a court of final appeal 
comprising of New Zealand judges to recognise that New Zealand is an independent nation with its own history and 
traditions. The Supreme Court replaced the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council located in London, and came 
into being on 1 January 2004, with hearings commencing 1 July 2004.  
244
245 The TAA 1994 provides the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (and his delegated officers) wide ranging information 
collection powers. Many steps which might otherwise be regarded as intrusive of a person’s privacy or their 
entitlement to not be the subject of search and seizure under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 are justified 
because of s 16 TAA 1994. Section 16 provides the Commissioner with very broad powers of access to any 
premises and is not limited to the acquisition of evidence or information that may lead to or support a prosecution 
for an offence against the tax statutes: Davies v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2004) 21 NZTC 18,675 (HC). 
Section 17 TAA 1994 also confers wide powers on the Commissioner to request any information in writing 
(including documents) for inspection, if the Commissioner considers them “necessary or relevant” for any purpose 
relating to the administration, enforcement, or any other function lawfully conferred on the Commissioner. There is 
also provision for examination before a District Court Judge to obtain information under s 18 TAA 1994 and before 
the Commissioner under s 19 TAA 1994. Section 19 authorises the Commissioner to issue a notice requiring any 
person (not just a taxpayer) to attend and give evidence before Inland Revenue officers and to produce all relevant 
documents in the custody or under the control of the person. A person who does not attend a s 19 inquiry or who 
attends and does not give the information requested commits an offence. Inland Revenue can also seek enforcement 
under s 17A TAA 1994 which provides for court orders concerning the production of information or tax returns. 
There are limitations on the Commissioner’s powers, including the requirement for authorisation of the officer by 
the Commissioner to utilise the powers, the taxpayer is entitled to legal advice and also access to the courts; the 
information or documents requested must be “necessary or relevant” to the inquiry.  The main limitation on the 
Commissioner's information gathering powers is legal professional privilege. Legal professional privilege can attach 
to both communications in which legal advice is sought and given, and also to communications in the context of 




 In one of the first tax template cases, Case M109248 (the Ron West 
Motors case), Judge Barber stated that the agreements prepared by Mr Russell:249  
…purport to have been signed on 31 December 1981. This would mean that the new 
arrangements took effect for the remaining months (90 days) of the 1982 income tax year. 
However, Judge Barber concluded that the arrangement was not actually completed on the 
purported date stating:250 
I have already recorded that I do not accept, on the balance of probability, that the 
documentation was completed by 31 December 1981. It is not clear when the documentation 
was signed. A legal practitioner advised that although he had witnessed a number of 
documents dated 31 December 1981, that date could not have been correct as he was not 
working on that day. 
confidential matters between an accountant and their client. Under s 20B to 20G TAA 1994 a form of statutory 
privilege for tax advisors exists known as the non-disclosure right. There are certain specific requirements in 
relation to the non-disclosure right. By way of example the right is not automatic - it must be claimed by the
taxpayer (or their tax advisor); the document must have been intended to be confidential; and the advice is 
given by an approved advisor.  For further discussion see Alistair Hodson, “Tax Administration” in New 
Zealand Taxation, above n 161. 
246
247
248  Case M109 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,690 (NZTRA). 
249  At 2,699. 
250  At 2,701. 
78 











Prior to 1 April 2003, when an assessment of tax was in dispute and a taxpayer had requested a case 
be stated to the TRA or High Court by Inland Revenue, at least 50 per cent of the disputed tax had 
to be paid in accordance with Inland Revenue’s assessment. The remaining 50 per cent was deferred 




256  A disputant was liable to pay non-deferrable tax relating to any tax in dispute on the due date for payment of the tax 
specified in the notice of assessment that was the subject of the challenge. The non-deferrable tax was 50 per cent of 
the tax in dispute.  The requirement for taxpayers to pay half the tax in dispute was removed as from 1 April 2003, 
although a taxpayer may be required to pay all the tax in dispute if the Commissioner considers that there is a 
significant risk that the tax in dispute would not be paid should the challenge or objection proceedings by the 
taxpayer not be successful. Non-deferrable tax was also able to be provided to the Commissioner by way of 
acceptable security if the disputant was unable to pay the sum in cash. See also S 7A [Authorisation to take 







259 Case M109, above n 248. 
260 S 414A ITA 1976 [Discretion to grant relief in cases of financial hardship]. 
261 S 414A (1) ITA 1976 [Application for Relief] allowed relief at the Commissioner’s discretion, if the Commissioner 
considered it necessary or desirable to do so in order to maximise the net present value of any recovery or likely 
recovery. This section has similarities with s 6A (3) TAA 1994 in respect to collecting the highest net revenue over 
time and s 177 TAA 1994 [Taxpayer May Apply for Financial Relief]. S 177B and 177C TAA 1994 address 












































In 1982 an amendment279 to the Companies Act 1955 was passed whereby this type of company 




The Registrar of Companies took a case to the High Court.283 An application was made to have the 
company appoint directors and secretary who were natural persons and not a body corporate or any 
other incorporated body or firm and to file the relevant prescribed form. The application was made 
pursuant to s 11 of the Companies Act 1955 which entitled the Court on the application of the 
Registrar to make an order directing the company to make good a default under the Act within such 
time as may be specified. The application came about as a result of a return by the respondent 
company of particulars of directors and secretary pursuant to s 200 of the Companies Act 1955 
indicating the purported resignation of two limited liability companies as directors of Commercial 
Management Ltd showing that they had resigned on 26 June 1983, and in their place Commercial 
Management Partners and Commercial Management Associates, described as a company director 
and company secretary, respectively, “appointed” on 26 June 1983. 
The orders284 given by Heron J in the High Court285 were subsequently followed by further 
litigation in the Court of Appeal286 with orders obtained directing Commercial Management to 
279 Sections 180 and 181 of the Companies Act 1955 were created by virtue of s 12 Companies Amendment Act 1982 
which came into force on 16 December 1982. Up until that time a limited liability company could be a director. 
280
281  Commercial Management Ltd filed the prescribed form indicating the purported resignation of two limited liability 
companies as directors and the appointment of two partnerships. Each partnership comprised two incorporated 
companies and two natural persons. One of the partnerships was also purported to be appointed as secretary. The 
Registrar gave notice that the company was to appoint only natural persons as officers. The respondent claimed 
there was no requirement in the Companies Act 1955 that such officers should be natural persons and that only a 
body corporate or a person under 18 years were ineligible. 
282
283 Registrar of Companies v Commercial Management Ltd (1985) 2 NZCLC 99,298 (HC). 
284 Registrar of Companies v Commercial Management Ltd at 5. 
The orders given by Heron J in the High Court at 5 were: 
90 
name natural persons as directors and secretary. In the Court of Appeal decision counsel for the 
appellant submitted that while s 180(2) and 180(3) Companies Act 1955 both excluded bodies 
corporate from holding the positions of director and secretary, all other legal entities were capable 
of being appointed. A partnership, counsel submitted, was not a body corporate but was a legal 
entity entitled to act as director or secretary. The appeal was dismissed. The Companies Act 1955, 
having provided in s 180 (2)(a)287 and s 181 (3)288 that a body corporate is not capable of being 
appointed or holding office as either a director or secretary of a company, cannot be circumvented 
by the appointment to either office of a partnership in which a body corporate is a partner. A 
partnership is not a legal entity capable of being appointed and holding office as a director.289  
Mr Russell stated in a 2011 interview290 that the reason he had structured the various entities 
without being named personally was due to the ‘bad press’ after the Securitibank collapse. He stated 
that it was all right for those that knew him, but for those that did not, it was better that his name
was not associated with the Commercial Management business. 
A perspective of Mr Russell in a non-tax sense is found in an August 1989 case, on the cusp of the 
first of the ‘Track A’ litigation Gault J provides an account of the conduct of Mr Russell that was 
under scrutiny in First City Corporation Ltd v Downsview Nominees Ltd & Ors (No. 2), a case 
concerning receiver negligence, stating as follows:291 
1. Directing the respondent company to appoint within one month of the date of the order directors who were
natural persons.
2. That the respondent company appoint within one month of the order of the Court a secretary or secretaries who
were natural persons.
3. That the respondent company furnish within 14 days of the date of appointment hereinbefore ordered a return in
the prescribed form containing all the required particulars of persons so appointed as directors or secretary of
the said company.
4. That the respondent company pay costs in the sum of $500 together with disbursements as fixed by the
Registrar.
285  Registrar of Companies v Commercial Management Ltd, above n 283. 
286 Commercial Management Ltd v Registrar of Companies [1987] 1 NZLR 744 (CA); (1987) 3 NZCLC 100,221. 
287 Section 180. Directors –  
(1) Every company shall have at least 2 directors.
(2) The following shall not be capable of being appointed or holding office as a director  of a company, namely, -
(a) A body corporate
(b) A person who has not attained the age of 18 years.
288 Section 181. Secretary – 
(1) Every company shall have a secretary.
(2) …
(3) A body corporate shall not be capable of being appointed or holding office as a secretary of a company, or as an
assistant or deputy secretary of a company, or of being authorised generally or specially in that behalf by the
directors.
289  The partners may, however, be individually appointed as directors. The Companies Act 1955 envisaged the office of 
director as being held by one individual and not held jointly by two or more persons as this is quite foreign to the 
concept of the office of director which calls for individual judgment and responsibility. 
290  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
291  First City Corporation Ltd v Downsview Nominees Ltd (No. 2) (1989) 4 NZCLC 65, 192 (HC) at 20.
91 
Mr Russell does not lack confidence in his ability. To some extent that may be justified. 
Clearly he is capable and knowledgeable in matters of accounting, commercial financing and 
insolvency. In this last field his working knowledge of the law is quite extensive, but in 
practice he prefers to focus on how he might best serve his immediate objectives rather than 
the underlying purposes of the rules of law and practice. 
His Honour continued:292 
I found Mr Russell a man who tends to offer as reasons or justification for his actions, what is 
convenient rather than what is correct.  
292  At 21. One result of this case was that Mr Russell was prohibited under s 189 of the Companies Act 1955 without 
the leave of the court from being a director or promoter of or being concerned in or taking part in the management 
of any company for a period of five years.  The Court of Appeal held that Gault J lacked jurisdiction under s 189 
Companies Act 1955 to prohibit Mr Russell from acting as a director or promoter or being concerned in the
management of a company.  Their Lordships in the Privy Council agreed for the reasons given by Richardson J in
the Court of Appeal: Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 265 (CA); (1990) 5 
NZCLC 66,303 (CA) and Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 51; (1993) 11 







293 Mr Russell may have felt that Inland Revenue were also effecting delay by directing matters to people with little or 
no experience in Case U11 (1999) 19 NZTC 9,100 (NZTRA).  Mr Russell had spent many days cross-examining Mr 
Clearkin, an Inland Revenue witness.  Judge Willy, at 9,138 stated in relation to Mr Clearkin, that he had been 




















It has to be remembered that a lot of Mr Russell’s accounting and advisory business was not 
template related,304 and that any increase in investigations or concerns requiring answers from 






304  A significant percentage of Mr Russell’s consultancy business was connected with insolvency type work. He had 

















However,  the magnitude of the tax template ‘problem’ became evident during the 1980s and this 
led to the two Auckland cases, M104315 and M109316 being test cases to allow the courts to 
determine what was acceptable and what was not. After the success of Cases K28317, M104318 and 
M109319 the Commissioner continued to investigate Mr Russell 
Inland Revenue reassessed the client companies (‘Track A’), however, the companies had by then 
been stripped and the Inland Revenue victories were ‘worthless’ in dollar terms. 
320
As a result of the asset stripping that had occurred under ‘Track A’, a new approach commenced, a 
reconstruction under s 99(3) ITA 1976 to assess the individual taxpayers with 100 per cent of the 
income diverted. 
321
315 Case M104 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,660 (NZTRA). 
316 Case M109, above n 248. 
317 Case K28 (1988) 10 NZTC 257 (NZTRA). 
318 Case M104, above n 315. 




Interestingly s 276 of the ITA 1976 was modified with application to tax on income derived in the 
1992–93 income year and subsequent years and in the case of an arrangement entered into after 
8pm New Zealand Standard Time on 30 July 1991 to tax on income derived in any earlier year. 
Prior to the law change the section heading read ‘Liability of New Companies for tax payable by 
former companies with substantially same shareholders or under same control’. 
After the change it read ‘Liability for tax payable by company left with insufficient assets’. It would 
be a straightforward hypothesis to suggest that this section of the statute was changed to address the 
type of asset stripping that had occurred and had become apparent under the ‘Track A’ route, which 
addressed liability for tax payable by a company left with insufficient assets. 
322
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1 Attempting to obtain the Russell Team minutes
Mr Russell has argued that he has been unable to access certain documents that may have helped 
him in his vendetta argument. Perhaps the most useful case in relation to this argument is Case 
W37.325 Judge Barber was ruling on legal professional privilege for minutes of certain monthly 
meetings of the Tax Avoidance Unit.326 Mr Ruffin, Inland Revenue counsel, submitted that 
litigation privilege is a type of legal professional privilege.327 Mr Judd, acting for Mr Russell, 
extensively addressed the concept of legal privilege being subject to the ‘fraud exception’.328  
Mr Judd submitted that if the so called ‘fraud exception’ applied regarding the Russell Team 
minutes of 31 March 1995, that Judge Barber did not need to inspect the documents but should 
simply direct them to be produced.329 Judge Barber took Mr Judd’s approach on this issue to be that 
the Commissioner’s general conduct in the Russell template cases could constitute ‘fraud’, for the 
purpose of the fraud exception to legal professional privilege, particularly in terms of non-
compliance with s 6 TAA 1994 (requiring care and management of the tax system). Mr Judd had 
also submitted that the Commissioner was subject to the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) where the 
Crown affirms, and is required to protect and promote, citizens’ rights to natural justice in hearings 
before tribunals, which included the TRA. Mr Judd stated:330 
Fraud in the present context “includes all forms of fraud and dishonesty (per Goff J (ibid)), 
“anything of an underhand nature or approaching to fraud” (per Kekewich J, quoted by 
Vinelott J (ibid)), “communications made for the purpose of frustrating the processes of the 
law itself even though no crime or fraud is contemplated”, and “abuse of statutory authority 
and by that abuse [proving] others from exercising their legal rights under the law” (per 
O’Keefe J’s quotations). 
325 Case W37 (2004) 21 NZTC 11,360 (NZTRA).  Referred to in Case W49 (2004) 21 NZTC 11,454 (NZTRA). 
326 Judge Barber was dealing with submissions from each party in relation to the claims of legal professional privilege 
for minutes of ‘monthly’ meetings over the period 31 March 1995 to 23 August 2002 of persons initially called ‘J G 
Russell Co-ordination Team’ and subsequently variously called that, or ‘J G Russell Committee’, or ‘Russell Team’, 
or ‘Tax Avoidance Team’, or ‘Tax Avoidance Unit’ but coupled with ‘litigation meeting’. 
327 See Dinsdale v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1998) 18 NZTC 13,583 (CA) where the nature of litigation 
privilege was restated by Blanchard J. 
328 The two cases below are referred to in Case W37, above n 325, at [30].  Mr Judd submitted that there have been 
various explanations of what is required to bring circumstances within the ‘fraud’ exception.  These are discussed by 
Vinelott J at some length in Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 7) [1990] 3 All ER 161 (Ch.). A quotation from His 
Lordship from the judgment of Kekewich J in Williams v Quebrada Railway Land & Copper Co [1895] 2 Ch 751 at 
172b includes: “...where there is anything of an underhand nature or approaching to fraud, especially in commercial 
matters, where there should be the veriest good faith, the whole transaction should be ripped up and disclosed in all 
its nakedness to the light of the Court…” 
329 Mr Judd referred extensively to Case U11, above n 293.  This decision was reversed on appeal to the High Court in
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Dandelion Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,293 (HC) which was in turn 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Dandelion Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2003] 1 NZLR 
600 (CA); (2003) 21 NZTC 18,010. 
330 Case W37, above n 325, at [34] referred to by Mr Judd at 4.16 of his submission. 
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Interwoven in the submission by Mr Judd was reference to ‘vendetta’331 on the theme, apparently, 
that the conduct of the Commissioner amounted to a deliberate obstruction of the objector’s rights 
to have the merits of cases put before the Court because of personal dislikes. Essentially Mr Judd 
was submitting that if the Commissioner was carrying out a vendetta against Mr Russell and his 
clients which manifests itself in improper behaviour, such as deluging Mr Russell with s 17 notices 
and then prosecuting him when he is unable to do the impossible, that constituted conduct within 
the description of fraud for the purpose of the fraud exception to legal professional privilege, and 
comes directly within the description in the case authorities of conduct stated (earlier) which is 
preventing others from exercising their legal rights. 
Mr Judd referred to the rights to a fair hearing being affirmed by the BORA, and that the 
Commissioner cannot claim privilege for documents which record the plans being made by his 
officers and legal representatives for legal campaigns against Mr Russell and his clients, and that 
these documents should be fully disclosed to the Court, and that the Russell Team minutes are such 
documents and must be fully disclosed. 
Mr Judd further submitted that it was not for the TRA to look at documents to decide whether they 
do or do not disclose a vendetta, as that would be a prejudgment of the very issue before the TRA, 
and if there is evidence of a vendetta (and it is within the meaning of ‘fraud’ for this purpose), the 
documents must be yielded up so that Mr Russell can use them to prove the cases of his clients. 
Judge Barber was conscious of the submissions from Mr Judd that such documents must be 
disclosed because of the applicability of the ‘fraud’ exception, and appreciated that the vendetta 
theme had been raised in relation to that possibility.332  Judge Barber was given a black radofile of 
the said minutes of the meetings between 31 March 1995 and 23 August 2002 over which legal 
privilege was claimed.  
In terms of the law, Judge Barber ruled that the minutes were clearly subject to legal professional 
privilege as they recorded communications between the Commissioner’s staff and his legal 
advisors, and recorded advice received on the conduct and progress of litigation arising out of the 
331At [34]: Mr Judd referred to The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary including as a meaning of ‘vendetta’ to be “a 
prolonged bitter quarrel with or campaign against a person”. 
332 Case W37, above n 325, at [39]. 
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Russell template cases, and whether prosecutions should be initiated.333 Judge Barber334 referred to 
B v Auckland District Law Society,335 a Privy Council decision where Lord Millett emphasised:336 
Some principles are well established and were confirmed by Lord Taylor CJ in R v Derby 
Magistrates’ Court, ex p B at p 530G-H. First, the privilege remains after the occasion for it 
has passed: unless waived: once privileged, always privileged. Secondly, the privilege is the 
same whether the documents are sought for the purpose of civil or criminal proceedings and 
whether by the prosecution or the defence. Thirdly, the refusal of the claimant to waive his 
privilege for any reason or none cannot be questioned or investigated by the Court. Fourthly, 
save in cases where the privileged communication is itself the means of carrying out a fraud, 
the privilege is absolute. Once the privilege is established, the lawyer’s mouth is “shut for 
ever”; (see Wilson v Rastall (1792) 4 Durn & E 753, at p 759 per Buller J).  The Society has 
not alleged that any of the documents fall within the excepted category, but if any of them 
does it retains the right to make such a claim hereafter.  
This was regarded by Judge Barber as a correct statement of the law in New Zealand. It is clear that 
the fraud exception is limited to “cases where the privileged communication is itself the means of 
carrying out a fraud.”337  Judge Barber held:338 
…there has been nothing in these cases resembling fraud from the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue, his officers and/or external legal advisors. There may have been some lack of co-
operation or even, perhaps ill-will sometimes; but it is preposterous to even suggest anything 
resembling fraud, even of some technical type, against the Commissioner or his staff or 
contractors. I say this having been closely involved in these Russell tax avoidance template 
cases since their inception in about 1989…. 
Judge Barber summed up by stating:339 
Quite frankly, it seems to me that Mr Russell and his advisors are deliberately using due 
process in these template tax-avoidance cases to conduct a huge fishing expedition in the hope 
of somehow finding a golden technical argument to save the day for Mr Russell and his 
clients. 
333 Judge Barber noted that if the occasional ‘aside remark’ is not part of the privilege it was irrelevant to any objection 
proceedings. Further, some staffing and administration matters were covered, but they were irrelevant to any 
assessments. 
334 Case W37, above n 325, at [49]. 
335 B v Auckland District Law Society (2003) 21 NZTC 18,221 (PC) at [44]. 
336 Case W37, above n 325, at [49]. 
337 At [50]. 
338 At [51]. 
339 At [52]. 
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In relation to the ‘nub’ of the template scheme, the use of tax losses, Judge Barber continues:340 
In the terms of the many cases heard before me on this template, I can only see a situation of clear 
tax avoidance. I note the feature that the losses used, in effect, in an endeavour to convert income 
into capital, are genuine losses incurred by somebody (other than Mr Russell) and that, perhaps, if 
the law had been followed at material times in terms of corporate group use of tax losses, there 
could have been some tax savings; but that did not happen. 
2 The car park files and the Ponsonby businessman 
Mr Russell did, however, obtain a copy of the minutes from one of the Russell Team meetings in 
rather unusual circumstances. He received a call one day from a Ponsonby businessman who had 
found a file lying in a car park as he was walking back to his car. Mr Russell could not recall the 
man’s name, but he said that he would never forget the man’s words as he thought they were very 
funny. The man from Ponsonby said, in relation to the file that, “I must say it made very interesting 
reading!” The businessman continued:341 
I thought anybody that can cause Inland Revenue so much trouble must be a good fellow so I 
am ringing you up and offering you this file… 
In the TRA decisions342 discovery issues343 were addressed, including the car park files. Ultimately 
when Mr Russell presented the minutes in court they were held to be legally privileged even though 
both Mr Russell and the Ponsonby businessman had read them.344  
345 Mr Russell 
340 At [52]. 
341 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
342 Case W24 (2003) 21 NZTC 11,246 (NZTRA); Case W35 (2004) 21 NZTC 11,340 (NZTRA); Case W36 (2004) 21 
NZTC 11,353 (NZTRA); Case W38 (2004) 21 NZTC 11,372 (NZTRA); Case W39 (2004) 21 NZTC 11,375 
(NZTRA); Case W34 (2004) 21 NZTC 11,334 (NZTRA). 
343 There were five interlocutory decisions relating to certain participants of the J G Russell tax avoidance template. 
Case W36, above n 342 dealt with an issue of waiver of confidentiality of the minutes of a Russell Team
meeting, dated 1 September 1995. A copy of these minutes were apparently found in a car park in 
Auckland by an unidentified member of the public, and given to Mr Russell. The Commissioner argued that 
the minute was confidential and covered by legal professional privilege, which had not been waived. The 
Commissioner further applied that the minute and copies of it be returned to the Commissioner. Judge Barber 
held that the minute was confidential and privileged and that it was inadmissible in the proceedings. His Honour 
also held that it was in any event irrelevant.   
344 Section 20 TAA 1994 provides that any information or book or document is privileged from disclosure if it is a 
confidential communication (whether written or oral) passing directly or indirectly between legal practitioners in 
their professional capacity and a client, or legal practitioners in their professional capacity and it is made for the 
purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice, and it is not made for the purpose of committing some illegal or 
wrongful act.  
345
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officially ‘retired’ in 1999 so this appears to be likely. 
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VI The Russell Template 
“…once upon a time…there was the Russell Template…”346 
A Introduction 
Prima facie one may consider that any arrangement to pay less or no tax would have attracted
many takers for such an opportunity. Mr Russell’s view of the template was that he was never 
a risk to the New Zealand tax base as some would suggest because in his opinion it was 
extremely rare for the circumstances to arise for someone to use the tax template.  He stated:347 
…there was no way could a wage earner use it…no way could a professional person use 
it…and it’s only those people who are prepared to sell their enterprise to someone else and 
then just work for it…and not own it…now there’s very few people that would do that…I 
think if you went up and down the street and said if you were prepared for more money to
not own your own house, not own anything and just work for someone else…most people 
say no…we want to own our house…we want to own our own business and they don’t care if 
they only make half the money…they must own it…the pride of ownership is far more 
important…
Mr Russell also found this sentiment with regard to people settling trusts. Some settlors struggled to 
realise they had actually disposed of their property. Mr Russell considers his arrangement is simple. 
Mr Russell maintained justification of the template by way of paying an inflated price for the 
business due to the fact that they would pay a premium for the profitable business as they were not 
paying cash.  The agreement also provided to keep the previous owner running the business to make 
use of their expertise. 
The purpose of the agency and management agreements was to permit the principal parties to 
derive an income in a manner that complied with the statutory provisions regarding insolvency.  
Had there been no agency and management agreements the principal partners would have been 
regarded as directly trading in the market place which would have been a breach of company law. 
In addition, the receiver is personally liable for such trading. The whole purpose of the template 
structure was to buy an income stream for a company with genuinely incurred tax losses.  This has 
always been the issue at the heart of the Russell template and where Mr Russell and Inland Revenue 
strenuously disagree. 
346 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 32, per Stevens J, 1 February 2012, Wellington. 
347 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
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Following is a reproduction of the Russell template as drawn by Mr Russell:
Figure 6: The ‘Russell template’, drawn by Mr J G Russell, 27 January 2010. 
Mr Russell described the template transaction as follows:348 
It’s a tax loss company that has got tax losses buying an income stream….you could only do 
this type of transaction if you were a tax loss company…and therefore the arrangement didn’t 
generate the tax advantage…it was the fact that the company had tax losses that generated the 
tax advantage…now there is nothing wrong with that and no one has ever suggested that there 
was…then it can’t be tax avoidance…because that is all the company did…was buy an 
income stream to use up its tax losses. (emphasis added). 
The TRA once estimated that up to 1,100 smaller businesses including up to 3,500 individuals had
been affected by the template.349 This number is hotly disputed by Mr Russell and there appears  
348  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
349 Case T52 (1998) 18 NZTC 8,378 (NZTRA) at [121] where Judge Barber states “there has been reference to a 
possible 1,100 companies having the Russell template implant (that would translate into affecting the lives of at least
2000, but probably about 3500, individuals) but, at another stage, the reference was to 500 such companies. I believe 
that only 76 such groups have, so far, places on my Register.”  Judge Barber continues “All in all, I see the picture 
as a sad mess which could benefit from the attention of the Executive and of Parliament.” 
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to be some speculation as to the exact number of entities and people affected by the template
litigation. Mr Russell stated that the template can only ever be put in place with people who are 
prepared to sell their income earning asset to somebody else. He found that very few people in 
business in New Zealand wanted to do so. In 1998 after almost a decade of template litigation it was 
reported:350 
Cases involving another 70 odd companies are in the pipeline. The latest ruling affects 
an estimated 1100 companies and up to 3500 individual investors. Many will not have the 
cash to meet the tax bill now landing in their lap. That means bankruptcy. 
351 Appendix 4 of this thesis contains a selection
of template related companies.
In Case T52 Judge Barber states:352 
…on the face of it, many taxpayers have been put into the mess I have described, but Messrs 
Grierson and Russell seem convinced that the law will eventually come out in their favour. 
Perhaps it will, but I think such an outcome is most unlikely. 
350 Mike Ross, “Thousands of individuals to pay as tax schemes are unravelled” The National Business Review, (online 
ed., New Zealand, 8 May 1998) at 61. 
351
352 Case T52, above n 349, at [121]. 
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B The Russell Template Discovered – The Pakuranga House Call 
The powers of the Commissioner, and by delegation to other officers of Inland Revenue, are very 
extensive. The Commissioner or any authorised officer of Inland Revenue are granted full and free 
access for the purposes of inspecting any book and documents together with any property, process 
or matter.353 
Although Mr Russell has had numerous requests for information under s 17 TAA 1994,354 he has 
never been the subject of a s 16 TAA 1994355 notice allowing the Commissioner access to search 
his premises to obtain information.356 
357
358 The Russell template documents were initially found to exist after a 
search of his accounting practice premises by the Department of Justice.359 
After the well-publicised Securitibank collapse, being the largest corporate collapse in New Zealand 
history at the time, Mr Russell claimed it was difficult to have any employment opportunities 
and this led him to start Commercial Management, initially run out of a small office in Upper 
Queen Street, central Auckland, and ultimately run out of his family home in
Pakuranga. Mr Russell stated:360  
There was no point really in applying for a job anywhere…while you are successful you are a 
financial genius, if you are unsuccessful you are a crook…that is basically the way you are 
looked at in New Zealand. 
353 See section 16(1) TAA 1994. 
354 Section 17 TAA 1994 [Information to be furnished on request of Commissioner].  
355 Section 16 TAA 1994 [Commissioner may access premises to obtain information]. 
356 Mr Russell was convicted of failure to furnish certain information pursuant to a s 17 Inland Revenue Department 
Act 1974. A conviction was entered on 30 October 1989. The Commissioner issued further notices in identical terms 
and Mr Russell applied for judicial review of all of the notices, seeking an order declaring the notices ultra vires. Mr 
Russell submitted that the information was sought as part of a ‘fishing expedition’ or roving inquiry without any 
cause for suspicion, and secondly that the Commissioner was using the s 17 provisions improperly and 
unreasonably. Smellie J struck out the application in Russell v Latimer (1990) 12 NZTC 7,321 (HC).  
357
358
359 The Department of Justice was created in 1872. In 1995 it was split into three parts, the Ministry of Justice, dealing 
with policy matters, while the practical administration of the courts and prison system were given their own 
departments. 
360 Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 23. 
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Mr Russell stated that he had “quite a few people come along to me and want me to rescue their 
businesses and all that sort of thing….”361 He considered that if half the businesses that came his 
way could be turned around and saved, that was a very good percentage. So Commercial 
Management began with just a few clients and experienced rapid growth. 
Mr Russell placed some initial advertisements in the Accountant’s Journal. He had never placed
advertisements in the newspaper. He soon found that he could not handle the volume of work, as
word of mouth recommendations to promote his business flourished. He shifted Commercial
Management from the Upper Queen Street premises to his home at Pakuranga. Having had five 
children the Russell’s had purchased this house in 1971. It had seven bedrooms and as children left 
the home to go flatting or get married Mr Russell “speedily converted their room into an office!”362 
Six rooms were converted into offices and a lounge was used for meetings with clients.  
Figure 7: Downsview Road, Pakuranga, Manukau City, Auckland 
The business was very well organised with a booking system for the meeting room (the lounge) 
initiated and daily lunch was provided by Melva, John’s wife, for all the staff. Mr Russell had shifts 
of accountants working from 4am in the morning until 11pm at night.363 With this activity all being 
361 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
362 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156.  Mr Russell displays his sense of humour during our interview by saying 
that it was hard to convince Melva his wife of the need for the additional room as an office at one stage saying 
‘Look Melva, we have got to do this because (1) we need it for the business, and (2) if we don’t, they [the children] 
might come back!’  
363 The long hours worked from a suburban home led to complaints by neighbours to the local council. The bylaws 
allowed employment of 3 people and the proprietor, not over 50 people. Mr Russell applied for resource consent in 
1996. The Council reached agreement with Mr Russell to continue the activity at 6 Downsview Road. The 
Commercial Management staff numbers were declining and Mr Russell had advised the Council he would officially 
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run out of a suburban home it is unsurprising it led to official complaints made by neighbours to the 
local council. Staff shared the desks but each had their own drawer in a desk that belonged 
specifically to them. Ultimately staff numbers peaked at 59.364 Mr Russell stated he had no problem 
getting good staff365 as a lot of people found the flexibility of hours very suited to them, especially 
young mothers that had previously been full time accountants, who could work a couple of days
a week at unusual hours suiting their other family responsibilities. 
Figure 8: The lounge (meeting room for clients) 
Mr Russell did have success in the ‘doom and disaster business’ as he referred to it. There were also 
the real disasters too, the real doom and gloom businesses that could not be rescued in any way.  
When Mr Russell was away on business visiting clients his practice while away was to ring his 
office to make sure everything was ‘running smoothly’. He had been on a business trip visiting 
clients in Matamata. On this particular trip in 1989366 when Mr Russell spoke to one of his staff 
retire in 1999. The council granted resource consent on that basis. Mr Russell shifted the location of Commercial 
Management to his current home at 1439 Clevedon-Kawakawa Bay Road in 1999 with no employed staff. 
364  The 6 Downsview Road property sold at auction in September 2012. The floor space was estimated at 
approximately 280m2, not an overly large amount of space to occupy 59 employees. A trust associated with Mr 
Russell had owned the property for over 40 years. The business had operated from this location for over 17 years. 
365  Mr Russell had employed at one stage an ex-District Commissioner of Inland Revenue. Mr Russell stated that ‘he 
was a very good man to employ’ and had asked him at his interview how he would manage shifting from being the 
‘gamekeeper’ to ‘poacher’. The ex-District Commissioner stated that he would have no problem in changing roles. 
Mr Russell recalled that this gentleman he had quite a sense of humour. A group of ex Inland Revenue 
Commissioners would meet once a month at a club in Remuera for a general catch up. Mr Russell told how his new 




members he was told that there were “a couple of guys sitting in a car….looks like they are staking 
the place out”.367 Naturally, this was of concern to Mr Russell so he decided to head back to 
Auckland immediately. In 1989 about 75 per cent of Commercial Management’s business was 
template related.  
When he arrived home he saw “a huge truck there with an army of people carrying files out of my 
house”.368  Ian Ramsay, the former head of the Justice Department’s Corporate Investigations Unit, 
was there with a Court Order. Mr Russell stated that there were several policemen there as well, so 
they “must have been expecting a big fight”.369 Mr Russell asked to have a look at the Court Order 
and saw that it provided authority to only take a couple of files.  
 Although Mr Russell confirmed that Inland Revenue had never come and 
physically searched his house he told me “but don’t talk too loud…it might give them an idea…he 
he….”370 
367 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
368 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23 
369 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
370 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
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The latest Receivers Report under s 24 Receiverships Act (filed 4 January 2012) shows 
an amount owing to the debenture holder of $368,433,797. This gives an idea of the amounts 
accumulating under a debenture. To illustrate this I looked at several years of Reports filed under 
the Receiverships Act 1993 with respect to this company. The growth of the debenture is as 
follows: 
376  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
377  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
378  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
379  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 1. 
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  Period of report (six monthly)          Amount owing to Debenture Holder 
7 April 1997 to 6 October 1997 $64,592,295 
7 October 1997 to 6 April 1998 $77,953,392 
7 April 1998 to 6 October 1998 $77,953,392 
7 October 1998 to 6 April 1999 $93,455,545 
7 April 1999 to 6 October 1999 $93,455,545 
7 October 1999 to 6 April 2000 $111,615,499 
7 April 2000 to 6 October 2000 $111,615,499 
7 October 2000 to 6 April 2001 $133,938,598 
7 April 2001 to 6 October 2001 $133,938,598 
7 October 2001 to 6 April 2002 $160,726,318 
7 April 2002 to 6 October 2002 $160,726,318 
7 October 2002 to 6 April 2003 $192,871,582 
7 April 2003 to 6 October 2003 $192,871,582 
7 October 2003 to 6 April 2004 $206,880,776 
7 April 2004 to 6 October 2004 $206,880,776 
7 October 2004 to 6 April 2005 $223,160,654 
7 April 2005 to 6 October 2005 $223,160,654 
7 October 2005 to 6 April 2006 $242,696,508 
7 April 2006 to 6 October 2006 $242,696,508 
7 October 2006 to 6 April 2007 $266,139,532 
7 April 2007 to 6 October 2007 $266,139,532 
7 October 2007 to 6 April 2008 $294,271,161 
7 April 2008 to 6 October 2008 $294,271,161 
7 October 2008 to 6 April 2009 $328,029,116 
7 April 2009 to 6 October 2009 $328,029,116 
7 October 2009 to 6 April 2010 $368,538,662 
7 November 2009 to 6 May 2010    $367,922 (sic) 
7 October 2010 to 6 April 2011 $368,433,797 
7 April 2011 to 6 October 2011 $368,433,797 
(Sourced from www.business.govt.nz on 27 December 2012). 
This shows the steady growth of a debenture held over the company. 
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D Precursor Cases – Case K28 and Case L85 
There are two ‘pre-template’ cases that reflect aspects of the Russell tax template. Case 
K28,380 the earlier case of the two, addressed the issue of whether an ‘administration fee’ was an 
allowable deduction.381 Case L85382 considered the words ‘of a temporary nature’ in the context of 
tax avoidance. Mr Russell did not consider these as relevant in relation to the template litigation but 
these cases do show the courts considering aspects of what later became part of the template – the 
administration fee and its validity, and the transfer of shareholding. 
1 Case K28 – deductibility of the administration fee383 
Case K28384 was a precursor to the ‘Track A’ template cases M104385 and M109.386 A reply to Mr 
Russell’s advertisement led to the organising of the sale and purchase of the shares in a shell 
company which had become insolvent. The parent company charged an administration fee. The 
amount of the fee would be set-off against tax losses. The shareholders of a property
development company, in response to an advertisement initiated by Mr Russell, purchased 60 per 
cent of the shares in a tax loss company through a nominee company which they wholly 
owned.387 The purchase price paid to the vendors was immediately advanced back to the 
nominee company for the purpose of paying the former creditors of the shell company once tax 
benefits were utilised. 
 Contemporaneously, the shell company purchased 100 per cent of the shares in the property 
development company thereby becoming its parent company. The parent company charged its 
subsidiary development company an administration fee which it then sought to deduct under s 104 
ITA 1976.388 Conversely, the parent company sought to offset the income received from its tax loss. 
The accounts of the parent company showed that the development company had been advanced a 
sum equal to the amount of the administration fee. This sum was apparently later repaid. The 
380 Case K28, above n 317. 
381  The objector was a property development company. 
382 Case L85 (1989) 11 NZTC 1,485 (NZTRA). 
383
384  Case K28, above n 317.
385 Case M104, above n 315. 
386 Case M109, above n 248. 
387  The agreement for sale and purchase of the tax loss company shares had to be nominally for only 60 per cent to 
comply with the provisions of s 188(7) ITA 1976 (prior to its amendment by the Income Tax Amendment Act 1980 
s 40(3) as from 1 April 1980. 
388 Section 104 ITA 1976 [Expenditure or loss incurred in production of assessable income], now s DA 1 (1) [Nexus 
with income] ITA 2007. 
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Commissioner disallowed the deduction pursuant to s 99 ITA 1976 so the arrangement was 
never completed. 
There were allegations raised by Inland Revenue that certain documents were backdated so as to 
circumvent legislation introduced with effect from 1 March 1980. It was the tax inspector’s belief 
that various documents involved had been backdated to 21 February 1980 “…so as to circumvent 
legislation introduced with effect from 1 March 1980.”389 Bathgate J doubted whether any of the 
documents mentioned were completed on that date.  390  391 
Ultimately the deduction claimed for the administration fee was disallowed. It was held that the 
purpose or effect of the deduction was tax avoidance rather than tax mitigation. 
2 Case L85 – A ‘temporary’ transfer of shares 
It would appear that the first case to be litigated where tax avoidance and loss offsets between 
companies involving Mr Russell was Case L85.392 A private company sought to have losses from 
another company set-off against its assessable income for the 1980 financial year.393 The private 
company entered into an agreement394 to temporarily purchase shares in a loss company,395 so as to 
satisfy the grouping requirements of s 191 ITA 1976,396 and to enable the losses to be deducted 
from the private company’s assessable income. 
389  The effect of the legislation introduced with effect from 1 March 1980 was never spelt out by counsel for the 
Commissioner, nor was it relied upon at the hearing to support the Commissioner’s case. 
390
391
392 Case L85, above n 382. 
393  These losses were allocated in the 1980 return of income to the objector, which declared its assessable income as 
$78,831.19 but deducted the so called accumulated losses of the company (and a small loss brought forward from 
the previous year). The amount of income tax at issue in this case was $35,441.55. 
394 An agreement was signed between the private company as the purchaser, a Mr RSC and Downsview Nominees Ltd 
as the vendors, for the sale and purchase of ordinary shares in the company in February 1980. 
395  On 31 March 1980 the company had losses of $79,004.29 available for carrying forward to the next year. 
396 [Section] 191 COMPANIES INCLUDED IN GROUP OF COMPANIES] 
191(1) [Determination of group of companies] For the purposes of this section – 
(c) The proportion of the paid-up capital, and of the nominal value of the allotted shares, and of the
voting power, and of the title to profits held by any person in any company at the end of any income
year shall be determined by the Commissioner; and
(i) In determining those proportions, the Commissioner shall disregard any alteration in those
proportions which, in his opinion, is of a temporary nature and has or purports to have the purpose
or effect of in any way –
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The single issue in this case was whether the transfer of all (36,250) of the ordinary shares in the 
company from RSC (except for 1 share) to the objector (purchaser) on 14 February 1980 was of a 
‘temporary’ nature. The issue of the preference shares on 14 February 1980 was designed to fulfil 
the 40 per cent common ownership requirement of s 188397 regarding the carry forward of losses. 
This in many respects reflects an aspect of the Russell template in that the vendors of the profit 
company could repurchase the assets of the company at a later stage, or re-enter the template 
arrangement. The agreement also had similarities398 to tax loss agreements being entered into prior 
to this time, including the Challenge case399, and as already noted these types of agreements to 
‘split’ the tax benefits were being approved by Inland Revenue at the time. 
The agreement contained various clauses,400 including preventing the purchaser from selling the 
shares in the loss company without the consent of the vendors.  It also required the purchaser to 
transfer the shares to the vendors, between three and ten years after the date of the agreement;401 
and contained a clause stating that the vendors and purchaser covenant that all enquiries regarding 
this transaction, or with each other, or with the Inland Revenue Department, be channelled 
through Mr Russell’s company, Commercial Management Ltd.  
397 [Section] 188 (7) ITA 1976 [Requirements to satisfy] ‘Subject to subsections (9) and (9A) of this section, if any 
taxpayer (hereinafter referred to in this section as the loss company), being a company having the liability of its 
members limited to its memorandum of association to the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares respectively held by 
them, claims, in accordance with subsection (2) of this section, to carry forward the whole or part of a loss incurred 
by it in any income year (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the year of loss), to any later income year, the 
claim shall not be allowed unless the Commissioner is satisfied that –  
(a) At all times during the period commencing with the beginning of that year of loss and ending with the end of
that later income year, shares in the loss company carrying between them –
(i) The right to exercise not less than 40 per cent of the voting power in the loss company; and
(ii) The right to receive not less than 40 per cent of the profits that may be distributed by the loss  company; and
(iii) The right to receive not less than 40 per cent of any distribution of the paid-up capital of the loss company, -
Were held directly, or through any one or more interposed companies, by or on behalf of the same persons…..’ 
398 Clause 3 of the 1980 agreement provided that ‘the purchase price of the said shares shall be the sum of one dollar 
($1.00) provided that should at any time the Purchaser receive a definitive tax assessment which includes therein tax 
benefits accruing as a result of the Purchaser holding the said shares then the Purchaser will forthwith pay to the 
Vendors one half of such tax benefit by way of increase to the purchase price hereunder…’ (emphasis added). 
399 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 49; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
Challenge Corporation Ltd, above n 49; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd, above n 24. 
400 The restriction contained in Clause 6 of the 1980 agreement was to ensure that no one ‘unfriendly’ to RSC would be 
able to use the name of the company. John Russell said at 4 of Case L85, above n 382 that “I was a mate that 
rescued him” (RSC) and that he (JGR) would have done what was right and proper in the circumstances. It was put 
to Mr Russell in cross examination that the effect of clause 6 of the 1980 agreement was to have the objector 
purchase the ordinary shares in the company for three years to enable the objector to use the tax losses of the 
company, and that the shares in the company were then transferred back to RSC via JGR. John Russell stated that 
RSC was “a layman and all this legal stuff was not his cup of tea”. 
401 This clause was removed in 1982 by an amending agreement (and revoked other clauses as the 1980 agreement did 
not correctly express the intentions of the parties and it was desired the 1980 agreement be rectified accordingly).
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The Commissioner in disregarding the alteration of the shareholding, thus disallowing a deduction 
for the losses, contended that the transfer was of a temporary nature and, had the effect of altering 
the incidence of income tax, and therefore should be disallowed under s 191(1)(c)(i) ITA 1976.   
Mr Ruffin, for the respondent, submitted the only issue was the transfer of shares and that the 
transfer was of a temporary nature and that it was a matter of fact and degree for Judge Barber to 
decide. Section 99 ITA 1976 was not relied upon but reference was made to the Challenge 
judgments including the Privy Council case. Mr Ruffin submitted that the temporary nature aspect 
must be considered against a background of tax avoidance. This then raised the question of what 
was the meaning of the phrase ‘of a temporary nature’ contained in s 191(1)(c)(i) ITA 1976. There 
was no authority for the meaning of the phrase ‘of a temporary nature’ in s 191(1)(c)(i) so Mr 
Ruffin referred Judge Barber to a number of passages from the 1985 Federal Court of Australia 
decision in Hazfa v Director-General of Social Security403 to assist. Although Hazfa dealt with an 
entirely different issue, the views of Wilcox J on the meaning of the word ‘temporary’ were helpful.
In terms of s 191(1)(c)(i) ITA 1976, the Commissioner was entitled to disregard an alteration in the 
shareholding of a company, if that change was of a temporary nature and involved tax avoidance. 
Judge Barber held that the holding of shares for three years may, more often than not, be regarded 
as a fairly permanent acquisition of shares. However, against the background of the purpose of 
utilising tax losses and steering the matters through Inland Revenue or objecting through the TRA 
or High Court, a period of three years is a relatively short period. In the context of this case and of 
the purpose of tax avoidance by utilisation of the losses of another company in terms of s 191 the 
three to 10 year period qualified as ‘of a temporary nature’ under s 191(1)(c)(i) ITA 1976. 
Judge Barber, in confirming the assessment, stated that he did not accept that, “…there was nothing 
temporary regarding the shareholding…”404 and that clause 6 of the agreement spoke for itself. 
Judge Barber considered in the context of this case that a period of three to 10 years qualified as “of 
a temporary nature” under s 191(1)(c)(i) ITA 1976.     
402 See Chapter VIII ‘Settlement at last...not quite!’ for a discussion on the Kemp litigation. 
403 Re Maya Hazfa v Director-General of Social Security [1985] FCA 164, (1985) 6 FCR 444. This case considered the 
meaning of “usual place of residence” and what constitutes a “temporary” absence in relation to the Social Security 
Act 1947. 
404  Case L85, above n 382. 
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Mr Russell was the only witness for this case and he accepted that tax avoidance had taken place 
intentionally. Case L85405 would have been one of the first cases that Judge Barber would have 
heard with a connection to Mr Russell and his associated litigation.  The beginning of the storm was 
brewing with few realising what lay ahead. 
405 Case L85, above n 382. 
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E The First Template Cases – Case M104
406
 and Case M109
407
“I agree with Mr Grierson’s submission that the transaction was ‘commercially 
ingenious’, but I reject his submission that it was ‘commercially realistic’”408 
The template cases concerned income tax years from 1980 onwards. Mr Russell stated that the 
purpose of the template was “nothing to do with tax”.409  It was to get some money for the 
debenture holder. The first template case, Case M104410 was reported on 23 August 1990. What is 
perhaps not commonly known is that the template, although initially a creation of Mr Russell, was 




F Fiorucci Fashions Ltd and the Miller and O’Neil Litigation 
The focus of this thesis is placed on the Miller and O’Neil template Case R25414 and the 
commerciality reasons for the Millers and O’Neil’s entering into the tax template arrangement. This 
thesis will consider in some detail the facts of the template case that ultimately was decided in the 
406 Case M104, above n 315. 
407 Case M109, above n 248.
408 Case M109, at 5 per Judge Barber. 
409 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 1. 
410 Case M104, above n 315. 
411
412 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 1. 
413
414 Case R25, above n 48. 
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Privy Council, O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue.415 As the template is essentially the 
same in most of the Russell template cases416 presented before the Courts it is considered that a 
detailed explanation of the Miller and O’Neil decisions is appropriate for this thesis.417
In essence the template involves shares in a profitable company being sold at an inflated price  
through a complex maze of corporate structures to a loss-making shell company controlled by Mr 
Russell. The owners of the profitable company remain as directors and trustees of their former 
company, running it as usual.  Appendix 5  of this thesis contains a complete set of redacted 
template documents.
Profits of the company are paid to Mr Russell’s company as so-called administration charges. 
In reality, the administration charges were partly a conduit for the money to be returned to the 
original shareholders as instalments of the purchase price and fees paid to Mr Russell for 
running the scheme. When all the instalments were paid to the original shareholders tax free, 
they could buy back the company at a nominal price and carry on as if nothing had happened, 
or re-enter the scheme.  
The core documentation and facts in Case R25418 were similar to Case M104419 and Case M109.420 
Judge Barber had found similar transactions to be void against the Commissioner in Case M104 and 
M109 because they constituted an arrangement in terms of s 99(1) ITA 1976. They were plans 
to avoid liability for income tax and were artificial, contrived, and not sensibly related to 
ordinary business dealings, nor did they amount to tax mitigation.421 A primary purpose and 
effect of the arrangements in those cases was tax avoidance and the tax consequences could 
not possibly be described as merely incidental. The Commissioner succeeded in Case M104 
and Case M109; however, the ‘cupboard was bare’ when the Commissioner sought to 
enforce the assessments confirmed by Judge Barber’s decision. In Case M104 and Case M109 
the Commissioner had not reconstructed assessments under s 99(3) [Adjustment of income] to 
assess the shareholders of the ‘profit company.’ In Case R25, s 99(3) was applied and resulted in 
very substantial assessments422 personally against the Millers and the O’Neil’s. 
415 O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
416 There were minor variations to the template.  
417
418 Case R25, above n 48. 
419 Case M104, above n 315 
420 Case M109, above n 248. 
421 Tax ‘mitigation’ was a term coined by Lord Templeman in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge 
Corporation Ltd, above n 24. 
422 An appendix in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142 displays the amounts initially allocated to 
Managed Fashions Ltd, Mr and Mrs Miller and Mr and Mrs O’Neil for the 1986 to 1989 income tax years. In later 
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1 The friendship with the Millers and O’Neil’s 
The Millers and O’Neil’s and their business, Fiorucci Fashions Ltd (later named Managed 





litigation the percentage split to the husbands and wives was considered. Also contained in the appendix is the 
amount of administration charge disallowed as a deduction in terms of s 99 and /or s 104 ITA 1976. 
423  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
424  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
425  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
426  Mr Russell had involvement with many companies as a director, in addition to being a director of Securitibank. 
Some of the other companies were associated with the Securitibank business. 






428 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
429 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
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Mr Russell reflects that probably around 20 per cent of the companies bought by the Russell group 
of companies were risky businesses. But there were others that were not risky in the sense that they 
had been in profit and were not in any financial difficulty. He states:436  
…the people were happy with the arrangement…probably because it returned more money for 
them than what they would get if they kept owning the assets themselves…so I suppose to that 
extent you could say that probably the tax advantage was one of the main reasons they did 
it…
432 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
433 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
434 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
435
Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 1.  







 This was the end 
of the line for any further use of the Russell tax template. In Case Z19, the ‘Track E’ litigation, 
case, Judge Barber stated in his last sentence of the judgment that “In this case, the Commissioner 
could reasonably have imposed shortfall penalty of 150 per cent for tax evasion.” 442 
437
438 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 1.
439
 Personally Mr Russell favoured the 
continuation of the Privy Council link rather than a New Zealand Supreme Court, in part due to his feeling that a 
litigant like himself becomes known by all of the judiciary in New Zealand and the independence of the Privy 
Council appealed to him in this regard. 
440
441 O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 






A Adjusting the Assessable Income – ‘Track A and B’ 
Mr Russell had conceived the idea of putting tax losses to use, employing s 188 of the ITA 1976 
(ITA 1976), which permitted taxpayers to carry forward such losses and set them off against 
assessable income in a later year, and s 191 of the ITA 1976 which allowed for grouping of the 
accounts of related companies. 
Mr Russell devised what he termed a ‘business structure’ for corporate reorganisation. It has been 
used since 1980 in essentially the same form and was described in the course of argument as a 
‘template’. The planned economic result was that the ‘water’ of income, which but for the ‘business 
structure’ would have been taxable to the profitable company and conceivably again if any dividend 
were paid to its shareholders, would be converted into the ‘wine’ of untaxed capital receipts in the 





In the early stages444 of attempting to deal with the Russell template tax schemes, the Commissioner 
appeared to have concentrated upon the tax saving afforded to the trading company by the 
disappearance of its profits in the form of administration fees. The Commissioner made assessments 
on the basis that the administration fees paid would not have been allowable deductions. This form 
of assessment was called ‘Track A’. Although there were quite a few ‘Track A’ cases, only two of 
them went to court being Ron West Motors (Otahuhu) Ltd and K J Cummings Ltd (Cases M104 
and M109 respectively).445  
During the ‘Track A’ litigation Inland Revenue perceived that collecting the tax would be a 
problem. Mr Russell considered that “if they were assessing the money they made a mistake in the 
first place choosing the company.”446 Mr Russell acknowledges that s 99(3) ITA 1976 counteracts a 
tax advantage derived from an arrangement, stating that “the only person you can assess is the 
person that got the tax advantage,”447 and in his mind it was quite clear that the tax advantage in the 
Russell template was in the parent company. Mr Russell considered Inland Revenue should have 
assessed the parent company, which they did under ‘Track C’, but later abandoned it because they 
could not make it work. 
1 ‘Track A’ – A ‘pyrrhic’ victory 
The ‘Track A’ assessment route was in reality a ‘pyrrhic victory’. This description was first coined 
by Blanchard J in the judicial review Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue448  where his 
Honour summarised the background by reference to Case M104 and Case M109. His Honour 
stated:449    
The Commissioner’s victories before the Taxation Review Authority in Cases M104 and 
M109 have proved to be pyrrhic. This is because the Commissioner chose in those cases to 
attack the schemes by assessing the trading companies on the basis of disallowing consulting 
fees paid to Mr Russell’s partnership and the administration fees paid to the parent company. 
When this was upheld by the Authority, it produced taxable profits in the trading companies 
but, of course, the moneys themselves had long since gone elsewhere and the Commissioner 
444
445 Case M104, above n 315 and Case M109, above n 248. 
446 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
447 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
448 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1993) 15 NZTC 10,187 (HC). 
449 At 7. 
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found himself with judgments against empty shells. For this reason when seeking to attack the 
arrangements put in place by Mr Russell for the present plaintiffs the Commissioner changed 
his approach. In his amended assessments he is using s 99 in a different manner. 
450
This suggestion prompted a meeting in Auckland on 7 February 1990 where the minutes of the 
meeting record:451 
…it is the original shareholders who get the CASH. Currently our approach is to disallow that 
deduction of ‘Administration fees’ paid to the alleged Parent Loss Company under s 104 – 
also using s 9. 
There would seem to be considerable advantage – especially in the recovery area, in trying to 
assess the cash received by the original shareholders using s 4. 
I will endeavour to obtain a legal opinion on this matter by 1 March. 
In Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,452 Baragwanath J agreed with Mr Ruffin (legal 
counsel for the Commissioner) that the administration charge was “simply a device to siphon the 
company’s surplus out of the company so that there would be no assessable income to the 
company.”453 Further he saw it as ‘perfectly clear’ that the charge was fixed to increase overheads 
to match the gross profit of a similar figure to result in a nil profit/loss. His Honour saw no 
conclusion available except that the administration fee was payable in exchange for the use of the 
template, not for gaining assessable income but for avoiding tax. Mr Russell states that, in relation 
to Case M109, Inland Revenue received payment in full of all tax owing.454 
2 ‘Track B’ – Miller and O’Neil 
In early 1990 it was apparent that Inland Revenue realised they were losing the tax collection 
‘battle’ and were proactively preparing to tackle Mr Russell head on. This is evidenced in several 
Inland Revenue file notes and internal memorandums written at the time. Recovery of tax was 
becoming an issue. A memorandum dated 12 February 1990, which recorded an important meeting 
of 7 February 1990 noted:455 
450
451  At 35. 
452 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1997) 18 NZTC 13,219 (HC). 
453 At 13,235. 
454 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 1.
455 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 80. 
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One of the problems to be faced in (sic) that some of the companies sheltering profits have 
now run their course. In these cases, some companies have sold their assets (and liabilities) 
back to the original shareholders – leaving the company as a mere shell. Recovery of any taxes 
now imposed will be a problem and we may decide to give these cases low priority. 
Another memorandum of 20 February 1990 recorded the remarks made by Mr Player, to another tax 
inspector: 456 
He said he is concerned that a lot of the Russell companies will sell back the business to the 
original shareholders and become dormant shells with no assets that we cannot recover tax 
from. This would mean even if we were in Court we do not recover any tax. Our problem is 
primarily a recovery one. (emphasis added).  
Some 22 years later, in 2012, Inland Revenue’s ‘problem’ remains one of tax collection, as well as 
one of ultimately wanting to be held as ‘being right’.  
On 11 May 1990 an internal Inland Revenue memorandum headed, ‘Review of JG Russell 
Schemes’, referred to a team of five inspectors controlled by Mr Player (a small team of 
investigators prior to the instigation of the ‘Russell Team’) awaiting the TRA decision concerning 
‘Track A’ saying:457  
[we are] losing the …asset less shell. New approach [is] being considered. 
This is that s 99 be applied to the WHOLE scheme and the persons who receive the 
cash advantage i.e. the original shareholders of the ‘Profit’ company, be assessed 
with the rearranged income from the scheme. 
On 24 May 1990, Inland Revenue received a series of file notes prepared by Dyer & Co. Chartered 
Accountants which purported to contain the record of a discussion with Mr Russell. 
The file notes included the following passage: 458 
On 7.2.89 following the meeting the AY, BAHM met with JRG (sic) to query matters relating 
to the tax structure to assist BAHM to decide whether to continue the arrangements or not. 
The following was discussed. 
456  At 80.
457  Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 80 & 36.
458 AY is an abbreviation for Arthur Young. BAHM is an abbreviation for the shareholders in Applied Beverages Ltd – 
Beuth, Abrahams, Haskayne and Mason. This material was admitted in the interim judgment of Baragwanath J. 
Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 80.  Mr Russell challenged the admissibility and accuracy 
of this material. Baragwanath J admitted it as it was relevant to the issue of the Commissioner’s motivation: Miller v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 81. 
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Question: (BAHM) If the IRD rejects the arrangements and comes back for tax what is 
BAHM’s liability? 
Answer: (JRG) (sic) IRD go for the company not the individuals. IRD give warning of 
investigation (warning bells) – assets would be shifted from BMM [Booth Manufacturing and 
Marketing Ltd] to another company. (emphasis added). 
Action would be against company with no assets – and JRG (sic) says he would win if one 
was brought against CML [Commercial Management Ltd] as owners. 
A record of a meeting held on 30 May 1990 referred to a belief of asset stripping, something which 
had previously only been suspected. It would appear the Dyer and Co. file note perhaps only 
confirmed the suspicions that may have been held by Inland Revenue investigations staff. A report 
dated 11 July 1990 indicated that a new approach was needed. The report recorded:459   
Inherent recovery issues built into the scheme by Russell at the outset but not appreciated in its 
essence until stage of potential hearing [before the] Taxation Review Authority.  (emphasis 
added). 
On 11 July 1990 the Assistant Controller of Investigations, Wellington, Ms Phillipa Foulds, wrote a 
memorandum stating:460  
Assessments issued to date under the Russell Project have been pursuant to section 104 and 
section 99 Income Tax Act 1976. Five of these cases are presently pending a hearing before 
the Taxation Review Authority. It is suggested that the technical approach be altered so that a 
reconstruction under s 99 has the effect of assessing the individual shareholders for the total 
income and to refer to s 65(2)(a) and /or s 65(2)(1) as back up. 
Ms Foulds was concerned about legal issues arising from the proposal that Inland Revenue adopt an 
alternative assessment approach and requested legal advice from Mr Alan Clarke,461 an in-house 
Inland Revenue solicitor. Mr Clarke’s opinion was provided on 10 September 1990, and following 
that report on 27 September 1990, another meeting was held where it was agreed that ‘Track B’ 
assessments would be imposed.   
459  Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 81. 
460  At 36. 
461  The legal advice provided by Mr Clarke was challenged as to whether it was a privileged document. His Honour
Baragwanath J held that in his view the opinion was to be characterised as prepared for the dominant purpose of 
giving legal advice rather than in performance of executive function. Mr Clarke had acted as a lawyer rather than as 
an official. Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 38. 
134 
3 Inland Revenue interview with the Millers and O’Neil’s 
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) came into force on 28 August 1990. Section 27 of the
BORA462 is concerned with a person’s right to justice, which in essence states that a person 
(including a taxpayer) is entitled to natural justice. One of the first cases to be considered under 
the then new BORA was in fact a tax related case Knight v Barnett.463 In this case, somewhat 
embarrassingly for Inland Revenue, two obviously overly diligent investigations officers were 
held to have crossed the line into what was clearly unacceptable surveillance of a tax agent. Mr 
Russell recently raised the issue of natural justice in his application for judicial recusal during the 
‘Track E’ litigation.  
However, the first time Mr Russell referred to the BORA was shortly after it had become law. The 
Millers and O’Neil’s were interviewed by Inland Revenue shortly after the BORA came into force. 
It was this interview that led Mr Russell to raise the BORA claim for the first time. By way of 
background an Inland Revenue investigations officer advised the Millers and O’Neil’s that he 
was to carry out an audit on the affairs of Managed Fashions Ltd for the period 1 February 1984 
to 9 August 1990 and sought to arrange an interview and requested records to be made available 
at the interview. 
The start date for this period was no doubt chosen as the sale of the Fiorucci Fashions Ltd business 
was sold to Mr Russell’s group on 10 December 1984.464 The request was made in terms of ss 16 
and 17 Inland Revenue Department Act 1974 (IRDA 1974).465 An interview was confirmed 
for Monday 1 October 1990 at 10.00am to be held at the premises of Managed Fashions Ltd, in 
Dacre Street, Newton, in Auckland. 
Managed Fashions Ltd was formerly Fiorucci Fashions Ltd, the original Miller and O’Neil 
clothing manufacturing company.
462  Bill of Rights Act 1990 s 27 [Right to justice]. 
(1) Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other public
authority which has the power to make a determination in respect of that person's rights, obligations, or interests
protected or recognised by law.
(2) Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law have been affected by a
determination of any tribunal or other public authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for
judicial review of that determination.
(3) Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to defend civil proceedings brought by, the
Crown, and to have those proceedings heard, according to law, in the same way as civil proceedings between
individuals.
463 Knight v Barnett [1991] 2 NZLR 30 (CA). 
464
465 Section 16 (Commissioner has power to inspect books and documents) and s 17 (Information to be furnished on 
request of Commissioner) Inland Revenue Department Act (IRDA) 1974. 
135 
 A sum equivalent to the tax saved was split between a company controlled by Mr Russell 
called Managed Hotels Ltd and the shareholders of the previously wholly unrelated profitable 
company Fiorucci Fashions Ltd, (later Managed Fashions Ltd), the Millers and the O’Neil’s.466
The correspondence from Inland Revenue about the pending audit was passed on to Mr Russell and 
a letter from Mr Russell dated 27 August 1990 to the Investigations Officer stated that Managed 
Fashions Ltd “is now entirely administered in this office.” Mr Foy, an Inland Revenue tax inspector, 
conducted the interview on 1 October 1990, just over a month after the enactment of the BORA. At 
the interview was the investigations officer, Mr and Mrs Miller, Mrs O’Neil (Brian O’Neil was 
away overseas) and Mr Russell. 
Mr Foy was told that following the application of the Russell business structure they ‘just carried on 
as usual.’ The Millers and Mrs O’Neil stated that advice and services were received from Mr 
Russell in exchange for a five per cent consultancy fee. They also told Mr Foy that they had 
never heard of an entity associated with them as part of the template arrangement, Managed Hotels 
Ltd.467 They said that the business structure was Mr Russell’s idea for providing a capital gain. 
They also confirmed that nothing had changed in respect of the running of the business.  
Mr Foy had 23 carefully planned ‘intelligent questions’ which formed the basis of the meeting. 
Various documents were also made available to him. The information gained during this interview, 
and pursuant to a s 17 notice requesting information, was later argued as either inadmissible 
or should not be accepted in Case R25.468 Essentially Mr Grierson in Case R25, who was 
acting for the taxpayers, submitted that evidence obtained at the interview and pursuant to the 
notice of request was either inadmissible or should not be accepted by Judge Barber in terms of his 
wide discretion to admit evidence under the IRDA 1974. He relied on several sections of the 
BORA.469  
466 The agreement for sale and purchase of the Fiorucci Fashions Ltd shares between the Millers and O’Neil’s as sellers 
and Commercial Management Ltd acting as trustee for Mr Russell’s company Managed Hotels Ltd. Other entities, 
including Managed Hotels Ltd’s holding company Gainsborough Motor Lodge Ltd (also controlled by Mr Russell) 
and Waikato Frozen Products Ltd, were employed to give effect to the arrangement.   
467 Mr Russell's company Commercial Management Ltd was acting as trustee for Managed Hotels Ltd in the arrangement. 
468 Case R25, above n 48. 
469 The following sections of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 were relied upon by Mr Grierson: 
Section 6:   Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred; 
Section 21: Unreasonable search and seizure; 
Section 23: Rights of persons arrested or detained;
Section 24: Rights of persons charged;  
Section 27: Right to justice.  
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Inland Revenue had legitimately obtained information about Mr Russell’s activities from the Justice 
Department, and although there were allegations the information was obtained in an illegal manner, 
it was found that the Inland Revenue officers had acted pursuant to s 17 of the IRDA 1974. Judge 
Barber did not see how the provisions of the BORA could assist Managed Fashions Ltd. 
Upon analysis there had been no unreasonable search or seizure and the information upon which the 
assessments were based could have been ascertained in a number of ways.470 There was no arrest or 
detainment. There was nothing irregular or improper about the meeting of 1 October 1990 or the 
notices requesting documents pursuant to the IRDA 1974 (now s 17 TAA 1994). Mr Russell was 
present at the interview and had been very involved in handling the responses to questions from 
Inland Revenue. Neither the Millers, O’Neil’s or Managed Fashions Ltd had been charged with any 
offence and Judge Barber stated he was always scrupulous to observe the principles of natural 
justice irrespective of s 27 of the BORA. 
None of the interviewed parties had been detained or arrested and there was no severe or 
overbearing nature to the questioning by officers of Inland Revenue. Mr Grierson seemed to submit 
that the Millers and O’Neil’s should have had legal advice before or at the interview but clearly 
there was nothing to stop them obtaining such advice. Mr Grierson referred to the Millers and 
O’Neil’s as “bewildered laymen being disadvantaged at such interview through sheer ignorance”471 
but in fact Mr Russell was present and it would appear he looked after the interests of the Millers 
and O’Neil’s. Mr Russell was referred to by Judge Barber as being “certainly not an ignorant or 
bewildered lay person.”472 
It is apparent that Mr Russell keeps abreast of the law changes and current events from our 
conversations. Consideration of the impact (if any) of the BORA for his template client only months 
after it becoming law is evidence of this. In addition is Mr Russell’s awareness of law changes both 
in relation to taxation, such as the changes to the tax loss offset provisions in the early 1990s. 
Mr Miller told Mr Foy that he had been advised that it had been decided to issue assessments to the 
shareholders because the company [Fiorucci] was now just a ‘shell’. He stated that both he and 
his wife considered it grossly unfair473 and quite improper for Inland Revenue to assess them 
simply because it believed that they were more likely to pay some tax than the company. Further, 
Mr Miller said that they were aggrieved as it was his understanding that the Commissioner 
470 Section 21 BORA provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether 
of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise’. 
471 Case R25, above n 48. 
472  At 35. 
473 Fairness/equity is one of the psychological factors in the BISEP Compliance Model. Perceptions of fairness are 
regarded as very important in relation to tax compliance.  See B.R. Jackson and V.C. Milliron, above n 106; M. 
Richardson and A.J. Sawyer, above n 105. 
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was said to have had full knowledge of their affairs in 1984 and performed an investigation in 1985 
which had not led to income being ascribed to them personally. Mr Foy wrote to Mr Russell (with 
copies to the Millers and O’Neil’s) outlining the steps contemplated by Inland Revenue by way of 
the imposition of a ‘Track B’ assessment, and invited their comments within 14 days. 
Both Mr Russell and Mr Miller replied by way of letters on 14 November 1990 making comment. It 
was said that the administration charges were not ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’ received by the plaintiffs 
as managers; that they ended up in the hands of the parent company and that the consulting fees 
ended up in the hands of Mr Russell’s partnership. The letters also contended that the payments 
made by the parent company were of a “capital nature being repayment of advances which were 
earlier made by the managers to the parent company.”  In addition Mr Russell’s letter stated “in any
event the actual cash payment ends up in the hands of our client company at the time of payment, so 
it is not correct to say that the funds end up in the hands of the managers. The actual cash ends up in
the hands of the company.”474 
A reply to clarify the matter was received from the Commissioner dated 4 December 1990:475 
Yourselves and Mr Russell were involved in what you in your letter describe as a ‘transaction’ 
to which you were parties. The Department’s proposed course of action involved treating such 
transaction, or rather the portions of it described in Mr Foy’s letter, as void against the 
Commissioner and, after avoiding the steps cited, reconstructing the factual situation to 
counteract the tax advantage sought to be gained by that which is avoided. In this context, the 
question as to what monies were actually received by you does not determine your tax 
position.    
As to the assertion that the Department may be claiming against the wrong persons in light of 
previous judicial decisions relating to other cases, such is not well founded as in such cases 
powers of reconstruction provided by the Income Tax Act were not invoked, whereas in the 
present case such would be invoked. (emphasis added). 
The letter summed up by saying that the proposal was to treat as void the elements of the 
‘transaction’ entered into between the Millers and O’Neil’s and Mr Russell described in Mr Foy’s 
letter, and to reconstruct to counteract the tax advantage obtained by entry into the transaction.  
474 Mr Russell’s letter cited in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 83.  Mr Russell finished this 
letter tongue in cheek with the comment: “However, having said all this it is apparent to us that it would be of great 
advantage to our client company and the parent company and to Commercial Management [Mr Russell’s 
partnership] if you were in fact able to get the Courts to find that the managers are liable to pay tax on the income of 
these other parties. From our point of view that would be a highly desirable arrangement and would be to the great 
benefit of all those companies with which we are involved. We regard the future possibilities of such arrangements 
as highly desirable to us and look forward to your further progress in the matter.” 
475  Letter of reply cited in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 83. 
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A few days later on 13 December 1990 Mr Miller on behalf of himself, Mrs Miller and the O’Neil’s 
replied to the Commissioners’ letter of 4 December by stating inter alia:476 
Unfortunately your letter does not tell us how you intend to reconstruct a situation which will 
involve us receiving assessment for tax over and above what we have already been assessed 
for and paid. We need to have the actual details if we are to comment sensibly on them and 
would be grateful if you would set out step by step how you propose to tax us on income 
which we did not receive… (emphasis added). 
In the meantime on 11 December 1990 Mr Foy had prepared his major report. According to Mr 
Russell Inland Revenue reversed quite a number of ‘Track A’ assessments and started again under 
the ‘Track B’ route. 
477
4 Changing tracks – is it permissible? 
Mr Russell considers the changes of ‘track’ to assess various parties are all part of the alleged 
vendetta being run against him by Inland Revenue. 
An argument raised in support of ‘Track B’ was that Inland Revenue had a better understanding of 
the template as aspects were uncovered. Mr Russell claims that Inland Revenue had a good 
understanding of the full nature of the scheme right from the start. They were simply trying to 
change the assessee to someone they thought they would get the tax from.  This would be surprising 
as a further change was yet to come – the least understood Track ‘C’ to be discussed shortly.   
On 20 December 1990, an Inland Revenue solicitor, Ms Margaret Cotton, performed her analysis of 
the Millers and O’Neil’s transaction and made a number of recommendations, first that 
reconstruction under s 99 be allowed; second, that the deduction for the administration charges be 
disallowed; and third, that the profit made by Fiorucci Fashions Ltd be assessed back to the Millers 
and the O’Neil’s. On 8 March 1991, Mr Phizacklea, a senior office holder in the Legal Services 
476 Letter cited in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 84.  Wylie J faced a similar situation in 
Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35 (the High Court ‘Track E’ litigation in 2010) where Mr 
Russell stated that he ‘did not receive a dollar from the arrangement, either directly or indirectly.’ See [140] to [149] 
of the judgment. 
477 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
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Division of Inland Revenue’s Head Office, endorsed upon Ms Cotton’s report approval to invoking 
s 99. 
On 19 March 1991 Mr Player signed a direction that s 25 [Limitation of Time for Amendment of 
Assessment] was not to apply. On the same day he endorsed Mr Foy’s 11 December 1990 report 
directing a reassessment of the Millers and O’Neil’s income for the years 1986 to 1989 in terms of 
Mr Foy’s report. Two days later, on 21 March 1991, Mr Player signed a series of letters to the 
Millers and O’Neil’s giving notice of reassessment on the ‘Track B’ basis. 
Mr Russell responded by way of letters on 15 and 18 April 1991 seeking substantial further 
information. On 15, 17 and 18 April 1991, he wrote giving notice of objection extending to 24 
grounds and advising Inland Revenue that until further information was obtained, it was 
not possible to finalise objections. Mr Player from Inland Revenue’s Auckland office responded 
to the requests for information by letters dated 7, 20 and 23 May 1991. The 23 May letter 
included a schedule showing how the reconstruction was performed.478  
On 13 June 1991 Mr Foy wrote to Commercial Management in essence stating that, as further 
information sought earlier had been provided, Commercial Management should be in a position to 
supply full and final grounds of objection. Mr Foy also advised that ss 99(1) to 99(4) ITA 1976 
would be applied and adjustments to Managed Hotels Ltd under s 99(4) would be made once a full 
review had been completed.479 
Baragwanath J held in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue480 that in his view there was 
nothing in this or other material adduced which could be said to establish that the Commissioner 
was distracted from his proper task by an improper purpose. It was in fact the contrary. The 
evidence satisfied Baragwanath J that it was well open to the Commissioner to conclude that the 
business structure infringed s 99 and that it was therefore the Commissioner’s duty to apply ss (3). 
He held that the Commissioner’s staff knew that the provision of the template allowed a pre-
planned comprehensive scheme to take effect which had the practical consequence of allowing the 
original directors/shareholders to continue to run the company and to receive the bulk of the net 
478 These letters were all referred to in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 13,044. 
479  
Mr Russell was granted 14 days to respond to the letter of 13 June 1991 and, after a lengthy letter of reply from Mr 
Russell, Mr Player wrote a letter dated 4 July 1991 spelling out in detail the basis on which the Commissioner was 
proceeding and affording a further 21 days for the formulation and submission of any further grounds of objection. 
By letter dated 12 July 1991 extending to five pages, Mr Player gave further particulars to Mr Russell of the 
Commissioner’s basis of claim against the Millers and O’Neil’s and afforded a further period of 14 days to submit 
any further final grounds of objection. 
480  Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 86. 
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profits of the business tax free. Furthermore Baragwanath J held that it was open to the 
Commissioner to conclude that the balance of payments by way of an administration charge was a 
fee for the provision of the template and not for other services. (emphasis added) 481  
The Miller’s and O’Neil’s had expressed at the earlier interviews that everything went on in the day 
to day running of the business as before. They were also in a position legally to reacquire the 
business by payment of a sum equivalent to the amount of the net liabilities plus $13,000, a right 
which was subsequently exercised.  
Baragwanath J held that the Millers and O’Neil’s knew that the transaction differed markedly from 
a conventional commercial transaction in the following respects:482  
Firstly, the transaction was planned to and did have the result of effecting no economic change 
in the position of the shareholders apart from the ultimate cost of repurchase of the $13,000 
and in the meantime they were receiving the whole of the net profits tax free after payments to 
Companies B and C. 
Secondly, Company ‘B’ did not perform any ‘administration’. Company ‘B’s receipt of the 
whole of the net profits of the business, out of which it made the tax free payments to the 
Millers and O’Neil’s, was pursuant to the original arrangement. 
Baragwanath J held that there was no element of improper purpose which would have constituted 
an abuse of power or would justify judicial intervention. His Honour stated that he did not doubt the 
Commissioner did seek to “go to where the money is”;483 equally the question of solvency was 
clearly not determinative, or his purpose dominated by such reason irrespective of any right to do 
so.  
The true issue was not whether the question of solvency was important to the Commissioner, and a 
major motivating factor, as Baragwanath J had no doubt it was. The real issue was whether the 
Commissioner lacked honest and reasonable belief that he was entitled to assess the Millers and 
O’Neil’s. Baragwanath J was satisfied that such was not the case and the Commissioner was fully 
entitled to elect to assess the plaintiffs and to rely on their receipt of substantial untaxed funds, and 
presumed ability to pay, in making that decision. The Commissioner’s task is to recover tax 
according to the law, not to waste public funds in useless forays against impecunious alternative 
targets.  
481 At 86. 
482 At 87. 
483 At 88. 
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Baragwanath J was satisfied that the Commissioner’s decision to shift from ‘Track A’ to ‘Track B’ 
was not simply because Fiorucci Fashions Ltd was insolvent. The true reason for the decision 
was that both Fiorucci Fashions Ltd and the Millers and the O’Neil’s were seen by the 
Commissioner as having obtained a tax advantage. This conclusion was clearly open to the 
Commissioner to reach and it then became the Commissioner’s responsibility to decide how the s 
99(3) ‘counteract’ duty was to be performed. It was the Commissioner’s view that the impecuniosity 
of Company A was in fact an element of the arrangement484 and that was the precipitating cause of 
the shift from ‘Track A’ to ‘Track B’. 
In conclusion, Baragwanath J considered that the decision to counteract based on the greater 
financial capacity of the Millers and O’Neil’s, was properly open to the Commissioner. It was not 
‘simply’ because of their stronger financial position but, critically, because of that position coupled 
with their tax advantage which it was the Commissioner’s duty to counteract.485  
The Commissioner could not require double recovery by both the plaintiffs and Company A. 
Baragwanath J found it was well open to the Commissioner to prefer to make recovery against the 
party which received the economic benefit and against whom the expenditure of public funds by 
way of recovery would be more likely to be more effective. It was on this basis that Baragwanath J 
found no reason to invalidate the ‘Track B’ assessments raised against the former shareholders, the 
Millers and O’Neil’s personally.  




Section 99(3) ITA 1976 (now s GA 1(2) ITA 2007) provides the Commissioner with the power to 
adjust the taxable income of a person affected by the arrangement in a way he/she thinks is 
appropriate in order to counteract a tax advantage obtained from or under the arrangement. 
486
The conceptual underpinning is that the arrangement in question is void as against 
the Commissioner. The adjustment can be made against anyone benefiting from the tax 
avoidance arrangement, there is no question of mutuality being needed, nor does the taxpayer need 
to be aware they are benefiting from or under a tax avoidance arrangement. The adjustment must 
counteract the tax advantage, which is not defined for the purposes of s GA 1 ITA 2007. The 
appropriateness of the Commissioner’s reconstruction was challenged in Miller v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue.487 When the ‘cupboard was found bare’ by pursuing ‘Track A’, the 
Commissioner changed to assessing under ‘Track B’. The issue was whether this changed 
approach was a suitable application of the reconstruction power of s 99(3) ITA 1976.  
It was argued by Inland Revenue that the company’s history demonstrated a low level of salaries 
and distributions from the company and that it was most likely that, had there been no arrangement, 
the profit would have remained within the profitable company. The Court of Appeal addressed this 
issue as follows:488  
We consider that the likelihood of receipt of moneys by the former shareholders must be 
judged by what they have actually done. They have caused all the profits to be removed from 
the company. It must therefore be taken that these sums would have been distributed in the 
form of additional salaries, management bonuses, dividends or in some other manner in the 
years in which they were earned by Fiorucci and would not have been left in the company.  
The desire of the shareholders to extract them is demonstrated by what they actually did. They 
were unlikely to have waited 10 years to get their hands on each instalment of earnings. It is not 
to be taken, either, that because a tax free means exists to receive moneys, their receipt by 
another means is to be deemed to be tax free. Furthermore, although part of the tax would 
otherwise have been borne by the company in the form of company tax, it is not to be forgotten
that an element of the arrangement was the stripping from it of its assets out of which it 
could otherwise have met that tax burden. In such a case those who had a responsibility for 
that course of action and who have themselves put it beyond the power of the company to pay its
486
487 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999] 1 NZLR 275 (CA). 
488 At 32. 
143 
tax and received the money themselves, have thereby indirectly received the tax advantage. 
Section 99(3) gives the Commissioner a wide reconstructive power. He ‘may’ have regard to 
the income which the person he is assessing would have or might be expected to have or 
would in all likelihood have received but for the scheme, but the Commissioner is not 
inhibited from looking at the matter broadly and making an assessment on the basis of the 
benefit directly or indirectly received by the taxpayer in question. 
On appeal to the Privy Council in O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue489  the taxpayer’s 
argument was dismissed saying at [31]: 
…provided that he was not using inconsistent hypotheses for his reconstructions, he was in their 
Lordships’ opinion entitled to assess any party who had obtained a tax advantage.  
Appendix 6 contains a letter demonstrating typical administration and management fees for a 
Russell template client. The original reconstruction of Managed Fashions Ltd, Millers and O’Neil’s 
is in Appendix 7 of this thesis. This reconstruction was later challenged by the taxpayers on the 
basis that a larger number of shares were held by Mr Miller and Mr O’Neil than held by their 
respective wives. 
489 O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
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B Assessing the Parent Company ‘Track C’ 
“…we can assess the parent companies because the whole thing is a sham…”490 
The least understood assessment ‘tracks’, and perhaps the most difficult to follow, are the ‘Track C’ 
assessments. The basis of the ‘Track C’ assessments was that the Commissioner could assess the 
parent companies because “the whole thing was a sham.”491 ‘Track C’ is based on that concept.492 
Lennard493 writes that “nothing is more calculated to raise the temperature of a tax dispute than an 
allegation of sham, tossed by the Commissioner like a handful of chillies into the slowly cooking 
stew of a tax dispute.” The success of such allegations has been mixed and well below the 
Commissioner’s usual success rate in the courts.
A finding of sham is clearly fact dependent. In a New Zealand context there have been very few 
reported tax cases holding that a sham exists.494 When examining the tax treatment of a transaction 
the first step is to ascertain the transaction’s true nature. In Re Securitibank (No. 2)495 it was said the 
true nature of a transaction can only be ascertained by careful consideration of the legal 
arrangements actually entered into and carried out. Before any issue of sham arises, it is important 
that a systematic and objective approach is undertaken to ascertain the true nature of the transaction. 
Richardson J in Re Securitibank (No. 2) provides guidance in this context.496  
490 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
491 For more on the meaning of ‘sham’ refer to IRD Tax Information Bulletin (TIB) Volume 9, No.11 (November 1997) 
at 7. 
492 In Snook v London West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786 (CA) at 802, Diplock LJ said that ‘sham’ means 
“acts done or documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are intended by them to give to third parties or 
to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal 
rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. One thing I think, however, is clear in legal 
principle, morality and the authorities…that for acts or documents to be a ‘sham’, with whatever legal consequences 
follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create 
the legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating.” 
493 Michael Lennard, “Wham Bam, It’s a Sham” [2007] Taxation Today 1. In Lennard’s view, it is bad public 
administration, and hence bad tax administration to make an accusal of sham on insufficient grounds. It is an 
inherently destructive act and should not be undertaken by the State in a casual or unfounded way. The vast majority 
of transactions are genuine and a court will be extremely reluctant to find sham unless it has been clearly proven by
the Commissioner. Any plausible innocent explanation would probably be preferred. Lennard concludes that 
although the allegation of sham is a tempting one for the Commissioner to make, a sham allegation with insufficient 
enquiry would be bad tax administration and lead to litigation which the Commissioner would be unlikely to win. 
494 A relatively recent win on sham was in the Actonz Management Ltd case, Erris Promotions Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (2003) 21 NZTC 18,330 (HC) where it was established on the basis of overwhelming evidence that 
some of the ‘software’ allegedly bought either did not exist or was not owned by the purported vendor, and that 
these facts were known to all parties. The Commissioner has not succeeded in sham allegations in Peterson v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 176; Glenharrow Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[2007] NZCA 346, [2008] 1 NZLR 222 and Accent Management Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2007], 
above n 136. 
495 Re Securitibank Ltd (No.2) [1978] 2 NZLR 136 (CA). 
496 ‘Sham – meaning of the term’, above n 491. 
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The assessments based on the doctrine of sham were ultimately withdrawn by Inland Revenue, 
although the time it took to do so appears to be quite excessive. Mr Russell stated “we were never 
able to work out what ‘Track C’ truly did…because we were never allowed to cross examine the 
architect of it.”497 Mr Russell considered that this particular argument “didn’t have feathers to fly 
with in the first place”,498 and it never got tested because the ‘Track’ was ultimately withdrawn. 
There were about one hundred ‘Track C’ assessments actually issued by the Commissioner; 
however, none of these assessments were paid.  
It was in September 1996 when the Commissioner embarked on the new assessment process 
originally called ‘Track C.’ 
499
Mr Russell stated that the ‘Track C’ process was “unintelligible and neither the Commissioner’s 
officers who were giving evidence or the taxpayers fully understood what was happening.”500 In 
fact, even now, Mr Russell said that he does not know for sure what the ‘Track C’ assessment 
process was all about. Interestingly, Case U23501 demonstrates the confusion that existed around 
this particular ‘Track’. Judge Barber writes:502  
It seems to me that there has been confusion over this so called Track C assessment approach to date 
because, when referring to it, witnesses and/or counsel have not necessarily been talking about the 
same thing. It seemed to me that even different witnesses for the respondent [IRD] had a different 
definition of Track C. 
Judge Barber continued:503 
However, by the end of the hearing before me, there did not seem to be dispute between 
counsel that Track C covers the administration charge, which has already been assessed to the 
497 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
498
499
500 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
501 Case U23 (1999) 19 NZTC 9,208 (NZTRA) was a continuation of interim decision Case T52, above n 349. 
502  Case U23, above n 501, at [18]. 
503  At [18]. 
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managers of the trading company, now assessed as sham income to Mr Russell’s parent 
company together with all expenses disallowed to that parent company. 
When examining the tax treatment of a transaction, the first step is to ascertain the transaction’s true 
nature.504 Before any issue of sham arises, it is important that a systematic and objective approach is 
undertaken to ascertain the true nature. For the Commissioner to make an allegation of sham the 
true nature would have to be objectively determined. 
1 FB Duvall – A supply of services and 505
The tax template litigation has been described as an “indisputably tortuous saga,”506 and the FB 
Duvall litigation that forms part of the template story, in particular with respect to ‘Track C’, is apt 
to also fit that description. In fact, the FB Duvall litigation has perhaps been the most difficult to 
504 Buckley & Young v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1978] 2 NZLR 485 (CA); (1978) 3 NZTC 61,271 (CA).  This 
is to be done in a systematic and objective way, so that there is no pre-judgment or “…sinister desire to impute to 
transactions something which they do not contain.” 
505
506 Managed Hotels Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2011) 25 NZTC 20,090 (HC) at [6]. 
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articulate in this thesis and provides insight into the procedural tax challenges that can arise in tax 
disputes. The plaintiffs in this litigation were all ‘parent’ companies in terms of the Russell template 
receiving payments made under the Russell template (as administration charges) for management 
services. Little is known about FB Duvall Ltd from a balance sheet perspective, although in the 
1998 case, FB Duvall Ltd (No 2)507 an affidavit was referred to sworn by Mr O’Dea508 that 
mentioned that $1.8 million of its assets were stripped from it and that it was insolvent. 
Initially in the FB Duvall Ltd Case Q34509 it was held that payments made under the Russell 
template (the administration charge) for management services were liable for GST,510 that the 
payments were not dividends (and accordingly not exempt from GST), and that earlier findings of 
the TRA511 in respect of income tax issues and the application of s 99 ITA 1976 [s BG 1 ITA 2007] 
did not affect the outcome in respect of GST issues. 
The GST periods in question in Case Q34512 were from 31 August 1987 to 30 June 1990. This is a 
common denominator with the Russell related litigation, where some of the income tax years in 
question date back over 20 years. 
The judgment for the ‘Track A’ Case M104513 was delivered on 23 August 1990 with judgment for 
Case M109514 delivered on 4 September 1990. Judge Barber had made an observation in this 
regard in Case M104 stating:
I observe that it seems appropriate that the receipts to MD Ltd from the objector be deemed 
dividends, and that the respondent has wide powers of reconstruction under s 99. 
It was following receipt of the first ‘Track A’ decisions515 in relation to the income tax assessments 
that Mr Russell, on behalf of FB Duvall Ltd, began to assert that the Commissioner should take a 
consistent approach in relation to the GST assessments. Essentially what Mr Russell said was that if 
the Commissioner was contending in an income tax context that no services had been provided by 
the plaintiff companies, then it necessarily followed that no services had been provided by those 
507 FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1998) 18 NZTC 13,943 (HC). 
508 Mr O’Dea, a member of the Russell Team.
509 Case Q34 (1993) 15 NZTC 5,159 (NZTRA). 
510 Case Q34, above n 509.  Judge Willy held that the payments were not dividends, and accordingly not exempt from 
GST. 
511 Case M104, above n 315 and Case M109, above n 248. 
512 Case Q34, above n 509.
513 Case M104, above n 315. 
514 Case M109, above n 248.
515 Case M104, above n 315 and Case M109, above n 248. 
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companies and that they had therefore wrongly been charged (and paid) output tax in relation to the 
fees they had received in that respect.  
Mr Russell considered the facts of Case Q34 to be indistinguishable to the facts in Case M104 and 
M109, consistent that the cases all were ‘template’ cases, in nature of similar structure. It was 
suggested GST already paid in prior periods would therefore be refundable.516 
In correspondence presented in Case M104 and M109 earlier, Mr Russell wrote that “the 
management fee is not a dividend, it is an invoiced fee on which goods and services tax has 
been paid and as far as we are aware no goods and services tax is applicable to dividends.”517
Further correspondence from Mr Russell in 1989 stated in relation to the administration charge 
“obviously the parent company is not going to provide administration services for nothing.”518 
Case Q34 did not address income tax avoidance, and consequently neither s 99 ITA 1976 nor its 
equivalent s 76 GSTA was in any way relevant. Although it has been very difficult to establish with 
any accuracy the number of companies (and individuals) involved in the template, Case Q34 refers 
to a comment made by Mr Russell where he states that the [template documents] are “standard in all 
cases within the group of some hundreds of affected companies.”519 
There were assertions made in Case Q34 that the evidence of Mr Russell had differed from that 
presented earlier in Case M104 and Case M109 where services were stated as being provided, 
and in Case Q34, where it was stated that it never supplied any goods or services to the
subsidiary companies with his Honour stating “he simply cannot have it both ways 
(particularly as he has appealed against the findings in Case M104 and M109).”520 Judge 
Willy held that the administration payment was made for services rendered by the parent 
company to the subsidiary and therefore cannot be a dividend but liable for GST. 
Judge Willy stated:521 
It is clear from the way Mr Russell approached the case that he finds such a conclusion 
repugnant to justice, and common sense. He takes the view that this court has already 
516 Both Inland Revenue and Mr Russell agreed that the amounts of money at stake were very large and although no 
precise figure was available counsel for the Commissioner estimated it would run into several millions of 
dollars. 
517  Letter from Mr JG Russell to the Commissioner, (8 September 1988). 
518  Letter from Mr JG Russell to the Commissioner, (25 April 1989). 
519  Case Q34, above n 509, at 3. 
520 At 10. In lodging an appeal to Case M104, above n 315 and Case M109, above n 248 his Honour Judge Willy 
thought that this would have indicated that the objector companies did not accept that the payments are in law 
dividends, or that the transactions were not caught by s 99 ITA 1976. 
521 Case Q34, above n 509, at 12-13. 
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characterised these payments as dividends, and that therefore they cannot be subject to GST. 
That overlooks the fact that this case turns on its own facts … the witness only has himself to 
blame for making such glaringly inconsistent statements about the same facts on different 
occasions. The conclusion is inescapable that he is merely trying to place upon those facts the 
construction that best favours his interests from time to time. 
Although it may have appeared only Mr Russell was presenting things to suit him, the ‘round two’ 
honours would certainly be awarded to Inland Revenue, as will be discussed shortly.  
To provide a little background, between April 1993522 and July 1997, the Commissioner undertook 
detailed investigations in respect of the affairs of FB Duvall Ltd, with the Commissioner 
subsequently forming the view and making the concession that no services had been provided by 
FB Duvall Ltd in return for the fee and that FB Duvall Ltd in fact had no taxable activity. 523 
In the High Court,524 Baragwanath J was of the view that this concession enabled or required the 
Court to look afresh at the assessments at issue and to take into account what he considered to be 
the logical corollary of the Commissioner’s concession, namely that FB Duvall Ltd was not entitled 
to claim any input tax credits either. Following the High Court judgment the Commissioner made 
zero assessments which, while deducting the wrongly imposed output tax, also rejected FB Duvall 
Ltd’s claim for input tax credits. That outcome was challenged by the taxpayer, but the High Court 
held in two further judgments525 that both output tax and input tax deductions should be reduced to 
zero in each period. 
That decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal526 on the grounds that, although it was open to 
the Commissioner to concede the appeal, the reasons for his doing so could not be interrogated by 
the Court. More particularly, the Court of Appeal held that in litigation involving an objection to an 
assessment the Commissioner was not entitled to depart from (reverse) the legal and/or factual 
position that underlay the assessment, which in this case was that FB Duvall Ltd was engaged in a 
taxable activity. The Court said that all the Commissioner could do was issue fresh assessments 
522 The judgment in Case Q34, above n 509 was delivered on 29 April 1993. 
523  FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2010) 24 NZTC 24,053 (HC). 
524 There were seven interim judgments issued by Baragwanath J in relation to the FB Duvall Ltd appeal, including;
FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1997) 18 NZTC 13,470 (HC); FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (1999) 19 NZTC 15,039 (HC) and FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1999) 19 
NZTC 15,515 (HC). 
525  FB Duvall Ltd v CIR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,039 (HC); FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1999) 19 
NZTC 15,515 (HC). 
526  FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,658 (HC). 
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which reflected his changed position, provided the statutory time bar did not prevent him from 
doing so.527 
The net result as far as FB Duvall Ltd was concerned, was that the Commissioner, as a result of his
concession of the appeal, was obliged to refund the output tax paid for the GST periods at issue
in the litigation.528 It would appear, that the Commissioner was unable to claw back the input 
tax refunded to FB Duvall Ltd.529 Following the Court of Appeal decision, FB Duvall Ltd asked 
the Commissioner to make amended GST assessments in accordance with the Court of 
Appeal judgment. The Commissioner failed to do so. 
FB Duvall Ltd asked that its request be referred to the TRA.530 The TRA held that it had jurisdiction 
to remedy any shortcomings regarding the assessments, including curing any procedural defects. It 
considered the Commissioner was obliged to reassess in accordance with the earlier decision of the 
Court of Appeal and that FB Duvall Ltd was accordingly not liable for output tax, but that there was 
no jurisdictional basis to embark upon a consideration of whether FB Duvall Ltd was entitled to 
corresponding input tax credits. 
At the request of the Commissioner, the TRA stated a case to the High Court.531 Priestley J allowed 
the Commissioner’s appeal and held that the TRA had no jurisdiction in respect of the case stated 
where there had been no disallowance of an objection, the TRA having no entitlement to discharge 
the Commissioner’s statutory responsibility to exercise his discretion. His Honour held that the 
reassessments that increase a taxpayers’ income tax as GST liability after the expiry of four years. There is an 
exception for fraud and wilfully misleading returns.
528  GST periods between 31 August 1987 and 31 August 1990, inclusive. 
529 Because of the length of time that had elapsed since the original assessments and because the amount of output tax
exceeded the input tax, it was not open to the Commissioner subsequently to issue fresh assessments that 
disallowed the input tax credits. To have done so would have involved increasing FB Duvall’s GST liability for 
the relevant periods in breach of the statutory time bar. The time bar (formerly in s 31 of the Goods and Services 
Tax Act 1985 and now contained in s 108A TAA 1994) provided that the Commissioner may not amend an 
assessment so as to increase the amount assessed if four years have passed from the end of the relevant taxable
period. The time bar issue that arose as a consequence of the way in which the Court of Appeal framed its orders in 
FB Duvall would not have arisen if the Commissioner dealt with the output and input tax issues at the same
time. If the two amounts were set-off against each other the overall amount of the assessments would have
decreased rather than increased. 
530 The Commissioner stated a case on 20 February 2001, but as a preliminary issue claimed that Duvall was unable to
request a case to be stated, as the objection, if any, made by Duvall had not yet been determined by 
the Commissioner. Questions for determination in the case stated included the following: 
a) Whether Duvall had made timely and competent objections to the assessments made by the Commissioner;
b) If not, whether Duvall was able to make a late objection to the periods in question;
c) Whether Duvall, in the absence of a determination regarding the alleged objections, was able to request a
case stated.
The TRA directed these jurisdictional questions to be the subject of a preliminary hearing, following which it made 
an interim decision Case V18 (2002) 20 NZTC 10,207 (NZTRA) and a final decision Case W25 (2003) 21 NZTC 
11,251 (NZTRA). 
531 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v FB Duvall Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,142 (HC). 
527  In broad terms the time bar contained in s 108 and 108A TAA 1994 prohibits the Commissioner from issuing 
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Commissioner could not be compelled to accept a late objection; nor did the Commissioner have a 
statutory duty to reassess prior to accepting a late objection. 
FB Duvall Ltd then appealed to the Court of Appeal.532 In dismissing the appeal, the Court 
observed that where an objection is late, it must first be accepted by the Commissioner. If so 
accepted, the objection must be considered by the Commissioner before a decision is made by him, 
either to allow or disallow it. If the decision is to disallow the objection or to allow it only in part, 
then the taxpayer may require the Commissioner to state a case. 
In addition, the Court of Appeal noted that the Commissioner is not bound by time limits when 
considering whether to allow or disallow a late objection, stating that the taxpayer is not deprived of 
remedy when unreasonable delay occurs. Judicial review would have been the proper course to 
follow if FB Duvall Ltd considered the delay to have been unreasonable. The Commissioner wrote 
to FB Duvall Ltd on two occasions advising that he had declined to accept the objections as 
timely.533 
(a) The ‘tortuous saga’ continues
The ‘tortuous saga’ has continued well into 2011. The plaintiffs all sought judicial review of the 
Commissioner’s refusal to accept late objections534 from them in relation to GST assessments made 
in the early 1990’s.535 
536
Mr Russell contended that the Commissioner was obliged to take the same approach to the GST 
assessments issued to other companies that were in the same position as FB Duvall Ltd. Mr Russell 
took this position not only on the basis that the Commissioner has a statutory duty to treat taxpayers 
532  FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2006) 22 NZTC 19,866 (CA). 
533 Letter from Inland Revenue to FB Duvall Ltd (31 May 2005).  The Commissioner wrote to FB Duvall Ltd advising 
that he had declined to accept as timely FB Duvall’s objections based on amended GST returns for the six month 
periods ended 30 June 1995 and 31 December 1996. On 5 May 2006, shortly after the FB Duvall Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue above n 532 decision, the Commissioner again wrote to Duvall advising that he 
had declined to accept as timely, Duvall’s late objections in respect of eight six month GST periods ended between 
31 May 1990 and 31 December 1994.  
534 There was no dispute that the time for objecting to assessments by Mr Russell was well past. This was the case even 
in 1993. The reason for the initial delay was that until the Commissioner had taken the tax position that the template 
transactions were tax avoidance arrangements that were void for income tax purposes, the issues in the Duvall 
litigation did not arise. The Commissioner regarded Mr Russell’s correspondence on these matters as constituting 
requests that the Commissioner accept a late objection under the relevant provision at the time s 33(2) of the Goods 
and Services Tax Act 1985. The Commissioner refused to accede to the requests and declined to revisit the earlier 
(original) assessments. The reasons that were historically given for this refusal were the lateness of Mr Russell’s 
requests and the need to await the conclusion of the FB Duvall litigation. 
535  There was a separate cause of action about delays by the Commissioner in making reconstruction adjustments that are
consequential on his tax avoidance assessments issued to other Russell entities under s 99(4) ITA 1976. 
536 FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52. 
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fairly under s 6 TAA 1994, but also because the Commissioner must necessarily (given his 
concession in FB Duvall Ltd), consider this is the ‘correct’ tax position.537  
(b) Affidavit discrepancy
An application by Managed Hotels Ltd (another ‘parent’ company) seeking interim orders declaring 
that the Commissioner take no steps to enforce a statutory demand pending resolution of judicial 
review proceedings, was heard earlier538 before Ellis J. Her Honour referred to an affidavit539 of Mr 
Strang dated 23 March 2009 where it was stated that the Commissioner “stands by” his original 
assessments (which were based on Mr Russell’s returns). Her Honour stated that in light of his 
[Commissioner’s] position in the Duvall litigation it seemed improbable that the Commissioner 
considered that Managed Hotels Ltd was providing services or engaging in a taxable activity. 
Her Honour considered the Commissioner faced something of a conundrum in that he did not 
consider the present assessments (the assessments that form the basis of the statutory demand) were 
correct but he was unwilling or unable to reassess in the way sought by Mr Russell because 
either:540 
(a) he was prevented by way of time bar from issuing reassessments that also require
repayment by Managed Hotels Ltd of the input tax refunds it had received; or
(b) in the event that any input tax received by Managed Hotels Ltd was less than the output
tax paid the Commissioner did not wish to pay a refund to Managed Hotels Ltd.
A further affidavit from Mr Strang referred to various items of correspondence prior to the 
concession made by the Commissioner in the High Court Duvall proceedings541 but then made 
statements with regard to ‘Track C’. The decision was made in August 1996 to reassess the parent 
companies on the basis of sham. The ‘Track C’ assessments were confusing to all parties with 
Inland Revenue staff having a different idea as to what the assessments actually were assessing. Her 
537  The Commissioner has the statutory power to amend assessments at any time (subject to compliance with any 
relevant procedural requirements, including the time bar) to ensure their correctness. This power was previously 
contained in s 27 of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, and is now contained in s 113 TAA 1994.  
538 Managed Hotels Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 506.  The hearing was 30 August 2011 with the 
judgment delivered on 19 October 2011. 
539 At [13]. 
540 FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52, at [13]. 
541  Mr Strang annexed nine substantial volumes of correspondence between the Commissioner and Mr Russell in 
relation to the various plaintiff companies. 
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Honour considered that what Mr Strang’s affidavit seemed to be suggesting was that, as a result of 
the Commissioner withdrawing income tax assessments (issued to other Russell entities) that were 
based on the contention that the template transactions were shams, the Commissioner had 
reconsidered whether his concession in the High Court was correct.  
Her Honour found these passages from Mr Strang’s affidavit “somewhat mystifying.” Why her 
Honour considered it so is because the Commissioner nonetheless continues to regard the 
transactions as (income) tax avoidance arrangements and (accordingly) has always been of the view 
that the administration fee served no purpose other than as a cog in the tax avoidance “machine.”542 
Her Honour considered that it was quite plain that any possible relationship between the ‘Track C’ 
income tax assessments and the Commissioner’s refusal to consider late GST objections was 
“news” to Mr Russell.543 Such a relationship could not have been a factor in the Commissioner’s 
earlier refusals because they preceded the ‘Track C’ assessments. 
It was for this reason that her Honour requested documentary evidence from the Commissioner that 
would show that the Commissioner had reconsidered the matter and made a fresh decision on that 
basis, and if so that the decision had been communicated to Mr Russell. This request brought to the 
Court’s attention three critical letters. There were two critical letters from Inland Revenue to Mr 
Russell in respect of the relationship between ‘Track C’ and the provision of services for GST 
purposes. 
In November 2008 Inland Revenue had said: 544 
…In summary, the purported link between track C and GST is not accepted by the 
Commissioner and the two matters are considered to be quite separate. (emphasis added) 
In other words, in 2008 the Commissioner was taking a position diametrically opposed to that 
hinted by Mr Strang in his 23 March 2009 affidavit. The letter then addressed the Commissioner’s 
concession in FB Duvall in the High Court as a “procedural error”545 and this did not accord with 
the reality of the matter in her Honour’s view.546  
542  The Court of Appeal in FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 526, noted at 15,662 that 
543  FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52, at [18]. 
544  At [20].  Letter from Inland Revenue to John Russell (19 November 2008).
545  FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52, at [22]. 
546  Her Honour stated that while it seemed clear that both the Commissioner and the High Court were procedurally 
mistaken as to the ambit of the High Court’s powers, that mistake had nothing to do with the merits of the 
underlying concession and to suggest otherwise was merely ‘cute.’  
Baragwanath J held that no services were supplied by FB Duvall in return for the administration charges. 
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The Inland Revenue letter then stated in what could be considered a somewhat condescending 
tone:547 
You make the point that you do not understand how a factual matter can give differing results 
under GST as opposed to the income tax regime. Primarily this is possible due to the differing 
nature of GST when compared to income tax. Both are governed by differing legislation 
which will affect the way that legislation applies to the same set of facts. In addition, GST is a 
tax on supply whereas income tax is, as the name says, a tax on income, meaning 
different tax concepts apply and which may result in differing tax consequences. 
Her Honour considered the proposition of the qualitative difference between GST and income tax. 
The question was whether or not the Commissioner, having determined for income tax purposes 
that no services are supplied in return for payment for the administration fee, can nonetheless assess 
for GST on the basis that the fee is paid in return for a supply of services.  
Inland Revenue legal counsel, Mr Ruffin, submitted that such a stance was not contradictory 
because there was a contractual obligation to make the payment and the existence of that obligation 
was sufficient to found a GST “supply”. Mr Ruffin referred her Honour to the High Court
decision Rotorua Regional Airport Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,548 which in her 
Honour’s view supported an opposite conclusion.549  
Ellis J considered in respect of the FB Duvall Ltd case that:550 
...the Commissioner’s position in the income tax litigation and the Court decisions all make it 
clear that, even if there is a contractual obligation to pay, no service is in fact “supplied” by 
the parent company in return for the administration fee. Money is being moved around for 
income tax purposes, that is all.  
547  FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52, at [22]. 
548 Rotorua Regional Airport Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2010) 24 NZTC 23,979 (HC). 
549 Mallon J in Rotorua Regional Airport Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 548, at [50] considered the 
established propositions as to the scope of s 8(1) GST Act 1985 [[Imposition of goods and services tax on supply]. 
His Honour considered the following: 
(a) ‘GST is levied in respect of “supplies”, therefore it is a tax on transactions rather than receipts or turnover;
(b) GST is charged on the supply of a good or service. Whilst services are broadly defined to mean anything
which is not goods or money, to be a service there must be a “thing” to be within the statutory word of
“anything”;
(c) Although the consideration need not be paid by the recipient of the services, there must be a nexus between
the consideration on which the GST impost will arise and the supply of goods or services; and
(d) The nomenclature used by the parties is not decisive, nor are the economic or other consequences. What is
crucial is the ascertainment of the legal rights and duties which are actually created by the transaction into
which the parties entered.’
550 FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52, at [26]. 
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While Baragwanath J in Miller said that the fee was payable “in exchange for the use of 
Mr Russell’s template”, that was not a “supply” made by the parent company. It has never been 
suggested that the sale of a tax avoidance product might constitute the relevant taxable 
supply.551 The Inland Revenue letter then reiterated that there was no relationship between the sham 
allegation made in the income tax context and the GST issue.552 
Mr Russell, in response553 stated perhaps rather provocatively that given that no attempt had ever 
been made by Inland Revenue to reassess the input tax, it could be assumed that the Commissioner 
had no issue with it and merely thought that the output tax should be refunded, in accordance with 
the concession. Mr Russell further stated that whether or not the administration charge was taxable 
was essentially a factual matter to which differences between the income tax and GST regimes was 
irrelevant.  
Mr Russell’s letter sought confirmation as to whether he was correct to now understand that the 
Commissioner:554 
…now claims that there is output tax on the administration charge?  It is true that he took that 
position before the TRA in the Duvall case but it was his own idea to reverse that position for 
the High Court. The reason he reversed his position was because after commencing the 
objection process for Duvall he came up with track C, which was a further change of mind 
from the track B assessment process and he could not then continue to claim in Duvall that 
there was output tax payable when he was alleging sham in the track C assessment process.  
Mr Russell’s letter then asked:555 
…would you please state precisely what the Commissioner’s now position is in respect of the 
administration charge for both the Goods and Services Tax regime and the income tax regime.  
Inland Revenue responded by reiterating the Commissioner’s position that there was no link 
between the ‘Track C’ (sham) income tax assessments and the GST treatment of the administration 
fee. Inland Revenue also stated that the Duvall litigation turned upon a “unique procedural fact”, 
rather than any statement of “general principle”, and that the fact that the administration fee had 
551 FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52, at [26], footnote 19 where Ellis J referred to 
Baragwanath J’s comments in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 452, at 13, 235.  Similarly, the 
Court of Appeal in FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 526 noted at 15, 662 that it had been 
held that no services were supplied by Duvall in return for the administration charges. 
552  Letter from Inland Revenue to John Russell, above n 544, stated:’ It is not accepted…that “…all parties now agree 
that the administration charged (sic) does not attract output tax in the GST regime”. 
553  Letter from Mr JG Russell to Inland Revenue (February 2009). 
554  Letter from Mr JG Russell to Inland Revenue (February 2009). 
555  Letter from Mr JG Russell to Inland Revenue (February 2009). 
156 
formed part of an arrangement that was void for income tax purposes did not “automatically” 
dictate the GST position. Her Honour expressed her views as to the invalidity of the last two points 
above and made comment that the first point was contrary to Mr Strang’s affidavit.  
Mr Ruffin could point to no correspondence556 where Mr Russell was told about what must have 
been a subsequent ‘about face’ by the Commissioner or any document in which his fundamental 
change in position has been analysed or explained. This clearly must add to the tremendous 
frustration Mr Russell must feel at times when dealing with Inland Revenue. 
Her Honour held that the plaintiff’s judicial review application in relation to the late GST objections 
must proceed. Ellis J stated that it ‘is well-established that the merits of a proposed objection must 
be considered unless the explanation for the lateness is so inadequate as to render that 
unnecessary’.557 Her Honour accepted that a considerable length of time had elapsed since the 
making of the assessments in question but considered the explanation for the delay could not fairly 
be regarded as inadequate.  
Ellis J thought it highly relevant that Mr Russell had first raised the issue of the proposed objections 
15 years ago, the merits of the proposed objections were linked with the outcome of the on-going 
Duvall litigation and it was the Commissioner who suggested that any decision on the late 
objections should await the conclusion of that litigation, and since the conclusion of the Duvall 
litigation Mr Russell has repeatedly and consistently renewed his request.  
Her Honour stated that once it is concluded that the explanation for the delay is adequate, the 
narrative shows quite clearly that either the Commissioner failed to turn his mind to the merits of 
the proposed objection or to the extent that he had done so, his assessment of the merits is seriously 
flawed. Her Honour in that respect considered that:558  
it is not possible to conclude that administration services were supplied by the parent 
companies for GST purposes in the face of the Commissioner’s position (which has been 
endorsed by the Courts) in the income tax cases. The fact that there may be 
differences between the GST and income tax regimes is immaterial, (emphasis added).
Her Honour also considered the withdrawal of the ‘Track C’ (sham) income tax assessments did 
not constitute a valid basis for revisiting the substance of the concession given that the 
Commissioner continues to regard the Russell template as void for income tax purposes and the 
administration fee as merely a profit transfer mechanism. Her Honour made the point that the 
556  FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52, at [31]. 
557  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Wilson (1996) 17 NZTC 12,512 (CA) at 12,521; Lawton v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [2003] 2 NZLR 48 (CA) at [29]. 
558  FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52, at [34].
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suggestion that the Commissioner has revisited the matter on that basis flies in the face of his 
repeated and vehement assertions to the contrary that have been made to Mr Russell. Ultimately her 
Honour ordered that the Commissioner reconsider his decision559 to refuse to accept late objections 
from the plaintiff companies, with the plaintiffs succeeding in the review. 
Ellis J reserved leave for Mr Russell to
bring the matter back before the Court if progress was not made.560  
Based on a sworn affidavit by Mr Graham Player on 29 May 1998, it would have been easy to 
conclude that the ‘services’ issue was decided. Mr Player had expressed the view that:561 
[c]ertainly after Case Q34 was decided on 29 April 1993, the Commissioner had sufficient
‘institutional knowledge’ to decide whether o[r] not there were services performed. 
562 So in 
summary, the FB Duvall litigation has been extensive, covering many procedural matters.563 It has 
spanned four decades covering tax periods from 1987, initially litigated in the TRA in 1993 and was 
still being litigated in 2011 with matters outstanding.564 
559 In Chesterfield Preschools Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2009) 24 NZTC 23,148 (HC), the “second” 
judicial review proceeding, Fogarty J granted the taxpayers’ application for judicial review and directed the 
Commissioner to reconsider matters in accordance with the High Court’s judgment and directions of December 
2006 in the “first” judicial review proceeding in Chesterfield Preschools Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(2007) 23 NZTC 21,125 (HC). Fogarty J was of the view that although the Commissioner had not deliberately 
disobeyed the Court’s directions, it was arguable that the Commissioner had “ignored” those directions. The 
taxpayers were entitled to costs. 
560  FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52, at [37]. 
561  Mr Player’s affidavit referred to in FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 507, at 12. 
562
563  There have been many procedural issues in the FB Duvall litigation, by way of example in FB Duvall Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue), above n 507 the High Court held that there was no reason why the Commissioner 
cannot himself, as the creditor of one person (where tax is owing) give notice to himself as the debtor of another 
person (where a tax refund is due). There have been jurisdictional issues, whether FB Duvall had entitlement to 
relief under the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, issues of unjust enrichment and the applicability of the statute time 
bar in s 108A [Time bar for assessment of GST].  
564 The lengthy time frame until resolution is only surpassed by the 1985 and 1986 income tax assessments of Mr 
Russell under the Track ‘E’ assessment route. 
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The ‘Track D’ assessments were dealt with by the TRA on a preliminary hearing as to 
their validity. Mr Russell considered that as a matter of procedure the assessments were entirely
invalid on two counts. First, the person who had invoked s 99, as part of the Commissioner’s 
delegated authority and who had the power to issue s 99 assessments was not the person who 
actually issued them. Consequently, under the Commissioner’s delegated authority, the 
assessments were a legal nullity. Secondly, most if not all of the assessments were statute barred 
and the person who made the declaration to set aside the statute bar did not have the delegated 
authority to do so. Mr Russell considered that as a consequence of this, even if the assessments had 
been valid by virtue of the s 99 authority, they would have been invalid because the statute bar 
plainly applied. 
565 In Case U23, above n 501, at [64] it was confirmed that there was no reason to depart from the fee rate of $250.00 
per hour (arrived at in Case R25), above n 48 for Mr Russell providing general business advice to two trading 
companies. Accordingly, in Case U23 the consultancy fee was deductible for a total, between the two companies, of 
15 hours per month at $250.00 per hour. The witness in Case U23 at [63] stated that the trading companies received 
“considerable advice” constantly from Mr Russell which they found very useful and during a time of great 
development in the electronics industry. However, he seemed unable to quantify the number of hours per month 
over which Mr Russell gave business advice as distinct from advice regarding the template scheme. He emphasised 
that he had found Mr Russell's general management advice very valuable and that he thought the 5 per cent 
consultancy fee was modest. He maintained that nearly all such advice related to the running of the businesses 
and that the accountant for their companies dealt with the template aspects with Mr Russell. He said that, generally, 
Mr Russell was responding to communications about a business problem. The witness referred to one such meeting 
involving Mr Russell driving to Tauranga from Auckland and immediately meeting with two brothers (the 





570 Section 99 (4) [Deemed derivation of income] ITA 1976 provides that “Where any income is included in the 
assessable income of any person pursuant to subsection (3) [Adjustment to income] of this section, then, for the 
purposes of this Act, that income shall be deemed to have been derived by that person and shall be deemed not to 




571 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52: Mr Russell was refused leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Court.  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 32. 
572  Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
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D ‘Track E’ – Assessing Mr Russell personally 
“I never got personally a single dollar of the income that they assessed to me…and I am 
saying you can’t avoid tax or get a tax advantage if you never got any of it at all…”573 
‘Track E’,574 which has been the subject of more recent litigation, attempts to tax all income derived 
by the Commercial Management Partnerships to Mr Russell personally.575 
576 Before considering the 
legal merits argued in ‘Track E’, it is essential to gain at least an overview of the money flows from 
the template income.  This is contained in Appendix 8 of this thesis headed ‘Understanding the 
Mechanics of ‘Track E’. Appendix 9 provides a summary of various loss entities and loss 
partnerships in relation to ‘Track E’. 
Wylie J, in the High Court, described the factual matrix as being of “labyrinthine complexity”. 
There were 289 folders of documents before the TRA containing thousands of pages of 
information.577   
The total income returned by Mr Russell from 1985 to 2000 was $298,700.76.578 The 
Commissioner took the view that the total income returned, but for the avoidance arrangements, 
should have been $15,757,556.18 – a difference of $15,458,855.42. He sought to recover use of 
money interest (UOMI) and shortfall penalties for taking an abusive tax position for the 1998,
1999 and 2000 years pursuant to s 141D TAA 1994.579 
573 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
574
575
576 Telephone interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 562. 
577  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at [7]. 
578  The Commissioner did not seek to reassess income for the years 1978 to 1984. He reassessed Mr Russell’s personal 
income for the years ended 31 March 1985 to 31 March 1996 under s 99(3) ITA 1976 and for the years 1997 to 
2000, under s GB1 ITA 1994.  
579  Section 141D TAA 1994 imposes a shortfall penalty on a taxpayer taking an “abusive tax position” in the taking of 
a taxpayer’s tax position, with application to tax obligations for periods commencing on or after 1 April 1997. The 
purpose of the abusive tax position shortfall penalty is to deter taxpayers from taking an unacceptable tax position 
and entering into arrangements or applying tax laws with a dominant purpose of the avoidance of tax. See Inland 
Revenue Interpretation Statement IS00061 ‘Shortfall Penalty for Taking an Abusive Tax Position’. Part 7 of TAA 
1994 imposes Use of Money Interest on unpaid tax. Use of Money Interest came into effect in 1998. 
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Mr Russell unsuccessfully challenged these assessments in a 64 day hearing580 in the TRA581 
and appealed to the High Court.582 Mr Russell appeared on his own behalf in the TRA as he has 
done in a lot of the later litigation, perhaps due to him being very able in the court room and also for 
cost reasons.583  
Mr Russell had unsuccessfully sought an adjournment of the hearing of the substantive High Court 
appeal. The ‘Track E’ matters were heard by Judge Barber in Case Z19,584 and prior to 
its commencement Judge Barber was asked to recuse himself by Mr Russell. His Honour 
declined to do so and Mr Russell had applied for judicial review of that refusal. He had sought an 
interim order pursuant to s 8 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 staying the proceedings 
before the TRA pending the outcome of that application. The application for interim relief was 
refused by Keane J on 27 September 2005.585 As a result, the proceedings before Judge Barber 
continued, even though the application for judicial review regarding the appropriateness of Judge 
Barber hearing the case had not been finally resolved.  
A substantive judicial review application was heard by Cooper J between 31 March 2008 and 2 April
2008. His Honour gave judgment on 19 December 2008 dismissing Mr Russell’s claim.586 An 
appeal against that judgment was lodged on 5 February 2009. However, the hearing of the appeal 
was delayed. Wylie J understood that this was because the proceedings by Judge Barber were by 
then so far advanced that it made sense to wait for the TRA’s determination before hearing 
the appeal on the disqualification issue.  
The Commissioner, at Mr Russell’s request, consented to a delay by Mr Russell in filing his case on 
appeal. Eventually the case on appeal was filed and in February 2010 the appeal was allocated the 
fixture date of 5 August 2010. 
580  This case was heard at Auckland over 64 days between 3 October 2005 and 30 April 2009. Mr Russell appeared on 
his own behalf and gave evidence. The Commissioner called evidence from a senior officer Mr Blakeley whose 
brief of evidence was 349 pages long. Cross-examination went into every aspect of the case in fine detail. The 
transcript of cross-examination of Mr Russell alone ran to almost 500 pages. The notes of evidence in total 
comprised some 2,455 pages. During the hearing the parties presented the Authority with an agreed statement of 
facts which in itself was a lengthy document of 123 pages. 
581 Case Z19, above n 442. 
582  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35. 
583 In 2005 Mr Russell stated that he had spent over $2 million in defending the template. In our interview in 2010 he 
stated that he had spent in excess of $5 million.
Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
584
585 Russell v Taxation Review Authority (2009) 24 NZTC 23,284 (HC) at [5]. 
586 Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585. 
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Figure 10: The ‘Track E’ litigation folders, Mr J G Russell’s Garage, Kawakawa Bay, April 2010 
1 High Court 
The High Court substantive hearing was due to commence on 26 July 2010 with the Court of 
Appeal judicial review hearing listed for 5 August 2010. Mr Russell sought adjournment of the 
High Court appeal. However, it was held that it was not in the interests of justice to adjourn the 
hearing of the High Court substantive appeal as there was a considerable amount of tax at stake and, 
in Wylie J’s view, it was in the wider public interest that the appeal be resolved as soon as 
reasonably practicable, as well as being in the best interests of Mr Russell. If an adjournment had 
been granted a delay would have been undesirable for both parties. Wylie J noted that the allegation 
of bias had been made before two Judges of the High Court and had been dismissed by both. 
The amount at stake under ‘Track E’ as at April 2010, was NZD $138,796,819.38. This amount has 
been increasing daily due to use of money interest and late payment penalties. It currently 
(December 2012) exceeds $200 million.587 Mr Russell’s August 2012 Statement of Account 
for income tax years 1985 to 2000 is in Appendix 10 of this thesis. 
587 The 1998 income tax year onwards demonstrates the monthly increase by way of incremental late payment penalty 
and Use of Money Interest. 
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In the Auckland High Court in 2010,588 Mr Russell challenged the ‘Track E’ assessments claiming 
that he had “never received any benefit from the money.” Wylie J, in a succinct decision, dealt with 
this aspect of Mr Russell’s case saying that the definition of tax avoidance was broad enough to 
capture his activity. He was the ‘main man’ in charge of everything and had the ultimate control of 
the funds. 
For the first time Mr Russell (via counsel) accepted that there were ‘arrangements’ for the purposes 
of s 99 ITA 1976 and its successor, between the Commercial Management partners and the various 
loss companies over the period. 
 Mr Russell was unable to personally attend the ‘Track E’ High 
Court case due to requiring back surgery at the time. 
588  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35. 
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Mr Russell did not contest that the arrangement by which the six Commercial Management partner
companies (the ‘agent companies’) diverted their income to loss companies amounted to tax 
avoidance and that it was void as against the Commissioner. He did contest that his personal 
relationship with the companies as director was part of the tax avoidance arrangement. It was 
submitted that no tax was avoided as a result of the director/company relationship and that Mr 
Russell was not a party to or affected by the tax avoidance arrangements. It was also argued that 
each company was a separate legal entity,589 and that there was no legal basis for lifting the 
corporate veil to assess income to Mr Russell as a director simply because he was a director. 
When considering the scope of the arrangement in respect to Mr Russell, Wylie J stated that:590 
He personally promoted the Russell template; he could be contacted personally by clients; 
he supervised all staff employed by CML [Commercial Management Ltd]; he signed all 
correspondence; he signed all cheques; he signed all agreements on behalf of the partners; 
he was the receiver, liquidator or director of all loss companies; he corresponded on behalf 
of the partnership with the loss companies; he introduced new loss companies when needed. 
In summary, Wylie J considered there was one overall arrangement over the years 1985 to 2000 
(inclusive) stating:591  
It was put in place by Mr Russell. It comprised a convoluted series of interlocking contracts, 
agreements, understandings and plans. They are collectively evidenced and constituted the 
arrangement. There were changes to entities involved in the arrangement over the years. The 
partners in the Commercial Management Partnership changed. There were changes to the loss 
companies over the years. Indeed changes to the loss companies were inevitable. It was 
inherent in the model that new loss companies would be required from time to time as losses 
in the old loss companies were exhausted. The fact that new entities were, from time to time, 
introduced to maintain the structure does not preclude there being one overall arrangement. 
Regardless of the entities, the end result was that income was diverted into companies that had 
losses and those losses were utilised to avoid the payment of income tax on the income. The 
basic arrangement remained essentially unchanged for 15 years. This points to there being one 
overall arrangement. 
Mr Russell’s involvement in all that occurred was, in Wylie J’s view, the most relevant factor in 
concluding there was one overall arrangement. His Honour considered Mr Russell as the ‘lynchpin 
on which all turned’, paraphrasing a description used by Lord Denning MR in Wallersteiner 
v Moir:592 
589  See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd, above n 197 and Lee v Lees Air Farming Ltd, above n 198.
590  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at [96]. 
591  At [99]. 
592 Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 1 WLR 991 (CA). 
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[Mr Russell] controlled [the parties’] every movement. Each danced to his bidding. He pulled the 
strings. No one else got within reach of him. Transformed into legal language, they were his agents 
to do as he commanded. He was the principal behind them. 
Wylie J considered it beyond dispute that Mr Russell controlled everything and that he was the 
architect of the overall plan. Each of the parties to the arrangement, starting with Mr Russell and 
finishing with Mr Russell, had the expectation the other parties would act in a particular way, 
because all of their actions were orchestrated by him. In effect, Mr Russell provided consensus, 
although Wylie J doubted this being a necessary ingredient of any arrangement.593  
The arrangement was not confined to the agreements between the partners and the loss companies 
as proposed by Mr Russell. Wylie J said this because the partners and the loss companies derived no 
benefit from the arrangement and took no independent role in the overall plan. They were 
functionaries that acted at Mr Russell’s behest. The end result of the arrangement was Mr Russell 
deciding how untaxed monies he directed into the finance companies were to be utilised.594  
Mr Russell claimed that he used legitimate corporate and trust structures with the judgments of the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Penny595  and Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue596 
referred to. The Commissioner was not challenging the legitimacy of the structures put in place by 
Mr Russell but was challenging the way those structures were applied.  
Wylie J had reached the view that the arrangement put in place by Mr Russell was designed to 
ensure that income which Mr Russell earned through his personal exertions was diverted into a 
series of partnerships and companies controlled by him, and that no tax was paid on that income, 
with Mr Russell retaining control and directing how the untaxed monies were used. Wylie J 
accepted that Mr Russell may have preferred to trade through a corporate structure597 to avoid any 
personal liability; however that was not the end of the matter. His Honour considered the 
593 An arrangement is defined to include a ‘plan’. The use of the word ‘plan’ in contradistinction with the words 
‘contract and agreement’, suggests that consensus is not a necessary ingredient. A plan can be devised and carried 
out by one person as was the case with Mr Russell and the template. In BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,732 at 15,787 held that a contract, plan or understanding required conscious 
involvement and that s BG 1 was confined to persons engaging in consensual activity towards an end (at 15,789). 
The majority in the Court of Appeal decision of Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd, above n 
174 affirmed the High Court decision. The majority in the Privy Council decision Peterson v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue, above n 176 held that a taxpayer does not need to be a party to an arrangement to be affected by it, 
while knowledge of the arrangement’s details is also unnecessary.  
594  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at [102]. 
595 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Penny & Hooper [2010] NZCA 231, (2010) 24 NZTC 24,287 (CA). 
596 Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZSC 95, [2012] 1 NZLR 433. 
597  Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd, above n 197.  
166 
arrangement as “so tortuous that it is hard to escape the conclusion that it was put in place simply to 
obfuscate the situation and to confuse even the most diligent tax inspector.”598 
With respect to Mr Russell and his numerous staff, Wylie J considered the evidence was clear that 
Mr Russell supervised all of the activities of the various employees. He reviewed all of their work 
and signed all correspondence including cheques. In his view, the fact that some or even much of 
the work was undertaken by employees did not materially affect the relationship between Mr 
Russell’s personal exertions and the earning of the income of Commercial Management Partnership.
Referring to Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Penny599, Wylie J addressed the issue of Mr 
Russell’s salary. Mr Russell allocated a nominal salary to himself each year that did not bear any 
relationship to the work he undertook or to salaries properly payable in the marketplace. Very 
significantly, Mr Russell retained control of the whole of the income generated with only him being 
able to direct how it was to be applied. In Wylie J’s view, the income of the Commercial 
Management Partnership was derived from Mr Russell’s personal exertions and he had retained 
complete control over it.  
Wylie J agreed with Judge Barber in the TRA that the steps taken by Mr Russell were not within the 
purpose or contemplation of Parliament600 when it enacted the loss offset provisions contained in s 
191 ITA 1976 and its successor sections. His Honour regarded the unrestricted transfer of profits to 
loss companies included in the group, purely because of the losses they brought with them, in the 
manner the template sought to achieve, would bypass the company grouping rules contained in the 
legislation and significantly undermine the tax base, which would not have been Parliament’s
intention.  
Further, in Wylie J’s view, the steps taken by Mr Russell, to divert the income which he generated 
by his personal exertions into the Commercial Management Partnership, were not within the 
contemplation of Parliament. Parliament had intended that individuals pay income tax at the 
appropriate rate on their net income. Wylie J referred to an obiter statement from Spratt v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue601 that: 
598  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at [118]. 
599  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Penny & Hooper, above n 595. 
600  The Supreme Court decision in Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 47 now
constitutes the definitive statement on the law of income tax avoidance in New Zealand. The taxpayer must 
satisfy the court that the component parts of the arrangement fall within the specific taxing provision, construed in 
light of its purpose, and are within Parliament’s contemplation; and that the arrangement as a whole is within 
Parliament’s contemplation. At [108] of the judgment the Supreme Court observed that “…a classic indicator of 
a use that is outside Parliamentary contemplation is the structuring of an arrangement so that the taxpayer gains the 
benefit of the specific provision in an artificial or contrived way. It is not within Parliament’s purpose for specific 
provisions to be used in that manner.” 
601 Spratt v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1964] NZLR 272 (HC) at 274 per Henry J (obiter dictum). 
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no taxpayer can, by way of assignment, escape assessment of tax on income resulting from his 
or her personal activity, and that such income always remains truly as income and is derived 
by him irrespective of the method he may adopt to dispose of it. 
In conclusion, Wylie J considered that Mr Russell had structured the arrangement so that he gained 
a tax advantage in an artificial and contrived way. In his Honour’s view, the purpose of the complex 
corporate structure was to divert income from Mr Russell’s personal exertions, whether generated 
either directly through Mr Russell’s activities, or indirectly through his control of employees, into 
companies, that were able to access the losses in the unrelated companies to avoid the payment of 
income tax. 
At no stage did Mr Russell lose control of the monies. They could only be applied as he directed. 
The companies and other entities used were all ultimately controlled by Mr Russell. At no point was 
the income beyond his direct control. Ultimately Mr Russell, and other entities which he was 
interested in or controlled, benefited from advances made by the finance companies controlled by 
him.  
Wylie J stated that the arrangement not only had the effect of altering the incidence of income tax, 
but that this was also its primary purpose. By virtue of s 99(3) ITA 1976 the Commissioner could 
adjust the assessable income of any person affected by the arrangement so as to counteract any tax 
advantage obtained. Once the existence and scope of the tax avoidance arrangement had been 
established, all those taxpayers who have benefited from it are subject to corrective adjustment by 
the Commissioner in the exercise of the reconstruction powers conferred by the anti-avoidance 
provisions.  
Mr Russell’s counsel, Mr Simon Judd, submitted that Mr Russell was not a person affected by the 
arrangement. He argued that Mr Russell did not receive a dollar from the arrangement, either 
directly or indirectly. Wylie J, with respect, stated that this was not the test. The correct test was 
whether Mr Russell was a person affected by the arrangement through obtaining a ‘tax advantage’ 
from it.602 Nonetheless, Wylie J accepted that Mr Russell did not directly receive any of the income 
generated by the arrangement, but that was because the purpose of the arrangement was to ensure 
that he did not have to pay tax on that income.  
Wylie J agreed with the TRA that the income was Mr Russell’s personal exertion income. His 
Honour also agreed with the TRA that Mr Russell was the only real person underpinning the 
arrangement. He was the person who ‘pulled all the strings’.603 Mr Russell controlled all of the 
602   Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at [142]. 
603   At [143]. 
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untaxed monies through the finance companies and no one else could access the funds unless he 
permitted them to do so. Money was advanced by the finance companies to Mr Russell to enable 
him to meet his personal obligations. Monies were also advanced to various trusts which Mr Russell 
had settled for the benefit of his family.  
2 Court of Appeal 
Mr Russell appeared personally in the Court of Appeal604 to address the ‘Track E’ litigation issues 
in early 2012.605 During the 2010 High Court hearing, Mr Russell had been represented by Mr 
Simon Judd. Mr Russell was unable to attend the High Court hearing due to having been in surgery
for back related health issues. Mr Russell’s daughter and grandson were in attendance to support 
him in the Court of Appeal. Mr Russell advised this was the first time he had family members in
attendance at any of his litigation.
Mr Russell’s filed a notice of appeal raising four grounds,606 however, when Mr Russell filed his 
submissions, his written outline raised five additional grounds of appeal.607 After consideration by 
the Court, only one additional ground for leave was granted, dealing with s 99(4) of the ITA 
1976.608 
The Court agreed with the reasoning of Wylie J that there was an ‘arrangement’ that was a ‘tax 
avoidance arrangement’ and that Mr Russell was a person affected by that arrangement. There was 
no doubt to the Court that Mr Russell “was the only real person underpinning the whole 
arrangement.”609  
604  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] NZCA 128. The judges were Glazebrook P, Randerson and Stevens JJ. 
605  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 32.
606  The four grounds were: that the Judge was wrong to find that there was an “arrangement” as alleged by the
Commissioner; that the alleged arrangement was a tax avoidance arrangement; that Mr Russell was affected by the 
alleged arrangement; and that Mr Russell had obtained a tax advantage from the alleged arrangement. 
607  The five additional grounds of appeal were as follows: 
(a) The majority of the assessments were time barred under s 25(2) of the ITA 1976;
(b) The threshold of proving the ingredients of tax avoidance required by the Privy Council in Peterson v
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 176 had not been met;
(c) The requirement inferred in s 99 of the ITA 1976 and particularised in the Commissioner’s Policy Statement
for a careful and thorough analysis had not been met;
(d) The assessment process was incomplete because s 99(4) of the ITA 1976 had been ignored; and
(e) The assessments were a product of an alleged longstanding vendetta practised by the Commissioner against the
appellant.
608  There was no dispute as to the applicable law regarding leave. Each of the additional grounds had been dealt with in 
considerable detail by the TRA and all of the grounds had been determined against the appellant by the TRA. None 
had been argued on appeal to the High Court. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the only ground that had 
even a remote chance of success was the s 99(4) ITA 1976 point. 
609  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 32, at [64].
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A centrepiece of Mr Russell’s submissions was that he had not received, in any form whatsoever, 
any of the income that had been assessed to him. He submitted that it was entirely permissible for 
him to carry on his consultancy business through a partnership and corporate entities and it was
they, and not him personally, that received the income. In essence he was arguing that the 
Commissioner ought not to have reconstructed the income to him personally. Previous Russell-
related litigation provided the answer to allow the Court to reject this argument. The 
Commissioner has broad powers of reconstruction under s 99(3) ITA 1976. Speaking for the Court 
in Miller,610 Blanchard J stated: 
Section 99(3) gives the Commissioner a wide reconstructive power. He “may” have regard to 
the income which the person he is assessing would have or might be expected to have or 
would in all likelihood have received but for the scheme, but the Commissioner is not 
inhibited from looking at the matter broadly and making an assessment on the basis of the 
benefit directly or indirectly received by the taxpayer in question. 
With respect to a reconstruction the onus is on the taxpayer to establish that the reconstruction is 
wrong and by how much.611 The Court was not satisfied that Mr Russell had satisfied that onus.  
Looking at the broader facts, the Commercial Management Partnership was controlled and managed 
by Mr Russell as its sole architect. He made all of the decisions as to where substantial money flows 
went and how it was treated by the partners, and throughout the 1985 to 2000 period, manipulated 
the partnership, corporate, finance company and trust entities as he saw fit, yet at the same time was 
receiving only a nominal income612 for the provision of consulting services. 
Their Honours concluded that what Mr Russell was doing involved more than just income 
allocation for genuine business reasons. Mr Russell was seeking to ‘launder’ through the 
Commercial Management Partnership, and the other partnership and corporate entities controlled by 
him, the whole of the substantial income from the Russell template system, itself a clear tax 
avoidance system.613   
This had extensive and dramatic financial consequences. Nominal taxation was paid by Mr Russell 
or the partners in the Commercial Management Partnership or the later partnership over a 15 year 
period. 
610  Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 487, at 32. 
611 Buckley & Young Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 504, at 498. See also Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures 
Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 47, at [171]. 
612 Mr Ruffin, for the Commissioner, referred to some similarities with Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above 
n 596. 
613  O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
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One area where the Court of Appeal reasoning differed from that of Wylie J was in respect of his 
reliance on the notion that the monies resulting from the Commercial Management Partnership 
business ought to be characterised as ‘personal exertion income.’614 The Court of Appeal did not 
consider that such a descriptor necessarily assisted the analysis, preferring to rest their conclusion as 
to the purpose of the overall arrangement and the tax advantage derived from it on a broader basis. 
The overall scheme was the means by which Mr Russell laundered the profits from the 
Russell template transactions 
Their Honours thought this ought not to be characterised as income earned by Mr Russell 
personally. It was income earned by the Commercial Management Partnership and other entities 
within the structure set up by Mr Russell utilising the staff employed by those entities. 
The income earned from 1985 to 2000 was to be attributed to Mr Russell because he was affected 
by the arrangement on a Penny615 basis and because he was the governing mind of the template 
arrangements and those other structures and arrangements designed to shelter from tax the income 
earned from the template arrangements in the Russell group of companies.  
Their Honours accepted that it was not inevitable that a tax avoidance arrangement by a company 
will or should be attributed to a shareholder. Each case would depend on its own facts and in the 
‘Track E’ case, there were ‘very unusual’ facts. The income itself came from tax avoidance 
arrangements orchestrated by Mr Russell and was sheltered by similar tax avoidance arrangements 
also orchestrated by him. 
The additional ground permitted by the court for consideration was s 99(4) ITA 1976, despite the 
fact that Mr Simon Judd as counsel had not pursued it in the High Court. Essentially Mr Russell
was saying that the Commissioner had not completed the assessment process required by s 99 ITA 
1976 in that the adjustments required by s 99(4)616 had not been carried out. 
Mr Russell had contended that on its correct interpretation s 99(4) is ‘instantaneous and automatic’, 
requiring the Commissioner to make an adjustment as soon as any income is included in the 
assessable income of any person pursuant to s 99(3). Mr Russell was submitting that the failure of 
the Commissioner to adjust as required by s 99(4) vitiated the assessments “which should be 
cancelled as a result”.617  
614  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at [146] and [148]. 
615  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Penny & Hooper, above n 595. 
616  Section 99(4) provided “Where any income is included in the assessable income…of any person pursuant to 
subsection (3) of this section, then, for the purposes of this Act, that income shall be deemed to have been derived 
by that person and shall be deemed not to have been derived by any other person.”  
617 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 32, at [77]. 
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The Privy Council had addressed an argument in Miller618 by the appellants based on s 99(3) ITA 
1976 in 2001, in relation to the change of track from ‘Track A’ to ‘Track B’. The submission was 
that only one party can obtain a tax advantage from an arrangement concerned. The appellants had 
argued that if the Commissioner thought that the trading company had obtained the advantage 
(‘Track A’), he could not properly have thought that the appellants (the Millers and O’Neil’s,) had 
obtained one (under ‘Track B’). The Privy Council rejected this submission.  
The appellant then submitted that the ‘Track A’ and ‘Track B’ assessments were in fact 
inconsistent. It was asserted that the Commissioner could not validly make a ‘Track B’ assessment 
while a ‘Track A’ assessment in respect of the relevant company was outstanding. Again, this 
argument was rejected by the Privy Council.619 
The principles from the Privy Council in O’Neil were considered relevant in the present context of 
‘Track E’. I attended the Court of Appeal ‘Track E’ hearing as part of my research. 
 Unfortunately I was unable to stay for the second day of the hearing 
due to teaching commitments. 
3 The final say – the Supreme Court 
The final ‘chapter’ in the ‘Track E’ litigation was delivered on 13 August 2012. The Supreme 
Court620 dismissed an application for leave to appeal.621 Mr Russell had indicated to the author 
earlier that this decision would not be unexpected to him. The statutory criteria for leave was not 
made out. In essence, the Court of Appeal decision represented the application of well settled legal 
principles to the particular facts of Mr Russell’s case. The Court of Appeal upheld the findings in 
the TRA and the High Court that there was an arrangement; that its purpose or effect was to alter 
the incidence of tax; that Mr Russell was affected; and that the tax avoidance involved was more 
than merely incidental. 
618 O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2, at [31]. 
619 At [33]. 
620 The Supreme Court was composed of Elias CJ, Tipping and William Young JJ.
621 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52.  
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The Court of Appeal was also satisfied, being in agreement with the Authority and the High Court, 
that Mr Russell had not shown the Commissioner’s reconstruction was wrong, let alone by how 
much. The Court of Appeal had given Mr Russell leave to advance a point which he had not 
expressly taken up in the High Court, the effect of s 99(4). The Supreme Court, after careful 
examination of this matter, was satisfied that there was no merit in this point. None of the matters 
which Mr Russell sought to raise by further appeal to the Supreme Court were matters of general or 
public importance. There was no basis for concern that a substantial miscarriage of justice may 
occur if leave was not given. The Supreme Court stated that there was a further reason why granting 
leave would not be in the interests of justice. None of the points Mr Russell sought to raise were 
reasonably arguable in his favour. Further, the Court of Appeal was undoubtedly correct in the 
conclusions to which it came to on the facts of this case. 
‘Track E’, the last of the five ‘tracks’, will undoubtedly be the track that leads to Mr Russell’s 
bankruptcy at some future date. Once again the question is raised, what has the cost been to so 
much litigation, and secondly, was the cost worth it? 
Coleman622 fears that, despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to allow Mr Russell to appeal, this is not 
the end of the long running ‘battle’. 
4 ‘Track F’ 
During our time together in July 2011 at the University of Canterbury interviews Mr Russell 
alluded to a ‘Track F’ being ‘conjured up’ by the Commissioner  In 
a recent decision623 submissions made by Mr Russell mentions a Track ‘F’.624 This is connected to 
622 James Coleman, “Tax Update – James Coleman, Barrister, Wellington examines the legacy of two decades of 
Russell litigation” [2012] NZLJ 290 at 291. 
623 Case 5/2012 [2012] NZTRA 05, (2012) 25 NZTC 1,017 at [79]. 
624 Mr Russell’s submissions state: 
6. “Since the hearing and as recently as 3 November 2011 the Commissioner submitted to the High Court at
Auckland in the judicial review proceedings that he now believes that services were provided by the parent
companies in respect of the administration charge and that GST is payable on those services. This new view
of the Commissioner which we can label as Track F plainly has consequences in both income tax and GST
regimes. The foundation for disallowance of the administration charge in Tracks A and B obviously
disappears so those cases must be reviewed and amended assessments made accordingly.
7. In addition, the previous view of the Commissioner that in the template cases no input tax was claimable
because the services were provided can no longer be sustained. In other words the inputs are clearly
deductible as a result of Track F.
173 
the ongoing ‘tortuous saga’ related to the FB Duvall litigation. It would appear that Coleman may 
prove to be correct to assume that the long running battle will last yet a little longer.  
8. Under the Commissioner’s new Track F view it would follow that inputs of the nature in these cases would
have to be deductible.”
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The ‘Sensitive Issue’ – the Vendetta
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VIII The ‘Sensitive Issue’ – The Vendetta 
625
Although the issue of judicial bias had never been raised in template cases prior to Mr 
Russell’s personal assessment under ‘Track E’, the situation is somewhat different in relation 
to the issue of vendetta. The vendetta claim has been raised by, and for, Mr Russell (and some 
of his many clients) on many occasions over the past 20 years or so. Judge Barber has stated 
that he had always made it clear that Mr Russell may develop the vendetta argument before 
him whenever it suited him to do so and in detail and at length.626 First though, clarification of 
what would be vendetta conduct must be ascertained.  
Mr Russell’s legal counsel, Mr Gary Judd, QC, referred to ‘The New Shorter Oxford 
Dictionary’ including as a meaning of ‘vendetta’ as “a prolonged bitter quarrel with or 
campaign against a person”.627 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary uses the description of ‘an 
often prolonged series of retaliatory, vengeful, or hostile acts or exchange of such acts.’  
A ‘Sensitive Issue’ – 
 This reached its peak with about nine charges to be 
prosecuted at one time.628 
625 Disputant’s Brief of Evidence on Threshold Issues in Case Z19, above n 442. 
626 Case Z19, above n 442, at [73] - [74]. 
627 Case W37, above n 325, at [34]. 
628  Mr Russell had been convicted for failure to provide information as required under s 17 IRDA in 1990. He 
had challenged his conviction by way of judicial review in Russell v Latimer, above n 356.  The total of nine 















Mr Russell raised the vendetta argument again in 1996 in the High Court before Baragwanath 
J in Miller Commissioner of Inland Revenue634. Baragwanath J stated that:635  
the plaintiffs are aggrieved that they sought to raise the vendetta issue before the 
Taxation Review Authority which in fact delivered a final decision without dealing with 
it, being of the view, recently corrected by the Golden Bay636 decision, that it had no 
jurisdiction to consider the question. 
Baragwanath J further stated that it was therefore appropriate for him to address the issue and 
deliver a decision. His Honour held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the 
Commissioner’s staff had gone to considerable lengths to investigate and challenge the use of 
Mr Russell’s business structure. There was evidence of the establishment of a team of 
inspectors whose task was to carry out what was described in one document as an “attack 
plan”. Quite surprisingly, his Honour referred to a minute written by Inland Revenue staff that 
contained the words “[it] may not be entirely legal but may help stem the flow.”637 The 
633
634 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142.  Contention 6 of the High Court Judicial Review 
proceedings was that the Commissioner had acted for the improper purpose of assisting in a vendetta against 
Mr Russell.  
635  Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 13,046. 
636 In Golden Bay Cement Co Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1996) 17 NZTC 12,580 (CA), the Court of 
Appeal rejected the taxpayer’s argument that a challenge to the validity of an assessment (as distinct from its 
correctness) could only be made by seeking judicial review and that the objection procedure was available 
only when there was a valid assessment.   Mark Keating, Tax Disputes in New Zealand: A Practical Guide, 
(CCH New Zealand, Auckland, 2012) at 301. 
637 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 13,046.
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allusion was to attempt to deter accountants from involving their clients in the use of the 
Russell business structure. 638 
Baragwanath J quite rightly saw such an attitude within the ranks of Inland Revenue staff 
charged with administering the tax system as ‘troublesome’. His Honour wrote that “the 
author has done a disservice to other officers who adhere to the spirit and letter of the law in 
performing their difficult task”.  He further stated that “the temptation to over react against 
conduct seen as anti-social must be curbed”.  
The plaintiffs also relied on another piece of evidence, an observation by Judge Barber, 
where his Honour said:639 
I have been sitting on these Russell cases for more than 10 years and I have to say that 
the Commissioner seems to have some sort of hang up as Mr Russell is concerned and 
does funny things that are quite unbalanced really. 
While this statement to most reader’s eyes would indicate that the Commissioner has 
not treated Mr Russell or his clients impartially, it is interesting to see how his Honour dealt 
with the statement. Baragwanath J stated the evidence was hearsay.640 In view of its generality 
and the fact that it was tendered in reply, his Honour was not prepared to treat it as admissible 
at common law in light of R v Baker641 and R v Bain.642 It was admissible under s 3 of 
the Evidence Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 but his Honour considered it to be of 
limited weight.643 His Honour did accept that from time to time during the long process of 
attack and counter attack between the parties the Commissioner’s staff had become deeply 
troubled by Mr Russell’s conduct and had sometimes over reacted. Baragwanath J was of 
the view that there was no such evidence of misconduct in the preparation of the 
assessments under challenge (Track B) to warrant the Court’s setting them aside.  
Baragwanath J continued that one can well understand why Mr Russell felt himself and 
the directors who adopted his business structure to be ‘targeted’, stating that Mr Russell 
was firmly of the view that his ‘meticulously crafted’ business structure entitles,644 those 
638
639 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 13,046. 
640 For more on hearsay evidence, see C. Gallavin, Evidence, (Lexis Nexis NZ Ltd, Wellington, 2008) at Chapter 
5. 
641 R v Baker [1989] 1 NZLR 738 (CA) at 741. 
642 R v Bain [1996] 1 NZLR 129 (CA). 
643 A ‘hearsay statement’ is defined in s 4 [Interpretation section] of the Evidence Act 2006. 
644  Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 13,046 recorded Mr Russell as having stated: 
“The intent of the Commissioner as far as my companies are concerned on either Track A or Track B is 
simply to deny my companies use of the tax losses in the manner allowed by law and to make nugatory the 
provisions of s 181 and 191 as far as my companies are concerned.” 
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availing themselves and their companies of it, to pay no tax. His Honour considered the military 
metaphors about ‘attack plan’ and ‘war’, the justified fear that the Commissioner’s officers 
were out to “destroy his business”, coupled with the long years of assessment, objections and 
litigation made polarisation inevitable. Baragwanath J was satisfied that Inland Revenue’s 
purpose in seeking to “destroy” Mr Russell’s business was to terminate what its members 




In 2004 Judge Barber commented with regard to the multiple tracks of assessment as 
follows:647 
With regard to vendetta, it seems that the objectors’ case may be that, in effect, the 
Commissioner “blinded by his dislike for Mr Russell” (to use Mr Judd’s words) has 
been devising multiple tracks of assessment when “if he dispassionately and impartially 
considered the law and the facts known to him” he could (assuming the arrangement to 
645
646
647 Case W37, above n 325, at [57]. 
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be void by s 99(2)) conclude that only one reconstruction was correct and that he has 
moved from track to track (i.e. from one reconstruction to another pursuant to s 99(3)) 
because he is motivated by a vendetta against Mr Russell.   
Judge Barber was reminded by Mr Ruffin that there was an express finding of Baragwanath J 
in the Miller & O’Neil litigation648 that there was no evidence of vendetta against Mr Russell 
or his clients from the Commissioner and/or his staff.  However, Judge Barber found that 
vendetta was still a remaining justiciable issue stating:649 
…However, that was some years ago. While I do not think I have yet seen evidence of 
vendetta, the issue has not been heard before me. As the parties know, I am allowing Mr 
Russell, if he so wishes, 10 full hearing days to package his case about vendetta into one so 
that he can make it as strong as he is able to. 
648 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at [340]. 
649 Case W37, above n 325, at [58]. 
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B Settlement at Last! ... Not Quite! 
The Kemp650 litigation may have unfortunately left an unfavourable lasting impression for the 
taxpayers of Inland Revenue processes. The Commissioner had agreed to compromise the 
collection of the full tax liability owing by the taxpayers651 who had been reassessed 
following their participation in the Russell template. Section 414A ITA 1976 permitted the 
Commissioner to write off a maximum of $50,000 in unpaid tax but any greater amount 
required authorisation by the Minister of Revenue. It is surprising that in spite of this section, 
Inland Revenue entered into settlement deeds writing off disputed tax in excess of the $50,000 
limit. This error was not identified until long after the settlements had been finalised, and in 
some instances not until long after the agreed amounts of tax had been paid. Certainty652 is a
principle of a good tax or a good tax system and it is difficult to reconcile this principle 
with the Kemp litigation. Prima facie one would expect a settlement deed arrangement 
entered into bona fides, to be certain and final. 
653
650  Kemp v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1999) 19 NZTC 15,110 (HC). 
651  The taxpayers each owed core tax exceeding $50,000 with the exception of one person, Mr Winter. 
652 John McCulloch (ed.): Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (Ward 
Lock and Co, 1776). 
653
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This thesis has not captured any direct comment from a participant to the Russell template 
schemes, although that may be an area of future research.654 An insight is gained however into 
the template participant’s reliance on Mr Russell. In Case L85655, one of the ‘pre template’ 
cases, a clause stated that all correspondence was to be directed through Mr Russell and 
Commercial Management Ltd. It is clear that template participants placed a lot of reliance on 
Mr Russell’s tax opinions and in many respects were distanced from direct Inland Revenue 
contact in many instances. 
The High Court adjourned proceedings to ascertain the Minister’s attitude before continuing. 
In each case the Minister would have approved the remission of additional tax but would have 
declined the remission of the core tax amount. The Minister also advised that subject to 
whether he had the power to retrospectively approve something which he should have 
approved prospectively, “he was likely to do so now.”656 
Robertson J stated in the first line of his judgment “this is an extraordinarily long running 
saga,” a theme consistent with almost the entire Russell related litigation. The taxpayers 
sought declarations that to resile from the settlement was invalid,657 the Commissioner had 
concluded that taking into account all the circumstances he should not resist the relief sought 
by the taxpayers. Counsel for the Minister advised that the Minister would abide by the reason 
of the Court. His Honour, Robertson J questioned counsel as to why the Court should be 
involved in the matter at all, if all parties were of the view that honouring the settlements was 
appropriate. 
Legally however it was simply not that simple. His Honour recognised that the Commissioner 
had a statutory duty to collect tax lawfully due, but also there was a public policy issue that 
once an agreement or deal had been made it should be upheld and preserved. Section 414A 
ITA 1976 was a mandatory section and not obtaining the Minister’s consent was “not a trivial 
or unimportant irregularity that the Court might overlook.”658 It was suggested by the 
654
655 Case L85, above n 382. 
656
657  The causes of action raised by the five separate plaintiffs were failing to take into account relevant 
considerations; a breach of natural justice; a breach of legitimate expectation; an improper purpose; proper 
delegation; mistake of fact; unreasonableness; and bad faith. Costs were also sought. 
658 The mandatory nature of s 414A 1976 was raised by the Commissioner’s counsel. In support the 
Commissioner cited Brierley Investments Ltd v Bouzaid [1993] NZLR 655 (CA) [also reported as Brierley 
Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1993) 15 NZTC 10,212 where the Court of Appeal 
discussed the legislative scheme. The “specific and very limited powers of relief from the statutorily imposed 
liability” were discussed at NZLR 659; NZTC 10,215. His Honour observed that the language suggested 
that, but for the specific empowerment in the relevant sections, no relief is possible. 
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Commissioner that even if a general power to enter into settlements with taxpayers was held 
to exist, it would not override specific requirements laid down by Parliament for the exercise 
of powers of remission. In essence, a general power could not create a ‘back door’ for 
settlement which did not meet the explicit statutory requirements.659 
Robertson J concluded that as the statutory requirements had not been complied with the 
Commissioner did not have the power to enter into the settlements and in doing so his actions 
were ultra vires. In R v Monopolies Commission, Ex parte Argyll,660 a case where the 
Monopolies Commissioner’s actions were ultra vires it was held that it was not appropriate to 
exercise the Courts discretion to set aside the action. By way of brief summary Sir John 
Donaldson MR considered the following principles in reaching his conclusion:661  
Good public administration is concerned with substance rather than form….good public 
administration is concerned with speed of decision, particularly in the financial 
field…good public administration requires a proper consideration of the public 
interest…good public administration requires a proper consideration of the legitimate 
interests of the individual citizens, however rich and powerful they may be and whether 
they are natural or juridical persons, and lastly good public administration requires 
decisiveness and finality, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. 
His Honour was persuaded that he should not exercise his discretion. With respect to the 
Kemp litigation it was noted that the decision to resile from the settlements was made up to 
three years after the settlements were made, and that the application of the Court for an order 
quashing presumptive validity was made up to five and a half years later. It was further noted 
that decisiveness and finality are required in the tax field as exemplified by the inclusion of 
such mechanisms as the statute time bar in the tax legislation, and that no taxpayer would 
expect after detailed examination of their tax affairs and agreement being reached in relation 
thereto that Inland Revenue would resile from that agreement unless information had been 
withheld at the time of entering into the agreement. 
Robertson J accepted the force of these arguments, however also stating the inescapable fact 
that the purpose of the administrative process as specified in s 414A ITA 1976 was totally 
ignored in this case. His Honour placed weight on the fact that an albeit retrospective 
659 His Honour was invited by all counsel to exercise the jurisdiction vested under s 5 Judicature Amendment Act 
1972. This Act provides that on an application for review in relation to a statutory power of decision, where 
the sole ground of relief established is a defect in form or a technical irregularity, if the Court finds that no 
substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred, it may refuse relief and here the decision has 
already been made, may make an order validating the decision, notwithstanding the defect or irregularity, to 
have effect from such time and on such terms as the Court thinks fit. 
660 R v Monopolies Commission, Ex parte Argyll [1986] 2 All ER 257 (CA). 
661 Kemp v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 650, at 15,119. See also John Caldwell, “Judicial Review: 
The Fading of Remedial Discretion?” [1988] NZLJ 238. 
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consideration of the settlements of the Minister indicated he would not have given his 
consent. His Honour accepted that there is clearly a public interest in taxpayers being able to 
rely on agreements made with Inland Revenue; however, this was balanced with the public 
also having an interest in seeing that laws are not ignored with impunity, particularly by those 
who are given power to exercise discretion as between taxpayers. His Honour was satisfied 
that the Commissioner had no option but to resile from the settlements which were made 
without lawful authority. With the agreement of all counsel Robertson J remitted the 
additional tax (apparently $2,657,933). The matter proceeded in terms of the core tax. 
Robertson J rejected the taxpayers’ attempts to rely on the agreements in the face of the clear 
statutory language of s 414A(5), even though the settlement agreements were not explicitly 
based on s 414A. However, Robertson J did allow the taxpayers relief on the first $50,000, on 
the basis that the Commissioner did not require approvals for amounts under $50,000. 
As an interesting aside in relation to costs his Honour was of the clear view that this was “one 
of those rare cases”662 where r 46(2) (a)663 of the High Court Rules should be applied and a 
successful party should be ordered to pay costs to an unsuccessful party. The plaintiffs were 
entitled to proper costs in respect of this litigation which arose because of errors made by the 
Commissioner. 
New Zealand tax legislation has not expressly provided a power for the Commissioner to 
settle a dispute with a taxpayer, at least until the enactment of ss 6 and 6A TAA 1994.664 
Cullen states that “it appears such power has always been implied, and the Commissioner has 
in fact reached settlement agreements in many disputes on the assumption that he had such 
power”.665 The Kemp litigation is evidence that such settlement agreements have included 
time payments of core tax, and probably of additional tax without ministerial approval. One 
must wonder why Kemp was essentially reopened after several years passing. Cullen 
considers that Inland Revenue confused matters in the case. 
662 Mirelle v A-G and Ministry of Commerce (1993) 7 PRNZ 107 at 109. 
663 The High Court Rules were substituted as from 1 February 2009 by s 8(1) Judicature (High Court Rules) 
Amendment Act 2008 (2008 No 90). Despite its plain wording, the general discretion as to costs in r 14.1 is 
qualified by the specific costs rr 14.2-14.10, and exercisable only in situations not contemplated by those 
specific rules, or which are not fairly recognised by them: Glaister v Amalgamated Dairies Ltd [2004] 2 
NZLR 606, (2004) 16 PRNZ 1047 (CA). In Glaister the Court of Appeal at [21] gave this rationale: 
“The…costs regime…is of a regulatory character. It is important that the integrity of that scheme be 
maintained.” It added, at [22], that any departure must be done “in a particularised, and principled way”. The 
Court then stated at [24]: “[T]he discretion exists to enable the unexpected and the unforeseen to be fairly 
accommodated. It is not a case of r 46 [r 14.1] having an exclusionary primacy over r 47 [r. 14.2] (or 
any other rules): the rules are complementary, and designed to produce an effective whole.” And added at 
[28]: “The discretion exists, and this Court has noted that where Judges are satisfied that it is appropriate to 
do so they ought not to hesitate to resort to the discretion. But…such an exercise…must be a 
considered and particularised exercise of the discretion.”  
664 Robbie Cullen, “Settling tax disputes – the effect of litigation risk”, (August 1999) NZ Tax Planning Reports 
1. 
665 At 1. 
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With respect to a hardship application the taxpayer would go ‘cap in hand’ once the taxpayer 
has conceded liability to tax, a settlement situation is where the liability is disputed. It is 
suggested by Cullen that it would appear in Kemp that these two matters were confused. The 
Commissioner had entered into settlement arrangements (which included instalment 
payments) with certain taxpayers. Crucially the settlements did not purport to be made under s 
414A. The taxpayers honoured those settlement arrangements and gave up their objections. 
Cullen considers the Commissioner did not obtain the Minister’s approval for the settlements, 
presumably because he did not think it was required. 
The Commissioner then unilaterally backed out of the arrangements, on the basis that s 
414A(5) had not been complied with. The Commissioner purported to rely on comments in 
the Court of Appeal decision in Brierley.666 In Brierley the Commissioner had indicated how 
he would treat existing and future transactions for tax purposes, by way of an informal ruling. 
The taxpayers in Kemp complained and sought judicial review and declarations to enforce the 
settlement arrangements. His Honour Robertson J directed the Minister to consider the 
arrangements. The Minister did not approve them, indicating in an affidavit that he would 
have remitted the additional tax but not the core tax. Cullen states that “on the statutory 
language this may be a little dubious, but is clearly a correct ‘judgment’ in the 
circumstances.” The taxpayers’ rights of objection had lapsed; they had given up those rights 
under the settlement and were out of time. It would appear that the Kemp settlements were 
made prior to s 6 and 6A TAA 1994 coming into force. Those sections were mentioned in the 
case, but the case was not decided on them. It seems that if the settlements in Kemp were 
made after ss 6 and 6A TAA 1994 came into force the result might have been different. The 
settlements were not made under s 414A at all, and accordingly s 414A(5) would have been 
irrelevant. 
Section 414A does not apply in a settlement situation; it applies to a ‘cap in hand’ approach 
by a taxpayer for relief. Section 6 and 6A specifically empower the Commissioner to enter 
into settlement arrangements as the Court of Appeal made clear in the case of Auckland Gas. 
Cullen considers the settlement power for the Commissioner existed before the enactment of 
ss 6 and 6A TAA 1994; that the Court of Appeal comments in Brierley were made in the 
different context of an informal Inland Revenue ruling on the subsequent application of the 
law, and not a settlement; that the Commissioner used the settlement power in the Kemp case 
settlements; and that s 414A was irrelevant in those settlements (section 414A was raised after 
the event of settlement by the Commissioner as a basis for getting out of the settlement 
agreements made by him). 
666 Brierley Investments Ltd v Bouzaid, above n 658. 
188 
Cullen concludes that it seems that the situation in the Kemp case settlements (where the 
Commissioner resiles from a settlement relied on by taxpayers because he had not obtained 
the Minister’s approval) is unacceptable tax administration, whatever the reasons given in the 
judgment for allowing that to happen.  
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C GST Refunds – The Paul Finance Case 
667 An 
administrative glitch on behalf of Inland Revenue led to litigation spanning six years, when 
Mr Russell sued Inland Revenue over a dishonoured a GST refund cheque. The original 1994 
High Court decision668 was upheld in the Court of Appeal669 in 1995, and initially it appeared 
that that may have been the end of the matter. The November 1995 Tax Information Bulletin 
commented on the Court of Appeal application for summary judgment even stated “The 
taxpayer is not appealing this decision.”670  
However, in December 1999, the High Court gave leave for the taxpayer to file an amended 
statement of claim commencing ‘round two’ of the Paul Finance litigation. The taxpayer 
sought exemplary damages671 in addition to the claimed refund.  
The facts of this case are relatively straightforward. Paul Finance Ltd had filed a GST 
return672 claiming a refund.673 On 23 April 1993 Inland Revenue advised Paul Finance Ltd 
that a routine check was being undertaken and the refund sought would be delayed pending 
receipt of information.674 Copies of various working papers, bank statements, cash books and 
tax invoices were forwarded to Inland Revenue in July 1993. An Inland Revenue investigator 
assigned to the case, had a meeting at the premises of Commercial Management675 on 23 
667
668 Paul Finance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1994) 16 NZTC 11,257 (HC).
669 Paul Finance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1995] 3 NZLR 521 (CA). 
670 IRD Tax Information Bulletin, Volume Seven, No. 5, November 1995 at 32. 
671 Exemplary damages sought were stated as $100,000 in Paul Finance Ltd v Inland Revenue Department 
(2000) 19 NZTC 15,600 (HC) at [2]. 
672 The GST return dated 30 March 1993 for the period ended 28 February 1993. 
673 The ‘Tax to Refund as Assessed’ was $517,947.66 less transfers totalling $132,869.79, plus interest of 
$32,916.25 leaving a refund for the period ended 28 February 1993 of $417,994.12. 
674 Subject to certain exceptions the Commissioner is required to make refunds arising from an excess of input 
tax deductions and adjustments over output tax (or following a change in accounting basis) within 15 
working days of the day following receipt by the Commissioner of the relevant GST return in accordance 
with s 46 of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985. The Commissioner may withhold a refund if not satisfied 
with a return and a decision is made to investigate that return, if a registered person has failed to furnish a 
return for any taxable period, or when further information is requested in respect of a GST return.  In Sea 
Hunter Fishing Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2001) 20 NZTC 17,206 (HC) and Sea Hunter
Fishing Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (No. 2) (2001) 20 NZTC 17,216 (HC) the High Court 
confirmed that there was a statutory obligation to refund no later than 15 working days from the day on 
which the registered person’s return was received by the Commissioner.  
675  6 Downsview Road, Pakuranga. 
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August 1993, where he met with Mrs Ravita Maharaj,676 a person who held herself out as a 
representative of Paul Finance Ltd. Further information was requested which had not been 
previously supplied to Inland Revenue in relation to the GST refund claimed. 
On 3 March 1994 Mr Rudd, an Auckland Inland Revenue investigator, was checking the 
status of Paul Finance Ltd’s account on the Inland Revenue computer system when he became 
aware that a debit had been recorded for a refund cheque amounting to $417,994.12. Mr Rudd 
was aware that all the issues in relation to the GST refund had not been fully clarified at that 
stage and all information requested had not been received.  
Mr Rudd checked the Inland Revenue computer to see whether a cheque had been mailed to 
Paul Finance Ltd for that amount. Although the cheque had been printed it had not at that 
stage been sent to the taxpayer. Mr Rudd took steps to try to stop the cheque being sent. 
However, Mr Rudd’s affidavit noted that once a cheque had been printed by the Inland 
Revenue computer it was impossible to retrieve the physical item from the Inland Revenue 
mailing system, due to the great number of cheques being printed at any one time, and finding 
a particular cheque would have involved sorting through all the cheques generated in any one 
batch.  
Mr Rudd was aware the cheque was not due to be posted until the next day so proactively 
contacted Mrs Maharaj at the first opportunity on 4 March 1994 and advised her that the 
cheque had been sent in error. Mr Rudd’s affidavit stated that “she said she would send the 
cheque back once she received it.”677 A notice of assessment and cheque were received by Mr 
Russell on 8 March 1994, four days after Mr Rudd’s discussion with Mrs Maharaj. The 
cheque was not returned but was presented on 8 March 1994.  
Mr Russell’s affidavit evidence was that he was the only person authorised to commit the 
appellant and, had the Department contacted him, he would have answered that the cheque 
would be banked as soon as it was received and he would issue proceedings to recover the 
amount outstanding if the cheque were dishonoured. The cheque was dishonoured on 
presentation, the notice of dishonour was given by Paul Finance Ltd to Inland Revenue on 29 
March 1994. Inland Revenue refused the plaintiffs demand for payment and summary 
judgment was sought. 
676
677 Mr Rudd’s affidavit at [18] referred to in Paul Finance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 669, 
at 4. 
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The High Court refused to grant summary judgment with Master Gambrill considering the 
nub of the real argument related to the manner in which each party viewed the steps taken by 
the Commissioner using the computer to produce a notice of assessment with a cheque 
annexed.678 In relation to ‘mistake,’ she considered that the statutory provisions did not 
override common law recognition by the court of genuine mistake and the power of the court 
to recognise such mistake and, in many cases, return the parties to their former position. The 
Master rejected the argument that Inland Revenue was bound to deal only with Mr Russell.  
The Court of Appeal held that the High Court was correct in refusing to grant the appellant 
summary judgment. The Commissioner had submitted that his actions did not constitute the 
making of an assessment. The cheque and purported notice of assessment were generated in 
error and no value was given for the cheque. The Commissioner did not owe any money to 
the appellant and there was a complete absence of consideration. Richardson J held that there 
was sufficient material before the Court to show an arguable defence. 
In December 1999 the High Court gave leave for the taxpayer to file an amended statement of 
claim. The taxpayer claimed exemplary damages in addition to the claimed refund, which was 
subject to other proceedings in Paul Finance Ltd v Inland Revenue Department.679  
The basis of the claim was that the Commissioner’s actions in relation to the cheque and the 
GST assessment (or possibly failure to make a GST assessment) were malicious, and known 
to be unlawful. The Commissioner acted to deprive the plaintiff of the refund to which the 
plaintiff was lawfully entitled with the motive of furthering a vendetta against the taxpayer’s 
director and agent, Mr Russell and/or that the defendant so acted to harm Mr Russell by 
inflicting economic injury on the plaintiff. Section 27 BORA and s 6 of the TAA 1994 were 
referred to in the claim. 
The taxpayer’s claims for exemplary damages and moneys by way of a GST refund were 
struck out by Master Kennedy-Grant as being an abuse of process.680 Ultimately the 
taxpayer’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused by Glazebrook 
678 On her consideration of the provisions of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 and the authorities she 
concluded that it was arguable whether the Commissioner directed his attention to the making of an 
assessment. The mechanical act of a computer producing a document labelled Notice of Assessment is not 
necessarily an assessment in the true sense of the word or in accordance with Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue v Canterbury Frozen Meat Co. Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 681 (CA). 
679 Paul Finance Ltd v Inland Revenue Department, above n 671. 
680 Paul Finance Ltd v Inland Revenue Department, above n 671 and Paul Finance Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (2000) 19 NZTC 15,655 (HC). 
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J.681 It is difficult to see what else Inland Revenue could have done to stop the cheque or 
avoid the associated litigation. 
D The Failed Section 17 Prosecution – 226 Informations 
682
Mr Russell, and his associated client companies, have perhaps received more s 17 TAA 1994 
notices to supply information than any other taxpayer in New Zealand. Inland Revenue often 
requests information, books and documents from any person (not only a taxpayer) without 
expressly relying on s 17. This practice fosters a spirit of reasonableness and mutual 
cooperation.683 If Inland Revenue consider that information will not be provided voluntarily 
or in a timely manner a s 17 notice will be issued in the first instance. Non-compliance with a
s 17 notice will usually result in Inland Revenue invoking statutory remedies.684
Mr Russell received a substantial number of s 17 notices to comply with and ultimately his 
non-compliance resulted with several prosecutions being laid. This was one example of where 
Mr Russell had some procedural success in relation to his tax affairs. By way of background, 
226 informations were laid by Inland Revenue in 2005; however, a large number of these 
were subsequently withdrawn. Mr Russell stated varying reasons for withdrawal of many of 
the informations, including charges laid against entities that no longer existed. Ultimately 106 
charges were laid.685 Mr Russell challenged their validity.  
681 Paul Finance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (HC) CP65-SD00 17 August 2000.
682
683 Standard Practice Statement SPS 05/08 – Section 17 Notices (July 2005) at [7]. 
684  It is an offence not to comply with a s 17 notice with the penalties contained in section 143 and 143A TAA 
1994. Section 143 Absolute Liability Offences (1) (b) states that a person commits an offence against the Act 
if the person ‘does not provide information (including tax returns and forms) to the Commissioner or any 
other person when required to do so by a tax law’ and s 143A is a knowledge offence section where a person 
commits an offence against the TAA if they (b) ‘knowingly’ do not provide information (including tax 
returns and forms) to the Commissioner or any other person when required to do so by a tax law.  These 
sections also state that no person may be convicted of an offence for not providing information, or knowingly 
not providing information (other than tax returns or forms) to the Commissioner if that person proves they 
did not, as and when required to provide the information, have that information in their knowledge, 
possession or control. Sometimes, a person will not have the ability to comply with a s 17 notice to provide 
information within the timeframe required. In these circumstances and where there is genuine difficulty in 
complying with the demand a modification to the initial demand can be made, however any change to the 
date for compliance must be made and agreed to prior to the expiry of the original notice. 
685  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Russell (2005) 22 NZTC 19,664 (DC) at [52]. 
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The only witness in this case was Mrs Denise Latimer, who had laid the informations on 
behalf of the Commissioner. Mrs Latimer had been seconded to the position of Manager of 
the Tax Avoidance Unit, having its main focus on the affairs of Mr Russell, and had its own 
structures in terms of legal advice. It became clear, through evidence, that in fact although 
Mrs Latimer held the title of ‘Manager’, her role was mainly directed by Mr Paul
McDermott,686 who was the chief investigator and had been at the Tax Avoidance Unit for 
three months or so before Mrs Latimer arrived there. Mr Russell only became aware that 
delegation may have been an issue during his cross examination of Mrs Latimer. It was clear 
to Judge Barber that it was Mr McDermott who was in control of the Tax Avoidance Unit and 
indeed the decision to launch the proceedings against Mr Russell. 
The issue was whether the informations laid on behalf of the Commissioner were valid. Judge 
Barber appreciated that when Mrs Latimer was seconded to the Tax Avoidance Unit, she was 
still holding the office or the title of Manager, Technical and Legal Support Group687 (TLSG). 
His Honour stated that a person can hold more than one office at any time. In Judge Barber’s 
view, at all material times, Mrs Latimer simply was not in control of the TLSG or the Tax 
Avoidance Unit. TLSG was not a particular section handling the Russell project. The Tax 
Avoidance Unit was handling the affairs of Mr Russell and Mr McDermott was in control of 
that. 
His Honour accepted that delegations are not legislation, and should not be construed by rules 
of statutory interpretation, but should be construed pragmatically in the context of enabling 
Inland Revenue employees to function and administer the Revenue Acts on behalf of the 
Commissioner. Although Judge Barber accepted that the business of the Commissioner 
should not be retarded by minor technicalities, criminal prosecutions involve serious steps, 
not only from the point of view of the Commissioner but also the point of view of the 
prospective defendant.688 Judge Barber held these particular proceedings a nullity unable to be 
overcome. Mrs Latimer’s actual work did not fit her departmental title and all prosecutions 
were dismissed.689 
686 Mr McDermott retired from Inland Revenue about the end of March 1997, some months after these 
proceedings were launched. Mrs Latimer then took over control of the Tax Avoidance Unit.  It was clear to 
Judge Barber that Mr McDermott had not delegated authority as the controller of the Tax Avoidance Unit. 
Mrs Latimer reported to Mr McDermott and it was clear to Judge Barber that she was not in control of the 
Tax Avoidance Unit at the relevant time.  This was stated in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Russell, 
above n 685, at [20]. 
687 This unit is now called Legal Technical Support (LTS).  
688 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Russell, above n 685, at [64]. 
689  The existence of a valid delegation was also tested in the Trinity tax avoidance litigation where the assessing 
officer did not hold the delegation necessary to impose a shortfall penalty. A special delegation was granted 
from the Commissioner to authorise the assessments. Due to the peculiar wording of the special delegation 
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Keating690 states that the Russell case691 demonstrates that a lack of delegation can be a 
complete answer to an assessment or prosecution. 
Accordingly, it is often prudent to verify whether the delegation for a particular function was 
correctly held. Mr Russell recalls several aspects of this case. First, this case did confirm the 
existence of the ‘Russell Team’ set up within Inland Revenue. Secondly, he appreciated it was
sheer luck that went his way: 692 
Dead lucky…it was only luck…I was able to prove that the person who issued them 
was unauthorised…it was sheer luck… 
In one year Mr Russell received over 3,500 s 17 notices, receiving 101 notices in one day 
alone. They arrived in large courier bags giving him 10 to 20 days to answer. Understandably 
there was a lot of information requested. Mr Russell spent quite some time replying but 
ultimately simply could not keep up. He had kept a record of how many notices were arriving 
for about a year. 
The question would have to be asked as to whether this volume of requests would have been 
made to any other taxpayer as impartiality would suggest, or whether Inland Revenue were
attempting to tie up Mr Russell completely with demands affecting any person’s ability to 
comply.   
Section 17 notices still arrive at Mr Russell’s mailbox. While I was in Kawakawa Bay for a 
second day of interviewing in April 2010, several s 17 notices arrived that morning. One of 
them was for an on-going FB Duvall Ltd investigation. 
the taxpayers contested whether it was effective, the High Court finding it to be valid in the circumstances. 
See the discussion by Venning J in Accent Management Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2005), 
above n 136, at [328] – [353]. 
690 M. Keating, “New Zealand’s Tax Dispute Procedure – Time for a Change” (2008) 14 NZJTLP 425. 
691 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Russell, above n 685. 
692 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
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Figure 12: Section 17 Notice to Furnish Information FB Duvall Ltd 
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E The Dandelion Case (Case U11)693 
There are two cases that Mr Russell regards as significant in relation to the issue of vendetta. 
Mr Russell stated:694 
Case U11695 was not a template case; in fact Mr Russell’s role was purely on a professional 
basis, being instructed to act by his client, Dandelion Investments Ltd.696 It was alleged the 
taxpayer was prejudiced because of the antagonistic attitude to Mr Russell shown by Inland 
Revenue officers. These included such matters as withholding information that was essential 
to the proper preparation by his agent of the case, and managing the trial by ensuring the 
wrong witnesses were called by the Commissioner. The TRA found that these complaints 
were made out. Judge Willy was satisfied that in relation to these complaints, the
taxpayer was not treated even-handedly. In some respects the Commissioner adopted what 
the TRA described as a “thoroughly unmeritorious stance.”697 Judge Willy held it was quite 
wrong for the Commissioner’s staff to allow their feelings for Mr Russell personally 
(whether or not they were well-founded) to rebound to the detriment of the taxpayer.698
Judge Willy found that the allegations of impartiality and unnecessary obstruction of 
the taxpayer by the Commissioner to be proven.   
The second allegation of managing the trial by ensuring the wrong witnesses were called was 
considered by Judge Willy699  to be very serious, and “if made idly would deserve censure.”700 
In essence the complaint was that the Commissioner had deliberately chosen an employee to 
693 In 1986 the objector (Dandelion Investments Ltd) entered into an arrangement, the effect of which was to 
avoid tax. Deductible interest was paid on a loan to purchase a subsidiary but, via a series of steps involving 
the Cook Islands, most of that interest paid was returned to Dandelion as a dividend from the subsidiary 
purchased. The only expense to Dandelion Investments Ltd were the fees paid to the companies involved.  
694
695 Case U11, above n 293. 
696
697  Case U11, above n 293, at 9,137. 
698  At 9,139. 
699
700  Case U11, above n 293, at 9,137. 
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give evidence on behalf of the Commissioner whose knowledge was so limited that 
Dandelion Investments Ltd was precluded from exercising its rights of cross examination in 
any useful way; in essence stonewalling attempts to prove that the assessment was wrong and
by how much. 
Judge Willy had some sympathy for the Inland Revenue witness, Mr Clearkin, who was 
subjected to days of gruelling examination on matters of which he had very little first-hand 
knowledge.701 Much of his evidence amounted to no more than his views on the work and the 
opinions of others.702 His Honour considered that the witness should never have been asked to 
bear the weight of the Commissioner’s case, and the question was why was he put in that 
position when there were others much better qualified. 
Judge Willy saw only two possibilities: either the witness was called by mistake or the choice 
of a patently inappropriate witness was by design. In the absence of evidence from the 
Commissioner on this point his Honour was left to draw his own inferences. His Honour 
could not accept that somebody as experienced in tax litigation as the Commissioner with all 
the legal resources would have made such an elementary mistake. Judge Willy  
concluded that the decision to rely on an inappropriate witness was consciously made. The 
effect seriously undermined the ability of the taxpayer objector to prove that a tax assessment 
was wrong and by how much. The decision of the inappropriate witness also added 
unnecessarily to the hearing, and the time taken to write the judgment. Judge Willy 
considered it resulted in a serious misuse of the resources of the TRA.  More importantly, his 
Honour stated that it meant that the taxpayer was put into an unhappy position of itself calling 
the appropriate departmental witnesses, at its own cost, in order to seek to discharge the onus 
of proof resting on it. It significantly lengthened the case and fuelled Mr Russell’s concerns 
that the taxpayer, for whom he appeared, had not been treated by the Commissioner in an 
even-handed way. 
Judge Willy considered this attitude at odds with the way Mr Russell presents to the TRA and 
stated “He puts forward, and argues his cases professionally albeit trenchantly.”703 Judge 
Willy strongly stated that “It is for the courts to decide the merits of the cases that arise, not 
for the Commissioner to seek to obstruct the objector’s ability to have those merits put before 
the court.”704 His Honour considered this a matter of serious public interest, and saw it as the 
resources of the Court and monies of clients being dissipated in adjudicating on sterile side 
issues which should never, (or perhaps rarely), be allowed to arise. His Honour also referred 
701  Case U11, above n 293, at 9,138. 
702  At 9,139. 
703 At 9,139. 
704 At 9,139. 
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to cases involving this taxpayer objector, as well as the Miller and McDougall cases,705 as 
illustrating this sort of wrangling in any case Mr Russell was involved in as becoming the 
norm. 
His Honour stated “this feuding must stop. The Department must treat Mr Russell’s clients as 
impartially as they treat those of any other tax practitioner.”706 Judge Willy found the 
allegations of lack of impartiality, and unnecessary obstruction of the objector taxpayer by the 
Commissioner to be proved. Judge Willy held that this finding vitiated the 
assessment. On appeal707 before Tompkins J, his Honour was not disposed to disturb that 
factual finding. However, the finding by the TRA that the lack of impartiality and 
unnecessary obstruction of the objector by the Commissioner vitiated the assessment did not 
stand.708 
705 Mr Russell had made a similar allegation in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 487. 
706  Case U11, above n 293, at 9,139. 
707 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Dandelion Investments Ltd, above n 329. 
708 Tompkins J was not prepared to disturb the TRA’s finding that there had been some improper conduct by the 
Commissioner’s staff in their dealings with Mr Russell but concluded that this could not invalidate an 
assessment properly made some 8 months before Mr Russell’s involvement. His Honour considered that the 
hearing before the TRA was de novo (allowing the matter to be considered afresh) and cured any procedural 
defects that might arise as a result of the Commissioner’s staff conduct. His Honour relied upon Dandelion
Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1997] 2 NZLR 96 (HC); (1996) 17 NZTC 12,689; 
Russell v Taxation Review Authority (2000) 19 NZTC 15,924 (HC) and Miller v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue, above n 487. The hearing before the TRA was for five weeks, and Tompkins J considered there 
was no possible basis to conclude the taxpayer had not had an adequate hearing. Dandelion Investments 
Ltd was unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal where the Commissioner’s assessment based on the 
application of s 99 were confirmed.   
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F Case U16 
The other case considered by Mr Russell as evidence of him being treated unfairly by Inland 
Revenue is Case U16.709 The case involving Inland Revenue Special Audit710 concerned 
deductibility of various expenses of a business conducting motor vehicle auctions.711 A 
creditor had put the taxpayer into liquidation and Mr Russell was appointed as receiver. From 
extensive evidence his Honour concluded that, at all material times, the financial records of 
the objector company were quite inadequate and in rather a mess. That situation developed 
well before Mr Russell was able to take control of the taxpayer’s affairs, and he had done his 
best to reconstruct matters but, naturally, in a favourable manner to the objector. With regard 
to Inland Revenue conduct his Honour stated:712  
At this point I record that Mr Russell made extensive submissions along the lines of 
improper purposes and motives of officers of the respondent and alleged a general 
vendetta of the respondent’s department towards him and his clients. I noted, in the 
course of the hearing, that I felt that the attitude of the respondent’s department to Mr 
Russell “lacks maturity and needs polishing”. I have often felt that the IRD are quite 
unhelpful to Mr Russell – sometimes hostile to him and sometimes flippant. Such 
attitudes do not assist resolution of tax disputes whether between the department and Mr 
Russell or his many clients. I appreciate that Mr Russell’s interpretation of revenue 
laws, particularly, in terms of tax avoidance, and his general strategies and the extent of 
his tax advisory business, are thorns in the side of the department and relate to 
enormous unpaid taxes overall; but treating him as an enemy of the State does not 
expedite resolution. (emphasis added)   
Case U16 also casts an interesting light on Judge Barber’s assessment of Mr Russell at the 
time. The case was heard in 1998 with the decision date being 14 July 1999, two years prior 
to the O’Neil Privy Council decision of 2001. Judge Barber makes a comment about the cross 
709 Case U16 (1999) 19 NZTC 9,168 (NZTRA). 
710  Inland Revenue has a specialist unit, Special Audit that conducts investigations into the tax affairs of people 
who earn income from illegal activities. Special Audit uses information from a number of sources to help 
with its investigations. Examples of people audited to date include drug dealers, prostitutes, and dealers in 
stolen goods. 
711 The Case Stated was to decide whether the respondent acted correctly in disallowing various deductions to 
the objector for the 1991 income tax year of advertising expenses $79,530; entertainment expenses $2,000; 
purchase of vehicles/goodwill $180,000; disallowing a deduction for the 1992 financial year of legal fees 
$9,019.45; and in assessing additional income of $61,624.24 against the objector that year. Special Audit 
may have been involved due to the $2,000 entertainment expenses relating to massage parlour services for 
buyers at the objector’s car auctions, rather than being spent on food for a staff Christmas function. In Case 
U16, above n 709 Judge Barber stated at [2] that: “Presumably, only a small number of buyers received that 
perceived benefit from “sex industry workers” at the massage parlour. Unless the services needed to be 
somehow provided as an inducement to purchase at a car auction, one wonders about deductibility; but the 
item has been conceded and the link between the service and the objector’s income earning process did not 
need to be explained to me.” 
712  Case U16, above n 709, at 9,169. 
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examination by Mr Russell, indicating that Mr Russell was clearly adept in the court room to 
do so.713 In relation to advertising expenditure incurred by the objector Judge Barber stated 
that “on the balance of probabilities, the explanation for the objector is credible and Mr 
Russell’s conclusions are to be accepted.”714  Mr Russell had accused the Inland Revenue 
staff of not wanting to understand his explanations with respect to aspects of this case.  
Although Judge Barber did not find any substance in the allegations for the objector regarding 
a vendetta or an abuse of power theme Judge Barber does make a comment in relation to the 
Inland Revenue running this particular audit by saying:715 
… I did not feel that IRD staff had in this case got a complete grip on this situation, but 
rather that they had been simplistic in their interpretation of the objector’s business 
modus operandi. I had decided to allow this item to the objector. I appreciate that IRD 
staff had the real problem of inadequate records, but they did not seem to ask the 
necessary questions, and many conclusions seem to be the outcome of sampling only. 
This case arguably shows case mismanagement on behalf of Inland Revenue rather than an 
alleged vendetta. 
 The comments by Judge Barber that treating Mr Russell as ‘an enemy of the State’ 
flies in the face of the impartial treatment of taxpayers. It would appear that Inland Revenue 
had ‘biased’ their approach towards Mr Russell based on past interaction, even though he was 
only acting as an agent for a client. 
713 At 9,170. 
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IX Getting Personal – Judicial Recusal 
A rule of natural justice is audi alteram partem or ‘hear the other party’. 
716
Mr Russell has ‘been heard’ by the courts,717 although even now he does not consider that he has 
received a full hearing on the alleged vendetta argument.718 A second rule of natural justice719 is 
nemo judex in sua causa or ‘no one should be a judge in his own cause.’ In other words, judges 
must be unbiased as bias would corrupt outcomes. 720 
Substantive tax litigation over many years can give rise to a taxpayer challenging a revenue 
authority from a procedural basis. One of the more notable procedural challenges undertaken by Mr 
Russell has been to seek to have Judge Barber recuse himself721 from hearing the ‘Track E’ 
litigation that personally assesses Mr Russell for substantial tax liability. The doctrine of judicial 
recusal enables – and may require – a judge who is lawfully appointed to hear and determine a case 
to stand down, leaving its disposition to another colleague or colleagues.722 
716
717 Case R25, above n 48 (‘Track A’) involved at least 43 hearing days before the TRA. Case Z19, above n 442 (‘Track 
E’) involved 64 days between 3 October 2005 and 30 April 2009. 
718 Mr Russell considers that he has never had a proper hearing in relation to the issue of vendetta. Interview with Mr J 
G Russell, above n 1. 
719  Section 27(1) Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that ‘every person has the right to the observance of the principles of 
natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which has the power to make a determination in respect of 
that person’s rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law.’ 
720 Richard A. Epstein, What Do We Mean by the Rule of Law?” (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 5 August 
2004). (First Published by the New Zealand Business Roundtable, Wellington in 2005) at 7.  Epstein writes “The 
need for unbiased judges works itself back into the way we structure a legal system under the rule of law. Thus, the 
rule of law requires probity in the way judges are appointed, evaluated, staffed and supported.” 
721 Mr G Judd QC was legal counsel for Dr Muir in an unsuccessful application for recusal in Accent Management Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2006) 22 NZTC 19,758 (HC) seeking recusal of Venning J and recall of the 
judgment. Also affirmed in Accent Management Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2007], above n 136 and 
Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2007] NZCA 334, [2007] 3 NZLR 495 (CA). As previously noted, Mr 
Gary Judd QC acted for Mr Russell for several years as legal counsel.     
722 For more on judicial recusal see Hon. Justice R. Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal, Principles, Process and 
Problems, (Hart Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2009). 
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At the time of the application to the High Court some 82 cases had been pursued through the 
TRA.723 Essentially Mr Russell’s key allegations,724 in his statement of claim were that over a 
period of 17 years (since November 1989), Judge Barber725 as the Authority, had heard over 65 of 
those 82 ‘template cases’ and had made findings that Mr Russell was a ‘tax avoidance specialist, 
has an obsession with saving tax and has a mental block, which affects his judgment.’726 It was 
argued that it would therefore be a breach of the principles of natural justice recognised at common 
law, under s 27 of the BORA 1990,727 and s 6 of the TAA 1994,728 in that a reasonable observer, 
723 A significant number of the template cases have been appealed to the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Privy 
Council. 
724 Key allegations were set out in [11] of the statement of claim which read as follows 
[11]. Over a period of 17 years from November 1989 to date His Honour Judge P F Barber as a Taxation 
Review Authority has heard 65 cases (‘the Template Cases’) in which: 
(a) the plaintiff has appeared as advocate for the objectors; and
(b) the plaintiff has been a witness for the objectors; and
(c) the matters in issue have related to financial arrangements devised and implemented by the plaintiff
and known as ‘the Russell Template’; and
(d) Judge Barber has made findings that the plaintiff is a tax avoidance specialist, has an obsession with
saving tax and has a mental block, which affects his judgment (TRA Case R25, above n 48 in
particular); and
(e) Allegations have been made that the second defendant and/or his staff have been undertaking a
vendetta against the plaintiff; and
(f) Judge Barber has made numerous rulings on applications by the plaintiff, as advocate for objectors, for
discovery against the second defendant and to subpoena witnesses relating to the allegations of
vendetta; and
(g) Judge Barber has made rulings restricting the scope and duration of the plaintiffs cross-examination of
witnesses; and
(h) Judge Barber has made findings and obiter statements concerning the role of the plaintiff in relation to
alleged tax avoidance arrangements in issue in the particular cases; and
(i) Judge Barber has made comments and given directions concerning the vendetta argument; and
(j) Judge Barber has made findings concerning whether or not the financial arrangements devised by the
plaintiff in the various cases amounted to tax avoidance; and
(k) Judge Barber has made comments giving his view of the motives of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s
conduct of litigation.”
725  Mr Russell has also appeared on occasion before Judge Willy. 
726 Case R25, above n 48, at 24. 
727 Section 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides as follows: 
27 Right to justice 
(1) Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other public
authority which has the power to make a determination in respect of that person’s rights, obligations, or
interests protected or recognised by law.
(2) Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law have been affected by a
determination of any tribunal or other public authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for
judicial review of that determination.
(3) Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to defend civil proceedings brought by, the
Crown, and to have those proceedings heard, according to the law, in the same way as civil proceedings
between individuals.
728 Section 6 TAA 1994: 6 Responsibility on Ministers and Officials to Protect Integrity of Tax System.
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fully informed of the facts and circumstances, would perceive a real danger of bias or would 
conclude there was a real possibility that Judge Barber was biased. Mr Russell submitted that the 
outcome of his ‘Track E’ case could in fact be “predicted now.”729 Further, he argued that the law 
had not been administered fairly or impartially, or according to law on many different occasions 
during the hearing of the template cases, and claimed that a fresh judicial mind was required to 
break the cycle which was already tending towards the same outcome in his own case.730  
The difficulty with Mr Russell’s argument based on s 6 TAA was that it depended upon the TRA731 
falling within s 6(1) which referred to ‘every Minister and every officer of any government 
agency…’ It is only those persons who, pursuant to the statute, have the obligation to protect the 
integrity of the tax system.732  
An initial application733 was declined and Mr Russell commenced review under the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972. In Russell v Taxation Review Authority734  his Honour Cooper J stated that
the claim was based on presumptive bias,735 and it was alleged that because Judge Barber had 
consistently held against Mr Russell over many years,736 in which arrangements designed by Mr 
Russell have been the subject of litigation before the TRA, there must be a reasonable apprehension 
that Judge Barber would not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case. 
6(1) [Ministers and officials to protect integrity of tax system]. Every Minister and every officer of any government
agency having responsibilities under this Act or any other Act in relation to the collection of taxes and other 
functions under the Inland Revenue Acts are at all times to use their best endeavours to protect the integrity of 
the tax system.  
729  Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [40]. 
730  At [45]. 
731 Taxation Review Authorities are established pursuant to s 5(1) Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994. Each 
Authority is one person, who must be a District Court Judge or a Barrister or Solicitor of the High Court of not less 
than seven years’ practice. For some years Judge Barber was the only appointed Authority. The appointment is 
made by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice s 5(4) Taxation Review 
Authorities Act 1994.  
732  Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [46]. 
733 Case Z3 (2009) 24 NZTC 14,027 (NZTRA). 
734  Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585. 
735
736 Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [4]. 
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Cooper J heard the High Court appeal737 with the application for review being dismissed. In 
considering the wording of the section, his Honour referred to s 6 being amongst the provisions of
Part 2 TAA headed ‘Commissioner and Department.’ His Honour considered the wording of s 6 did 
not cover the role and functions of the TRA. Plainly, the Authority was not to be equated with the 
Minister, nor are its members from time to time an “officer of a government agency having 
responsibilities…in relation to the collection of taxes.”738 
Mr Russell submitted that he had the right to the observance by the Authority of the principles of 
natural justice, in simple terms arguing that the right set out in s 27(1) BORA entitled him to a fair 
hearing before an unbiased Judge who would apply lawful and logical analysis and principles in 
determining his case. 
Section 27 BORA did not add in any significant way to the relevant common law principles. His 
Honour considered the cases on bias to understand the content and consequences of the entitlement 
to natural justice, and to assess whether or not the facts on which Mr Russell relied established a 
viable claim that there was a breach of his rights. Both parties739 referred to and relied on the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Muir).740 The Court in 
Muir said:741 
In our view, the correct inquiry is a two stage one. First, it is necessary to establish the actual 
circumstances which have a direct bearing on a suggestion that the Judge was or may be seen 
to be biased. This factual inquiry should be rigorous, in the sense that the complainant cannot 
lightly throw the “bias” ball in the air. The second inquiry is to then ask whether those 
circumstances as established might lead a fair-minded observer to reasonably apprehend that 
the Judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the instant case. This standard 
emphasises to the challenged Judge that a belief in her own purity will not do; she must 
consider how others would view her conduct. 
737  Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585. 
738 A government agency is defined for the purposes of s 6, in s 3 of the TAA. It includes any department or Crown 
entity (as those terms are defined in the Public Finance Act 1989) and any ‘public authority’ as defined in the ITA 
2007. The Authority is plainly not a ‘department’, since s 2 of the Public Finance Act relevantly defines that word 
by reference to a department or instrument of the government or any branch or division of the government, and 
‘government’ itself is defined as the ‘executive government’. The definition of ‘Crown entity’ is found in s 7(1) 
Crown Entities Act 2004. The definition does not include the Authority. 
739 Mr Russell in Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [57] placed some emphasis on what the Court 
said in Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 721, at [64]: “It is not possible or desirable to create a 
catalogue of disqualifiers for Judges in which a reasonable apprehension of bias may arise, but some broad 
principles can be stated. First, a Judge should not decide a case on purely personal considerations. Secondly, there 
should not reasonably be room for a perception that the Judge will decide the case on anything but the evidence in 
front of him or her. Thirdly, a Judge must be in a position to consider all potentially relevant arguments. Fourthly, 
there may conceivably be a series of events or ruling which reasonably warrant an inference that the challenged 
Judge’s perception is warped in some way.”
740 Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 721. 
741 At [62]. 
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Although the Statement of Claim was filed before Muir was heard, Mr Russell was content to argue 
the matter on the basis that the law was as has now been set out in Muir. Although Mr Russell’s 
submissions came close to alleging actual bias by the Authority the claim was not pleaded so as to 
make such an allegation. The contention was that, having regard to Mr Russell’s acceptance of the 
law as set out in Muir, that a fair minded observer would reasonably apprehend that the Authority 
might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case. His Honour considered some of the 
circumstances upon which Mr Russell relied.742 The difficulty was, except in a few instances, Mr 
Russell did not descend into any details which could justify a conclusion that the Authority had 
acted wrongly when it took any of the steps criticised by Mr Russell.  
In concluding, Cooper J stated that in terms of specific ‘disqualifiers’ mentioned in Muir,743 Mr 
Russell was effectively left to argue that there could be a perception that the Judge had already 
made up his mind because of his past experiences with the template cases or, putting the same 
matter differently, because of his mind-set he would not be in a position to consider all potentially 
relevant arguments. That in turn might lead to the proposition that his perception had been 
“warped” in some way, in other words by past dealings with Mr Russell in the long history of the 
litigation which has been before the Authority.744 
Mr Russell’s position was essentially reduced to the contention that there must necessarily be a 
reasonable apprehension of bias, because, over a course of many years, the Judge had consistently 
held against various objectors (in the template cases) and in favour of the Commissioner. In an 
earlier Court of Appeal decision Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,745 Richardson J referred 
to the “turgid history and the continuing saga of the numerous cases involving Mr Russell and his 
various clients.”746  
The question was, whether by dint of such a long association, and the track record of consistent 
findings in favour of the Commissioner, a fair minded lay observer might consider that for those 
reasons the Judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of Mr Russell’s case.  
742 Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [60]. Mr Russell claimed inter alia that the Authority had made 
a final decision in Case R25, above n 48 when it had promised an interim decision, and that there were about 50 
more days of evidence which should have been called, wrong witnesses were put forward by the Commissioner, the 
evidence of witnesses had been curtailed, the Authority had shown a disposition to accept the Commissioner’s 
views, showing a predisposition to reject or ignore the taxpayer’s views, that the Authority had made findings 
contrary to the evidence, and that issues had been determined before hearing evidence. 
743 Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 721, at [64]. 
744 Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [88]. 
745 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1995] 3 NZLR 664 (CA). 
746 At 667. 
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Cooper J in the High Court747 referred to the United States jurisprudence748 on judicial 
disqualification some of which had been discussed in Muir749 in the Court of Appeal.  
Every ruling on an arguable point will necessarily favour one party to the litigation or the other. In 
some cases in the United States it has been argued that a disproportionate number of rulings against 
one party may suggest that something untoward has motivated them. A party to the litigation may 
hold a subjective perception that the Judge’s perceived tendency to rule against them is inevitably 
suspect. It was held in Phillips v Joint Legis. Comm. On Performance and Expend. Review that:750 
a Judge must be free to make rulings on the merits without the apprehension that, should she 
make a disproportionate number of rulings in favour of one party, she would thereby have 
created the impression of bias toward that party or against its adversary. 
Likewise, in Massachusetts School of Law v American Bar Association751 it was said that “even-
handed justice does not require a Judge to balance numerically the rulings in favour of and against 
each party”, and that it was quite possible that a Judge’s consistent pattern of ruling against a party
could be entirely justified by the fact that the party has consistently taken positions that cannot be 
supported. On the basis of these cases and other cases referred to, Flamm concludes:752 
Thus, the mere fact that a judge has issued rulings that a party perceives to be unfavourable to 
its cause is usually insufficient to establish disqualifying bias, even when the number of such 
unfavourable rulings is on a statistical basis extremely high or possibly suggestive of a pattern. 
The same is true when the unfavourable rulings are directed toward a party’s counsel rather 
than the party itself. An Appeals Court is particularly unlikely to find that rulings are 
indicative of disqualifying bias when they were upheld on appeal. 
Flamm also discusses cases where it was alleged that a Judge was biased against a party because of 
adverse comments made. Flamm concludes on the basis of the authorities discussed that critical 
comments will generally not be regarded as disqualifying as long as they do not demonstrate the 
Judge has formed an opinion with regard to the ultimate merits of a matter pending before the 
Court. 
747 Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [90]. 
748 For more on this topic see Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges (2nd 
ed., Banks and Jordan Publishing Company, Boston, 2007). 
749 Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 721. 
750 Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [93] referring to Phillips v Joint Legis. Comm. On Performance 
and Expenditure Review (1981) 637 F.2d 1014 (5th circuit 1981). 
751 Massachusetts School of Law v American Bar Association (1997) 107 F 3d 1026 (3rd circuit 1997) at 1043. 
752 Flamm, above n 748, at 449-450. 
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Although the Authority had made observations in Case R25753 about Mr Russell’s obsession with 
tax saving, leading to a mental block about tax avoidance schemes, there had been no adverse 
finding about Mr Russell’s credibility as a witness. Cooper J concluded that while the Authority 
disagreed with the effect of the various schemes in which Mr Russell had been involved, the 
difference of opinion was as to the legal consequences of those arrangements and his Honour had 
not been referred to any finding of the Judge that Mr Russell was untruthful. 
His Honour considered the adverse comments made about Mr Russell were to be regarded as 
legitimate judicial responses to the nature of the litigation with which the Authority has had to deal, 
and Mr Russell’s part in it.754 His Honour considered it germane to refer to an affidavit of Mr 
Russell of 14 September 2005:755  
I wish to make clear that by bringing these judicial review proceedings I do not intend any 
slight on the character of Judge Barber or on his integrity as a Judge. As a lay advocate I have 
been greatly assisted by Judge Barber in the conduct of the cases and am grateful for such help 
over many years. 
In respect to the appearance of bias his Honour considered the second sentence quoted above of 
most significance, as it stated that the Judge had over a long period adopted a helpful stance in his 
dealings with Mr Russell. Cooper J recognised that care was necessary when considering the United 
States jurisprudence in this field, and recognised that although the test set out in Liteky v United 
States756 was not the same as that which the Court of Appeal had described in Muir757, the tests 
were not in fact far apart. Both were broadly similar to the revised Guide to Judicial Conduct758 
where it states ‘the ultimate issue is whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend 
that  the Judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case’.759 
His Honour concluded that the position apparently adopted in the United States was that there 
cannot be reasonable questions about a Judge’s impartiality arising simply from his or her 
determination of cases even if there is a consistent pattern of holding against one party. Cooper J 
was persuaded that was the appropriate conclusion and any different approach, by which it could be 
inferred from such a pattern alone that the Judge may be biased, would sit uncomfortably alongside 
753 Case R25, above n 48.  
754 Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [96]. 
755  At [24]. 
756 Liteky v United States 510 US 540 (1994). 
757 Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 721. 
758 Council of the Chief Justices of Australia, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2nd ed, Melbourne, Australasian Institute of 
Judicial Administration, 2007). 
759 At 11. 
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the judicial oath.760 Any suggestion that litigants deserve equal treatment in terms of outcome 
would be directly contrary to the core value that cases must be decided in accordance with the law. 
In his Honour’s view, a legal principle that there might be a reasonable apprehension of bias arising 
from the fact that the Authority had consistently upheld the position of the Commissioner in the 
various cases that had come before it involving Mr Russell would be fundamentally wrong. There 
could not be presumptive bias where the rulings of the Judge, although adverse to a party’s 
interests, have nevertheless been consistently in accordance with the law. Put simply, there is a duty 
to decide cases in accordance with the law, and compliance with that duty cannot give rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of bias. The notional fair minded lay observer must be assumed to know 
that much about the role of a Judge.761 
Mr Russell appealed to the Court of Appeal in Russell v Taxation Review Authority.762 The 
‘Appellant’s list of issues’ is on the following page. Mr Russell throws the “bias ball”763 in the air
as well as referring to the BORA and s 6 of the TAA 1994.  
I throw the Bill of Rights and s 6 [TAA 1994] in all my cases...I argue it in every one...I raise 
it as an objection...so they have got to consider it...then I can cross examine them on it...some 
of them don’t even know the section [s 27 BORA]...don’t know what it says...they have never 
looked at it...they have no idea...it’s being considered now in tax cases and in my cases 
because I am raising it all the time.764 
760 In all common law jurisdictions, a judge takes an oath on appointment. The New Zealand Oaths and Declarations 
Act 1957 section 18 Judicial Oath states: ‘I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of New 
Zealand without fear or favour, affection or ill will. So help me God’. (Emphasis added). 
761 Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [101]. 
762 Russell v Taxation Review Authority [2011] NZCA 158, [2011] NZAR 310 (CA), [2011] 25 NZTC 20,044 (CA).  Mr 
Russell had initially lodged an appeal against the judgment of Cooper J addressing the recusal issue on 5 February 
2009. This hearing was delayed for various reasons. It was due to be heard on 5 August 2010; however, Mr Russell 
applied for an adjournment as he was unwell and required surgery. 
763 Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [57]. 
764 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
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The Court of Appeal acknowledged that there was a basis for the taxpayer’s objection to Judge 
Barber rehearing the case, but it did not need to decide whether the Judge should have recused 
himself because of the view it took, that any basis for challenge had been overtaken by the High 
Court rehearing of the merits of the challenge to the tax assessment. There was no question of the 
decision of Wylie J being tainted by bias as there was no such allegation made against him, and the 
facts applied were established by agreement. Therefore, the question whether Judge Barber should 
have recused himself was treated by the Court of Appeal as moot.765 The Supreme Court766 gave the 
final word on this issue rather succinctly, declaring that in the circumstances, the Court of Appeal 
was correct to regard any taint as overtaken by the substantive appeal.767  
768
769
765  Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 762, at 25, 361. 
766  Russell v Taxation Review Authority [2011] NZSC 96, (2011) 25 NZTC 20,077. 








“…the distinction between tax mitigation and tax avoidance is unhelpful: as the judge 
pithily said, it ‘describes a conclusion rather than providing a signpost to it’”770 
A Introduction 
At first glance it is difficult to see substantial contribution to New Zealand jurisprudence as a result 
of the swathes of Russell template related litigation. There is no doubt that Mr Russell is an 
outstandingly clever individual. This is demonstrated by his successful earlier career as a 
management accountant and the initial success of Securitibank. 
 Mr Russell, it would appear, implemented his tax template in a time 
where the pendulum was swinging away from the Duke of Westminster771 
 It is important to note that when the template was designed and promoted this was in 
a ‘pre-Challenge’772 era. On closer review this section summarises some of the impacts Mr Russell 
and his related litigation has made in the New Zealand tax jurisprudence landscape.  
1 In the ‘eyes of the beholder’ 
The ‘concept’ of tax avoidance is at the heart of the entire Russell template-related litigation. 
Although tax avoidance cases appearing before the courts are often clever and well designed, the 
pendulum of what is acceptable appears to have swung in the Commissioner’s favour in more 
recent years. With promoter penalties773 now contained in the tax legislation it would be unlikely 
any tax advisor would promote a tax arrangement pushing the acceptable boundaries too far without 
first seeking a ruling or having considered the avoidance challenge possibilities. 
In the concluding stages of this thesis it is important to make some observations. Although it would 
be easy to dismiss Mr Russell as a serial tax avoider, this stance may be somewhat premature on a 
certain level. The Privy Council774 ruled the Russell tax template was tax avoidance and this is not 
disputed. 
 Although many did not ‘flock’ to the 
template one would wonder whether Mr Russell ever thought he (and his template) would be 
regarded as such a risk to the New Zealand tax base. 
770 O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2, per Lord Hoffman at [9].
771 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminster, above n 215.
772 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 49. 
773  Section 141EB [Promoter Penalties] TAA 1994. 
774  O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
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Mr Russell does not appear to be attracted to the gains financially but appears to be driven by an 
earnest belief that he has done no wrong. He maintains in interview after interview in the media that 
“To my dying day, I will always maintain that the courts have got it wrong.”775 Mr Russell has also 
spent an alleged $5 million in defending his views. If he did not hold a genuine belief in his tax 
stance one would think he would have walked away years ago. 
He perhaps has wanted exoneration that the template, designed in a ‘pre-Challenge’776 era, was both
inherently clever by design and perhaps justified by the attitudes of the day. This is supported by the 
comments from the Challenge case where the sales of existing tax losses were initially approved by 
Inland Revenue. The Challenge transaction, where $10,000 plus half the tax benefits was the “going 
rate at the time”, would clearly signal a different tax environment then to the tax environment post-
Ben Nevis.777  
What has Mr Russell and his tax template taught us? It has shown the tenacity and creativity of Mr 
Russell in designing a tax template with aspects of it that are still being litigated 30 years later. The 
substantive tax issue was firmly dealt with in 2001;778 however, the on-going matters still roll on.
 There 
really are no ‘winners’ in relation to the template litigation. Mr Russell’s cases were heard in the 
Privy Council on two occasions but if he had been granted leave no doubt he would have attended 
at least once more.779  
775  William Mace, “$138m tax bill appeal thrown out” The Dominion Post, (2nd ed., New Zealand, 21 April 2011) at 1. 
776 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd, above n 24. 
777 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 47. 
778  The New Zealand link with the Privy Council was broken in early 2004 with the establishment of the new Supreme 
Court of New Zealand. The Supreme Court of New Zealand formally came into existence on 1 January 2004 by the
passing of the Supreme Court Act 2003 on 15 October 2003. The court first sat on 1 July 2004. It replaced the right 
of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council based in London.   
779 Special leave to appeal was refused by the Privy Council in 2002 in Russell v Taxation Review Authority (2002) 20 
NZTC 17,832 (HC) and Wetherill Company Ltd v Taxation Review Authority (2001) 20 NZTC 17,166 (HC) and M 
and J Wetherill Company Ltd v Taxation Review Authority (2002) 20 NZTC 17,681 (CA) 2 October 2002, Judicial 
Committee (General Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules Order 1982 (UK). The petitioners in the Russell application 
argued that there had been a denial of a right to hear an argument relating to an alleged “vendetta” against the 
petitioners, that there were deficiencies in the TRA’s process, that the High Court should have exercised discretion 
in the petitioner’s favour and that there was bias in the Court of Appeal. The Privy Council does not provide a 
written decision in applications for special leave. 
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B Impact on New Zealand jurisprudence 
780
This thesis never sought to discuss the merits of the Russell tax template from an avoidance 
perspective. Judge Barber agreed with Mr Bruce Grierson’s submission in Case M109781 that
the transaction was “commercially ingenious”, but rejected his submission that it was 
“commercially realistic.”782 Another judge once said that if the Russell tax template was held 
not to be tax avoidance it would be hard to imagine what would be regarded as being tax 
avoidance. Mr Russell simply has a different perspective. 
From the formation of the so-called Russell Team in 1994 to the current litigation 
surrounding ‘Track E’, the many hours of investigators time, lawyers, Crown Counsel as well as 
judicial time, has been immense. It has been estimated that Inland Revenue has spent $30 million 
on the Russell related matters. 
One ‘constant’ throughout the whole Russell litigation story is the involvement of Mr Mike Ruffin. 
Mr Ruffin was a lawyer with Meredith Connell in Auckland and latterly is a Barrister acting on his 
own account. Mr Ruffin was one of the legal representatives for the Commissioner in the ‘pre-
template’ Case K28783 in 1988. 
784
780
781 Case M109, above n 248. 
782 At 2. 
783  Case K28, above n 317. 
784
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1 Section 99: “This section is indeed a tax collector’s dream”785 
I noted that in the first paragraph of Case R25786 Judge Barber refers to s 99(2)787 and (3)788 ITA 
1976. Some 18 years later these sections are still being discussed in relation to the Russell litigation. 
 If 
the Russell template transaction has proved one thing; it is the breadth of the powers of 
reconstruction under s 99(3) ITA 1976. Section 99(3) says that the Commissioner shall adjust the 
assessable income of any person affected by the arrangement to counteract any tax advantage that 
person obtained. (emphasis added). In O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue789 with respect to 
assessing the shareholders under ‘Track B’ Lord Hoffman states that:790 
…provided that he was not using inconsistent hypotheses for his reconstructions, he was in 
their Lordships’ opinion entitled to assess any party who had obtained a tax advantage. 
Mr Russell had argued in the ‘Track E’ High Court litigation that he did not receive “a single cent” 
of the income that was assessed to him and that it was wrong for the Commissioner to reconstruct 
the income of the Commercial Management Partnership to him.791 It was further submitted that the 
Commissioner’s statutory powers to reconstruct tax avoidance arrangements did not extend to 
permit him to include income earned by a company in the personal assessment of a company 
director, when the income was not received by the director in any form. The facts did show that the 
income was earned by the partnerships and not by Mr Russell personally. 
Mr Russell did not contest that the arrangement by which six Commercial Management Partner 
companies diverted their income to loss companies amounted to tax avoidance but he did contest 
that his personal relationship with the companies as a director was part of the tax avoidance 
arrangement. In his view there was no legal basis for lifting the corporate veil to assess income to 
Mr Russell as a director only because he was a director.  
In the High Court792 it was held that there was one overall arrangement and that Mr Russell 
controlled everything. He was the ‘architect’ and each of the parties involved, starting with Mr 
Russell and finishing with Mr Russell, had the expectation that the others would act in a particular 
785 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at [229]. 
786  Case R25, above n 48, at [1]. 
787  Section 99(2) [Void arrangements]. 
788  Section 99(3) [Adjustment of income]. 
789  O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
790  At [31]. 
791 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at [75]. 
792  At [101]. 
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way because all of their actions were orchestrated by Mr Russell. The partner and loss companies 
derived no benefit from the arrangement, taking no independent role in the overall plan. They were 
‘functionaries that acted at Mr Russell’s behest.’793 
Mr Russell used legitimate corporate and trust structures and the Commissioner did not challenge 
their legitimacy. Rather, he challenged the way the structures were applied. Wylie J agreed 
with the earlier TRA decision794 that an unrestricted transfer of profits to loss companies
included in a group purely because of the losses they brought with them in the manner sought 
to be achieved would bypass the company grouping rules contained in the legislation, and 
significantly undermine the tax base. This clearly could not have been Parliament’s intention. 
Although it was argued that Mr Russell did not receive ‘a dollar’ from the arrangement either 
directly or indirectly, it is clear that this was not the test from the Russell ‘Track E’ litigation. Wylie 
J held that Mr Russell was a person affected by the arrangement through obtaining a ‘tax advantage’ 
from it. Although it was accepted that Mr Russell did not receive any of the income generated from 
the arrangement that was its purpose, to ensure that he did not have to pay tax on that income. It 
was therefore open to the Commissioner to reconstruct Mr Russell’s assessable income to 
counteract the tax advantage obtained by him. An arrangement can be clearly carried out by one 
person. 
The Commissioner’s power to reconstruct is not fettered. Section GA 1(6) [No double counting] 
provides that the Commissioner cannot ultimately include an amount of income (or deduction) in 
the taxable income of more than one person. A predecessor to s GA 1(6) was considered in Miller v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue795 where Blanchard J stated in relation to reconstruction that:796 
It is not necessary on each occasion when the Commissioner makes an assessment of one 
taxpayer which is inconsistent with his earlier assessment of a different taxpayer that he 
simultaneously should amend that earlier assessment. That must ultimately be done or the 
Commissioner would, in effect, be collecting the same tax twice over, but he is to be allowed 
some flexibility in the timing of the adjustment to meet administrative demands and to enable 
him to await the outcome of objection proceedings in relation to the assessments.   
From a time bar perspective O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue797 has clarified that if a 
taxpayer has entered into a tax avoidance arrangement and failed to account for the income avoided 
by the arrangement, the Commissioner can assess the taxpayer for the unreturned income relying on 
793 At [102]. 
794 Case Z19, above n 442. 
795 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 487. 
796 At 13,973.  
797  O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
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s 108(2) (b) TAA 1994. In O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue798 Mr Judd submitted that the 
appellant’s returns did not altogether omit mention of income of the nature or from the source in 
respect of which they were being assessed under s 99 ITA 1976. Their Lordships considered this 
argument based upon a misapprehension about the effect of reconstruction.799
Section 99 was considered sufficient to counteract Mr Russell’s template right from the start, 





Mr Russell has claimed on many occasions that he considers income derived has been taxed in 
some cases three times over, in other words challenging the proper use of s 99. In 2006 Mr Russell
sought to have 20 struck-off companies reinstated to the Companies Office Register so that he could 
pursue legal action against Inland Revenue in relation to double taxation.803  
2 The interaction of the specific and general provisions 
804
 In Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue; Managed Fashions Ltd 
v Commissioner of Inland Revenue805 there was discussion of whether the general anti-avoidance 
798 At [21]. 




803 Kelly Sinoski, “Russell fights to sue IRD” The Independent (Auckland, 10 May 2006) at 4. 
804
805 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 487, at 13,977. 
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provision can apply when the specific provision does actually apply as well, to alter the tax position 
that would otherwise be reached. Mr Grierson, counsel in Miller806 did not pursue the argument that 
the specific provision in s 191(7C) ITA 1976 actually applied. The Court’s reasoning in Miller on 
this point was purely obiter. The Court of Appeal did indicate that the specific and general anti-
avoidance provision could apply at the same time to the arrangement. Coleman807 writes that there 
have been no decisions of the courts since the Miller808decision dealing explicitly with the 
interaction between the general and a specific anti-avoidance provision, where the specific 
provision actually applies to change the tax consequences of the transaction.809  Coleman provides 
some light on this by stating an example. If s GB 8 ITA 2007 [Arrangements involving attributed 
repatriation from CFCs] applied to an arrangement, could the Commissioner also apply the general 
anti-avoidance provision so as to make a larger adjustment against the taxpayer? In Coleman’s 
opinion the answer would be no.810    
3 Procedural ‘increments’ 
Procedurally Mr Russell has also had an impact. Mr Russell has challenged almost every move 
made towards him by Inland Revenue. He has challenged the privilege status of file notes found in a 
car park pertaining to his case, whether Inland Revenue in-house solicitors holding practising 
certificates were entitled to claim legal professional privilege,811 and is perhaps the first to allege 
vendetta on behalf of the Commissioner, even to the extent of wishing to subpoena the 
Commissioner himself. 
 In FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue812 Ellis J upheld the right 
of participants in the Russell template to have late objections regarding GST assessments made 15 
years earlier reconsidered by the Commissioner. Her Honour accepted that the taxpayer’s delay in 
filing their objection was understandable as they had been waiting for the outcome of on-going 
litigation regarding the template arrangement. The Commissioner was prevented from focusing on 
806  Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 487. 
807 J. Coleman, Tax Avoidance Law in New Zealand, (CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland, 2009). 
808 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 487, at 13,977 and 13,978. 
809 Coleman, above n 807, at 43. 
810 At 43. Coleman states that if a specific anti-avoidance provision actually applies to the facts of the case that 
provision ought to be applied rather than the general one. The Supreme Court has endorsed an approach that looks at 
Parliament’s purpose in enacting a particular provision. The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant is but an 
example of the scheme and purpose analysis. It is likely that a court will not permit a larger adjustment to be made 
against a taxpayer under the general anti-avoidance provision when a smaller one would be directed under the 
applicable specific anti-avoidance provision. 
811 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142. 
812 FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 52. 
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the lateness of the taxpayer’s objection but had to consider its merits. The Commissioner could not 
use the excuse of lengthy delay to justify refusing to do so. 
Mr Russell has received an astonishing number of s 17 TAA 1994 information requests. It is not 
surprising that the Commissioner’s powers to obtain information have also been subject to challenge 
by him. In Russell v Latimer813 Mr Russell argued that it was improper for the Commissioner to use 
s 17 IRDA 1974 to request information that did not relate to an already identified issue regarding a 
named taxpayer. The High Court in Russell v Latimer confirmed that the Commissioner has the 
authority to make general enquiries to ensure compliance with the Revenue Acts. With regard to the 
226 informations for failure to comply with s 17 notices, one may think this volume or request to be 
burdensome. Again in Russell v Latimer814 the court rejected this ground, so the fact that it is 
onerous to provide the information does not alleviate the obligation to provide it.   
Mr Russell’s procedural success as a result of “good luck more than anything else”815 is highlighted 
in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Russell.816 Mr Russell by ‘sheer luck’ during cross 
examination of Mrs Denise Latimer challenged her authority to issue the informations. It was found 
that indeed Mrs Latimer lacked the correct delegation. In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
Russell817 Judge Barber held that in his view the particular proceedings were “a nullity and that 
cannot be overcome.”818 Keating819 states that “the Russell case demonstrates that a lack of 
delegation by the IRD officer can be a complete answer to an assessment or prosecution.”820 
Actions by Inland Revenue officers without the necessary delegation is also demonstrated in the 
Russell related Kemp821 litigation where a concluded settlement with a number of taxpayers was 
overturned once it became apparent that Ministerial approval was required for settlement, and the 
respective Inland Revenue staff did not have the necessary delegation to enter into the settlement 
arrangements with the taxpayers.  
The Commissioner has tremendous information collecting powers and again it is a Russell related 
case Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue822 that would suggest it is legitimate for the 
813  Russell v Latimer, above n 356. 
814  Russell v Latimer, above n 356. 
815 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
816  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Russell, above n 685. 
817  At [65]. 
818  Russell v Latimer, above n 356, at [65]. 
819 Keating, above n 636. 
820  At 259. 
821 Kemp v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 650. 
822 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1997) 18 NZTC 13,127 (HC). 
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Commissioner to exercise his powers under ss 16, 17 or 19 TAA 1994 with a view to place himself 
in a good position for litigation, at least before the litigation commences. 
Legal privilege issues were challenged with various minutes of the Russell Team meetings. Mr
Russell often felt that correspondence was claimed as being legally privileged when it was 
not. The Russell Team meetings would no doubt discuss strategy issues and again Russell related
litigation provides some guidance on this point.823 Legal professional privilege applies only to 
legal advice and does not extend to strategy meetings or general decision making. This 
was confirmed in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue824 where a memorandum 
recording the decision to invoke s 99 ITA 1976 prepared by an Inland Revenue officer (who 
was a practising solicitor) had to be disclosed to the taxpayer. The memorandum purely 
recorded the administrative decision leading up to the assessment and did not purport to provide any 
legal advice.  
The Dandelion825 case where Mr Russell was acting purely as a tax agent also confirms a legal
point, that even if there is actual prejudice by an assessing Inland Revenue officer, this could 
be cured by a de novo hearing provided to a taxpayer under the statutory procedure and did 
not generally warrant vitiating an assessment.  
Mr Russell has thrown the ‘bias ball’ in the air with regard to Judge Barber and recusal from the 
‘Track E’ litigation and it comes as no surprise that apparent bias has been discussed in earlier 
cases. In Russell v Taxation Review Authority826 the Court of Appeal confirmed the validity of 
tax assessments despite apparent bias stating:827 
But, even if it is assumed that the Commissioner did have a dislike of Mr Russell which 
might have inclined him to look for an opportunity of assessing Mr Russell’s clients, that 
would be of no continuing relevance if, in the end, the Commissioner made his assessments in 
due time and in accordance with the law and to the best of his judgment.   
823 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142. 
824 At 13,001. 
825 Case U11, above n 293; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Dandelion Investments Ltd, above n 329; Dandelion 
Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 329. 
826  Russell v Taxation Review Authority (2001) 20 NZTC 17,418 (CA). 
827  At [9]. 
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4 Assessment 
The Paul Finance828 litigation raised some valid points. Firstly, that a computer generated 
assessment that ‘got away from the mailroom’, lacked the necessary exercise of judgment by the 
Commissioner to qualify as a valid assessment.829 In this case the assessment and cheque were 
issued in error. It was also acknowledged in this case830 that an assessment can often only be 
tentative, yet remain a valid assessment provided it is the best estimate based on information 
available at hand. 831 
Mr Russell (and the template-related litigation) has challenged whether compliance with the 
Commissioner's Policy Statement (CPS) on section 99832 by Inland Revenue staff was
required for the making of a valid assessment. Baragwanath J’s approach to the CPS was 
stated in Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue:833 
I do not accept the Crown’s main argument – that Departmental staff could simply ignore the 
policy statement as not binding. Whether as Mr Grierson argues it provides a fetter on 
their authority, or whether it should be construed as giving rise to a legitimate expectation 
which should be given effect by the Courts…the result is the same: the directive must be 
complied with. It does not impose an improper fetter on the exercise of the s 99(3) and s 23 
functions but directs how they are performed. 
The issue of whether compliance with the CPS was required for the making of a valid assessment 
invoking s 99 was authoritatively determined in O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue.834 Lord 
Hoffman, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, refers to the CPS setting out what he 
regarded as its proper scope. His Lordship said:835  
It is relevant to observe that the question of whether an arrangement is void against the 
Commissioner under s 99(2) is not a matter for his discretion or policy. The Act says that an 
arrangement falling within the terms of the section ‘shall be absolutely void’. Likewise, the 
Commissioner is under a statutory duty to reassess the taxpayer’s assessable income to 
counteract any tax advantage. Discretion enters into the matter only as to the method of 
calculation by which the Commissioner discharges that duty. 
828  Paul Finance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1995) 17 NZTC 12,379 (CA). 
829  Paul Finance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 828. 
830  At 12,382. 
831
832 “Commissioner’s Policy Statement on Section 99”, IRD Tax Information Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 8, Appendix C, (Feb. 
1990) at 1-17. 
833  Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142, at 13,048. 
834 O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
835  At 17,059. 
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At 17,060 Lord Hoffman considered a submission advanced by the appellant that an assessment 
under delegated powers must be ultra vires if the thorough analysis promised by the CPS had 
not been undertaken. On that submission his Lordship said:836
A more fundamental point is that their Lordships do not think that the CPS was intended to lay 
down conditions at all. They do not consider that the parts of the document relied upon by the 
appellants do more than to reassure the public that the Commissioner and his officers will 
think very carefully about whether s 99 applies to any particular case. But his statutory duty is 
to reassess the taxpayer in any case in which s 99 applies and this duty cannot be made subject 
to internal conditions. Nor do their Lordships think that he intended to restrict his duty in such 
a way. 
It is clear from Lord Hoffman’s statement that the proper approach to the CPS has been determined. 
Compliance with the CPS (or Interpretation Statements) cannot be regarded as a condition 
precedent to the issue of a valid assessment.837 Although there is now the Parliamentary 
Contemplation test post Ben Nevis, and what appears to be a very comprehensive discussion 
document released by Inland Revenue on tax avoidance and the interpretation of ss BG1 and GA 1 
ITA 2007, the status of such a statement or guideline will not be held to restrict the Commissioner’s 
duty in any way to reassess a taxpayer under s BG 1 ITA 2007. Although internal statements are not 
binding on the courts or on the Commissioner, Coleman makes the point that “as a matter of 
practice any published statement by the Commissioner is binding on his or her staff by virtue of 
their employment obligations.”838    
839
836  At [26].
837  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Dandelion Investments Ltd, above n 329, at [50] per Tompkins J. 




841 Mr Russell has never let 
go of the CPS issue. In O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue842 the Privy Council dismissed a 
judicial review application that alleged an assessment was invalid because the Commissioner had 
failed to adhere to his published policy on tax avoidance. Lord Hoffman stated that “it would only 
be in exceptional cases that judicial review should be granted where challenges can be addressed in 
the statutory objection procedure.”843 
5 Settlement 
The Kemp844 litigation, where initially it would be easy to think that Inland Revenue had 
inappropriately resiled on concluded settlements, raises an interesting settlement point. In Accent 
Management Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue845 taxpayers who had continued with litigation 
(and lost) were not offered terms made available to the taxpayers that had previously settled. This 
can be contrasted with Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue846 where the Commissioner was 
explicitly directed to extend the benefits of the settlement reached by some taxpayers earlier to 
those that had previously rejected the settlement. 
All of the taxpayers had entered into a settlement offered by the Commissioner, which the High 
Court subsequently ruled to be ultra vires in Kemp v Commissioner of Inland Revenue.847 Most 
taxpayers entered into new, less favourable settlements. Other taxpayers litigated and subsequently 
lost. The Court of Appeal thought these taxpayers should nevertheless be offered the opportunity to 
840
841
842 O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
843  At [18]. 
844 Kemp v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 650.   
845 Accent Management Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2007], above n 136. 
846  Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2002) 20 NZTC 17,826 (CA). 
847 Kemp v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 650. 
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avail themselves of the settlement they had previously rejected. Although there were no 
explanations provided for this opportunity being extended to these taxpayers, one may wonder if the 
court simply wanted to bring an end to the matter, bearing in mind the particular circumstances of 
the Kemp settlements.  
6 A non-tax jurisprudential contribution 
From a non-tax jurisprudence perspective, yet related to Mr Russell by way of the Securitibank 
relationship, Harley regards the judgment given by Richardson J in Re Securitibank (No 2)848 as one 
of the most important his Honour has delivered in the Court, stating that “it reflects foundations that 
have been repeated in his subsequent judgments.”849  
Shortly after Richardson J was appointed a Judge in the Court of Appeal, two differently composed 
courts heard the appeals in Re Securitibank (No 2) and Buckley & Young v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue.850 Richardson J delivered the judgment for the Court of Appeal in Buckley & Young on 
the same day as judgment was given in Re Securitibank. The judgments in both cases referred to a 
number of the same authorities; however neither decision referred to the other. 
Harley writes that “the Court itself has referred to the Richardson Re Securitibank (No 2) judgment 
in numerous other decisions”851 that have followed. He considers the decision “reflects a strong 
adherence to precedent and also a strong appreciation of the economic costs of uncertainty in law, 
as it affects commercial life.”852 The argument presented would have required the court to disregard 
the separate legal existence of two Securitibank group companies, Merbank and Commercial Bills.
Richardson J explained why, in his opinion it was so important to accept the separate entity theory 
on which the Salomon853 doctrine rests. His Honour reinforcing the conclusion said:854 
One is that the approach contended for would, I believe, create undesirable uncertainty as to the 
application of our law. Commercial men are surely entitled to order their affairs to achieve the 
legal and lawful results which they intend. If they deliberately enter into a genuine commercial 
transaction intended to operate according to its tenor, what they ask of the law is assurance, the 
certainty that their intentions will be recognised. 
848  Re Securitibank Ltd (No 2), above n 495. At issue was whether client bills constituted loan transactions in 
contravention of the Moneylenders Act 1908. 
849  Geoff Harley, “Collecting Taxes” (2002) 33 (3) VUWLR 333 at 350. 
850  Buckley & Young Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 504. 
851  By way of example Mills v Dowdall [1983] NZLR 154 (CA) and WT Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners, 
above n 218. 
852  Harley, above n 849, at 350. 
853  Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd, above n 197.  See also Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd, above n 198. 
854  Re Securitibank Ltd (No 2), above n 495, at 173. 
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C All Actions have Consequences 
1 Frivolous or vexatious? 
Some may consider Mr Russell’s actions over the past few decades to be vexatious or frivolous. 
These two words are often placed together. Perhaps the number of Official Information requests 
sent by Mr Russell seeking essentially the same information but with enough variation to require 
Inland Revenue to answer the requests could be regarded as both.855 
This thesis has been very difficult from the perspective that so many cases argue very similar (or the 
same) points with the same (or similar) outcome. In Case U23856 Judge Barber observed that: 
Regrettably, the objectors have been rather repetitive in terms of submissions and evidence...
the objectors keep seeking to re-litigate matters which are res judicata…and appear to 
have a “clutching at straws” mentality…there is an atmosphere of the desperate hope of a 
miracle point materialising from nowhere for the objectors. 
Wire Supplies Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,857 a case not discussed in this thesis due
to size constraints, in many ways sums up much of the litigation. Judge Barber’s comments (above) 
in Case U23 were referred to in the Wire Supplies Ltd case as follows:858 
[20] Those remarks were made in 1999. Now, nearly eight years later, we have before us
numerous issues which have exactly the same hallmarks. Needless to say, the constant 
reiteration of the submissions rejected by courts at all levels does little to advance the cause of 
justice. Immediately after making the above remarks, Judge Barber said he thought the 
situation called out for mediation. We doubt that that is a realistic suggestion in the 
circumstances. Rather, in our view, it calls for proper restraint on the part of the taxpayers and 
their advisers and acceptance that repetition of failed arguments, sometimes with hair-splitting
variations to the arguments as originally made, does nothing to make them more convincing. 
855  A frivolous action is regarded as not having any serious purpose or value. A vexatious action can denote an action 
brought without sufficient grounds for winning, purely to cause annoyance to the other party. Some of the defence 
issues raised in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Rupe (2003) 21 NZTC 18,219 (DC) could be regarded as 
frivolous (such as claiming he had not been named properly). This point was also argued in Boyton v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue (2002) 20 NZTC 17,615 (HC) where the taxpayer argued that his name had sui juris status.
856 Case U23, above n 501, at [5]. 
857 Wire Supplies Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2007] NZCA 244, [2007] 3 NZLR 458. 
858 Case U23, above n 501, at [20] referred to in Wire Supplies Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 857, at 
[20]. 
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The amount of documents in the ‘Track E’ litigation provides an insight into the legal cost and 
expense, not to mention time involved. There were 289 folders of documents before the TRA in 
’Track E’ containing thousands of pages of information. One Inland Revenue senior officer, the 
‘architect’ of ‘Track E’, Mr Phillip Blakeley, had a brief of evidence that was 349 pages long. Cross
examination went into every aspect of the case in fine detail. The transcript of the cross-
examination of Mr Russell alone ran to almost 500 pages. The notes of evidence in total comprised 
some 2,455 pages. The agreed statement of facts was 123 pages long.859     
2 Use of money interest and issues of fairness 
According to the Policy Advice Division of Inland Revenue “the [use of money interest] UOMI 
rates are a cornerstone of the tax compliance system in New Zealand.”860 Section 120A TAA 1994 
sets out the purpose of the UOMI rules.861 Parliament enacted the current UOMI rules in July 1996 
applicable to all taxes and duties from the 1997/98 income year onwards. The Commentary on the 
Bill included the statement that the regime is not intended as a penalty, although it has sometimes 
been confused with such. 
While on one level that is true, in other words the UOMI rules are a compensatory measure, 
concern was raised in 2008 by the Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) 
and the National Tax Committee of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) 
to the Minister of Revenue, Hon Peter Dunne, reviewing the disputes resolution and 
challenge procedures in the TAA 1994. The two bodies noted that they had made the 
submission “because we both have serious concerns about the current procedures and believe 
changes are required urgently”.862 The two bodies drew attention to the implications that the UOMI 
rules have for disputes:863  
If there is a substantive dispute as to whether tax is due in the first place, and the taxpayer is 
unable to fund a voluntary payment of tax to stop the interest accruing, the UOMI regime 
gives rise to very serious financial risk for taxpayers (which must be reported in their 
accounts)…It is taxpayers who are penalised for Inland Revenue’s inefficiency by way of an 
imposition of UOMI on underpaid tax at a very high rate. (emphasis added) 
859  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at [7]. 
860 Inland Revenue, Special Report from Policy Advice Division, “Use-of-money interest rates and underpayment 
method rate changes”, (23 June 2009) at 1 as cited in P. Vial, “Use of Money Interest: A Fair Deal for Taxpayers?” 
(November 2011) Taxation Today 22. 
861  Section 120A TAA 1994. 
862  Joint submission by the Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) and National Tax Committee 
of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) on “The Disputes Resolution Procedures in Part 
4A of the Tax Administration Act 1994 and the Challenge Procedures in Part 8A of the TAA 1994” (4 August 
2008). 
863  NZLS and NZICA joint submission to Inland Revenue on “Disputes: A Review – An Officials’ Issues Paper” (July 
2010; 3 September 2010) at 11. 
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Both the NZLS and NZICA believed that the UOMI regime is a factor in taxpayers deciding not to 
pursue disputable matters which is clearly not aligned with the original purpose of the disputes 
procedures regime. Their joint submission emphasised that the UOMI regime has become a penalty
on taxpayers and requires review.864  
Mr Russell’s personal Statements of Account865 show a marked increase in liability from 1997 year 
onwards and it is really a fiction to consider that Mr Russell would have the funds to clear this debt. 
A taxpayer looking at the growth of liability over the last two years in relation to Mr Russell would 
perhaps conclude that the UOMI rules are onerous. When the ‘numbers’ get large enough genuine 
attempts for debt settlement becomes meaningless. Presumably Inland Revenue are aware of the 
assets held by Mr Russell, or if not certainly should be after the years of investigation. They 
therefore have to realise they will not recover even a fraction of the outstanding amount. 
It is clear from the cases looked at in this thesis that Inland Revenue have huge resources compared 
to most taxpayers. Mr Russell is a rare example of a taxpayer with considerable but not unlimited 
resources. His funding to fight Inland Revenue largely came from his income derived from the 
template. 
 This section states that: 
‘notwithstanding anything in the Inland Revenue Acts, it is the duty of the 
Commissioner to collect over time the highest net revenue that is practicable within the 
law having regard to – 
(a) the resources available to the Commissioner; and
(b) the importance of promoting compliance, especially voluntary compliance, by all
taxpayers with the Inland Revenue Acts; and
864 The NZLS and NZICA joint submission recommended that the Government consider either suspending the UOMI 
while the conference process (a phase of the disputes resolution procedures) continues; or imposing UOMI at a 
lower rate (for example the overpayment rate) during the disputes resolution process; or suspending UOMI if Inland 
Revenue fails to meet particular timeframes for response built into the disputes resolution procedures.  
865 Mr Russell’s personal Statement of Account issued 17 August 2012 for an amount of $200,182,178.18. 
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(c) the compliance costs incurred by taxpayers.’
 UOMI is a cost to a taxpayer with an 
amendment to legislation enacted in August 2011 confirming deductibility.866 
Taxpayers can effectively become ‘burnt off’ and choose not to proceed with a tax dispute, 
choosing rather to settle and avoid the stress. This unfortunately is a problem with the tax disputes 
process. 
 In July 2010 the debt alleged was $138 million. By following legal 
avenues of dispute his personal tax debt now in late 2012 exceeds $200 million.
 Mr Gary Judd, in written 
submissions in the 1989 case addressing receiver negligence First City Corporation Ltd v 
Downsview Nominees Ltd (No. 2), found it necessary to say:867 
Mr Russell is clearly an unorthodox man who sometimes behaves in a manner which provokes 
antagonism, by insisting that things are done his way if he thinks that is the right way. 
Winning friends and influencing people by tactful persuasion is obviously not his style. He is, 
it is clear from the evidence before the Court, not hesitant to become involved in battles with 
public officials and others when he considers himself to be right. 
These characteristics whilst provoking irritation in those who have to suffer the consequences 
are not however the basis upon which Mr Russell’s actions must be judged. He is entitled, like 
every citizen, to take advantage of his legal rights and be judged accordingly. 
His Honour, Gault J agreed, stating:868 
It is, of course, quite correct that every citizen is entitled to take advantage of his legal rights 
and to take technical points if they are open, but if that course is adopted in the absence of true 
866  Deductibility of use of money interest, ss DB 3B, EF 4, EF 5, EF 6 ITA 2007.  Section DB 3B ITA 2004, s DB 2 
ITA 1994, and s 184AA TAA 1994. The amendment clarifies that UOMI is deductible for tax purposes. The 
amendments apply retrospectively from the 1997/1998 income year. The deductibility applies both to companies 
and individuals.  
867  First City Corporation Ltd v Downsview Nominees Ltd, above n 291, at 21. 
868  At 21. 
231 
merit, little sympathy can be expected at the end of the day if the position taken proves to have 
been unjustified. 
The question is of course, was Mr Russell’s tax position taken over the last three decades justified? 
Mr Russell has taken the steps as he has seen fit to address the Inland Revenue claims, and quite 
within his legal rights to do so. The delay has not all been caused by his actions. 
3 The big ‘pot of gold’ 
869
 Many of the entities that have received various tax advantages have now been 
liquidated and cease to exist. The Russell Team itself has been long disbanded. The tax debt alleged
has increased to a level beyond the bounds of reason for a person of Mr Russell’s age to pay. The 
changes to the Compliance and Penalties Regime from the income years ended 31 March 1998 
onwards introduced prospective changes to both the civil and criminal penalties870 under the Inland 
Revenue Acts. The impact of the new regime is self-evident in its impact on Mr Russell’s 
Statements of Account. 
Mr Russell has stated that whether the Statement of Account indicated a final amount of $1 million 
or $1 billion, it really would not matter. He has indicated that he cannot pay. 
 First, from a fairness perspective, one can readily understand the imposition 
of late payment penalties of one per cent for the first day late, followed by four per cent six days 
later.871 It is also readily understandable to see the imposition of a use of money interest charge 
being imposed.  
But what about when the tax in dispute exceeds many years and the amount of money is beyond the 
realm of most individuals. Do Inland Revenue really believe there is a ‘pot of gold’ somewhere in 
Kawakawa Bay or in an overseas bank account?  There may be a bank account somewhere but if 
there is one, I would have thought that Inland Revenue would have located it by now. It is 
common knowledge to Inland Revenue that Mr Russell’s property in Kawakawa Bay is owned by a 
trust, as is two other houses occupied by his children as beneficiaries, including the Pakuranga 
property872 (where his son had lived) that were once the offices of the Commercial Management 
business.  
869
870  Part IX – Penalties, TAA 1994. 
871  Section 139B (2) TAA 1994. 
872  The 6 Downsview Road property was sold at auction in 2012. 
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4 The ‘rule of law’ 
‘The rule of law’873 is at once one of the most persistent and mysterious phrases in jurisprudence.874 
All taxpayers should be treated impartially by Inland Revenue. Epstein provides an example:875 
Suppose, for example, we had one regime of taxation that applied to everyone whose 
surnames began with letters A-M and a different regime for those whose surnames began with 
letters N-Z.  We might be able to argue about which regime was better, so there might be no 
clear answer to the question as to whether we should be taxed the A-M way or the N-Z way. 
But we would be confident that a single system that applied to everyone equally would be 
better than a regime that distinguished between groups in this way, no matter which rule was 
chosen. 
Inland Revenue have procedures in place through legislation that aims to always treat taxpayers on 
equal footing. When penalties are imposed, there are procedures in place to ensure there is 
consistency in application whether the taxpayer is located in Auckland or Invercargill, or 
somewhere on the East Coast of the North Island. If taxpayers were treated differently due to their 
location, this would affect compliance, as fairness is one of the factors that has an impact on 
compliance. 
 This 
impartial treatment is vital in a tax system. 
876 The Use of 
Money Interest is also applied to taxpayers in an impartial manner. One of the criticisms of the pre-
1998 penal tax system was the arbitrariness of the application of penalties.877   
The two sections of legislation Mr Russell considers he has most impacted are s 6 TAA 1994 and s 
27 BORA. Section 6 TAA 1994878 addresses the responsibility on Ministers and officials to protect 
873 “The rule of law is an amalgam of standards, expectations and aspirations: it encompasses traditional areas about 
liberty and natural justice, and, more generally, ideas about the requirements of justice and fairness in the relations 
between government and governed”. TRS Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) at 21 as 
cited in Epstein, above n 720. 
874 Epstein, above n 720, at 4. 
875 At 4. 
876
877 Essentially the rules are to compensate the Commissioner for the loss of use of money through taxpayers paying too 
little tax; compensate taxpayers for the loss of use of money through their paying too much tax; and to encourage 
taxpayers to pay the correct amount of tax on time. Vial states that ‘it is therefore fair to assume that Parliament’s 
intention in enacting UOMI rules was that the first objective of compensating the party that is “out of pocket” and 
the second objective of encouraging compliant taxpayer behaviour should be ranked equally in importance: Vial, 
above n 860, at 24. 
878 The section charges every Minister and every officer of any government agency, having responsibilities under the 
TAA 1994 or any other Act, in relation to the collection of taxes and other functions under the Inland Revenue Acts 
are, at all times, to use their best endeavours to protect the integrity of the tax system. 
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the integrity of the tax system in a broader sense. Section 6(2) TAA 1994 makes reference to what 
is included in the meaning of ‘the integrity of the tax system’.879 The ‘integrity’ of the tax system 
includes the responsibilities of those administering the law to do so fairly, impartially and according 
to the law, as well as taxpayer perceptions of the integrity of the tax system. 
Mr Russell has fervently maintained that a vendetta has been conducted towards him by Inland 
Revenue staff. This could be his validly held perception concerning the ‘integrity of the tax system,’ 
only he really knows the answer to that. Perhaps ‘integrity is in the eyes of the beholder.’ The courts 
have addressed what could be considered an unmeritorious approach towards Mr Russell in some of 
the litigation he has been involved in, such as Case U11880 and Case U16881 with comment from 
Judge Willy that would suggest that Mr Russell’s perception of integrity has been tainted. There 
have also been adverse comments in relation to officers of Inland Revenue in Miller882 where 
Baragwanath J briefly mentioned the importance of the ‘spirit and letter of the law being adhered to 
by the tax authority.’883 
Although s 6 TAA 1994, without limiting its meaning, states that the integrity of the tax system 
includes (f) the responsibilities of those administering the law to do so fairly, impartially, and 
according to the law, it is presumed that the ‘law’ in this sentence is to be considered in the ‘letter 
of the law’ context. However, perhaps the section overall, which includes a taxpayer’s perceptions 
of the integrity of the tax system, would give the word a broader meaning, also encapsulating the 
word in a ‘spirit of the law’ sense. This being the case, one can see how Inland Revenue on 
occasion have not treated Mr Russell within the ‘spirit’ of the law as one would expect. After years 
of turgid litigation history it would be understandable that some Inland Revenue staff have simply 
become ‘battle weary’.  
879 Integrity of the tax system includes the rights of taxpayers to have their liability determined fairly, impartially and in 
accordance with the law; the rights of taxpayers to have their individual affairs kept confidential and treated with no 
greater or lesser favour than the tax affairs of other taxpayers; the responsibilities of taxpayers to comply with the 
law; and the responsibilities of those administering the law to maintain the confidentiality of the affairs of the 
taxpayer. These rights and responsibilities are what would be considered by any modern tax administration to be 
essential to a well-functioning tax system.  For further reading see Duncan Bentley (ed.) Taxpayers’ Rights: An 
International Perspective (Revenue Law Journal, School of Law, Bond University, Queensland, 1998) 4229.
[Inland Revenue also have an Inland Revenue Charter in respect of how a taxpayer will be treated by Inland 
Revenue staff – see Inland Revenue website:  www.ird.govt.nz.  See also A.J. Sawyer, “A Comparison of New 
Zealand Taxpayers’ Rights with Selected Civil Law and Common Law Countries: Have New Zealand 
Taxpayers’ Been “Short-changed”?” (1999) 32 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1345.] 
880  Case U11, above n 293. 
881  Case U16, above n 709. 
882 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142. 
883 At 90. 
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It is difficult to see any judicial contribution to either the BORA 1990 or s 6 TAA 1994 in relation 
to the swathes of template litigation, but Mr Russell maintains his contribution is ‘bringing attention 
to both of them in any case.” He states that:884 
natural justice is not a procedural matter, it’s an outcome matter….and if the outcome is 
perceived by the public to be unjust, then that person has not received natural justice. 
Mr Grierson, counsel for Mr Russell submitted in Case R25885 that Inland Revenue officers were 
out to ‘get’ Mr Russell, and had constantly harassed him and his clients by ways of constant 
auditing and refusing to pay out GST refunds.  Perhaps by 
way of conclusion to the vendetta argument it should be noted that in 1999886 Judge Barber 
observed that while he had seen no suggestion of vendetta conduct on the part of Inland Revenue to 
date he had seen ‘much unhelpful conduct’ from some of Inland Revenue’s officers. Further in 
2000887 the TRA observed that although the allegation of vendetta had been canvassed in Miller v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue,888 it had not been canvassed to the extent contemplated by Mr 
Russell for some years or by his Honour. Having said that his Honour then said:889 
However, I do not wish to raise false hopes in Mr Russell. I confirm the view I have stated on 
a number of occasions that I have found no evidence of vendetta or any type of abuse of 
process which would affect the integrity of template assessments; but I have often felt that 
there has been quite obstructive and uncooperative conduct towards Mr Russell and his clients 
by Officers of the IRD. That, of course, is a quite unacceptable way for the IRD to treat any 
citizen. 
These comments were made prior to the O’Neil890 decision and a lot has happened between Mr 
Russell and Inland Revenue since, as displayed in this thesis. Perhaps this is where it sits, no
evidence of a vendetta but clearly inappropriate attitudes by some within a tax administration. Mr 
Russell freely states that defending the template has cost him over $5 million dollars,891 and he 
believes it has cost the revenue in excess of $30 million.892 This is an expensive sum by any 
884 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
885  Case R25, above n 48. 
886  Case U24 (1999) 19 NZTC 9,223 (NZTRA) at [40]. 
887  Case U42 [2000] 19 NZTC 9,384 (NZTRA) at [9]. 
888 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1997) 18 NZTC 13,961 (HC). 
889  Case U42, above n 887, at [9]. 
890  O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
891  Mr Russell ‘conservatively estimates’ that he has spent $5 million over the years on his court battles. Nick Krause, 
“Accountant is relaxed about huge tax claim”, The Dominion Post (2nd ed., New Zealand, 11 August 2010) at 4. 
892  Mr Russell claims to have confirmed during a cross examination in the TRA that Inland Revenue has spent some 
$30 million pursuing him over the years. Inland Revenue declined to comment on Mr Russell. Krause, above n 891, 
at 4. 
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account and it is surprising that it has even reached anywhere near that figure.
 An ‘obstructive and uncooperative conduct’ will only have added 
expense to both sides, as evidenced in Case U11 and Case U16. 
Although disputes (even under the current disputes resolution process) take a long time to 
proceed893 through to completion it would be doubtful if a taxpayer would still be litigating 25 
years later. Mr Russell has received a tremendous amount of information requests from Inland 
Revenue over many years. Although this has waned in more recent times I would doubt whether any 
person would now receive 101 information requests in one day. Standard Practice Statement SPS 
05/08894 outlines the Inland Revenue procedures when issuing s 17 notices. Generally 28 days are 
given to comply with the requirements of such a notice, with an extension of time given in 
genuine circumstances. If Inland Revenue were so concerned to get so much information perhaps the 
use of s 16 TAA 1994 may have been warranted rather than expect a taxpayer to comply 
with what essentially was in impossible task. This may have been a better option for both parties. 
The tax disputes process implemented in 1996 was designed to improve the timely resolution of tax 
disputes. Lennard commenting on the Russell cases, states: “hard cases make bad law, so it is said, 
but even easy issues like the (in)effectiveness of the J G Russell tax avoidance template have the 
potential to make tardy law.”895 Lennard then states that indeed the Russell template cases “still 
persist, a quarter of a century or so after the events with which they are concerned.” This is perhaps 
an indictment on both sides. 
893  See also Michael Lennard, “How long to resolution?  Delay in Dispute Resolution Process”, August 2008, 
www.mikelennard.com/?t=32 (Accessed 4/1/2013). 
894  SPS 05/08: Section 17 Notices (July 2005). 




“…its God’s work to them, it really is.” 896 
The ‘Russell team’ 
897
 Case U11898 and Case U16899 both suggest that individual attitudes have come 
to the fore in relation to dealing with Mr Russell or his clients, 
 In Miller v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue900 Baragwanath J stated that ‘the temptation (by Inland Revenue officers) 




898 Case U11, above n 293. 
899 Case U16, above n 709. 
900 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 142. 




2 Impact on Inland Revenue policy and procedure 
904
905
There can be a balance of power issue around investigations, and quite rightly so. Inland Revenue 
are after information to determine the correct tax position and this thesis has demonstrated at times 
the difficulty Inland Revenue has had in obtaining information in a timely manner. There are of 
course situations that can develop where Inland Revenue may be in litigation with a taxpayer and 
use their statutory information collection powers in addition to the usual court discovery 
procedures. Care must be taken and this was highlighted in the Vinelight Nominees Ltd906, 
Chesterfield Preschools Ltd907 and Next Generation Investments (in liq)908 litigation and 
commented on by Keating.909 
Inland Revenue have very deep pockets (or at least the taxpayer does) compared to an average 





906 Vinelight Nominees Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2005) 22 NZTC 19,298 (HC). 
907 Chesterfield Preschools Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (No 2) (2005) 22 NZTC 19,500 (HC).  
908 Next Generation Investments Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2006) 22 NZTC 19,775 (HC). 
909  M. Keating, “The Use of the Commissioner’s Powers during Litigation” (2007) 13 NZJTLP 195 at 195. 
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Mr Russell has clearly been a challenge for Inland Revenue to deal with. He is not 
only exceptionally clever, but also aware of law changes as they occur. Mr Russell was aware of
the then new BORA when the Millers and O’Neil’s were first interviewed in 1990. He was very 
aware of the law of recusal when I interviewed him in 2010 just prior to the ‘Track E’ 
substantive litigation in the Auckland High Court. 
Will there be another John George Russell on the New Zealand tax landscape? I doubt if there will 
be to a similar extent. It would be difficult to imagine anyone with not only his ability but more 
importantly his tenacity to see it through. It is not a light thing to be engaged with a powerful 
revenue authority, not just for an audit or two but for over three decades.  
Will Inland Revenue have further difficulties with taxpayers long after Mr Russell has left the tax 
dispute landscape? The answer is an absolute “yes.” History does repeat and although lessons have 
no doubt been well learned as a result of the Russell litigation there will always be cases where 
audits get out of hand. Mr Russell is not a normal taxpayer to engage with. 
3 Settlement and the ‘spirit’ of the law 
910
Earlier in this thesis mention was made in regard to the letter and spirit of the law. The penalties 
provisions and use of money interest rules are expressly ‘letter’ in nature and this thesis would not 
suggest that these should be modified or changed.911 The issue of settlement, however, can be 
managed with the ‘spirit’ of the law in mind. There clearly is a tipping point where a taxpayer with 




penalties becomes unmanageable and clearly non-payable. 
Mr Russell has expressed a desire to retire completely. He did offer to settle but the terms of his 
settlement were not acceptable to Inland Revenue. 
912
The tax quantum was about $60 million at the time. Mr Russell said “I will pay that…at a rate of 
$1,000 a week.” 
913  Mr Russell replied:914 
oh well, I can’t do better than that…that’s a true offer but I guarantee you I will pay you 
$1,000 a week until the day I die or the $60 million, whichever comes first,…you guys can 
pray nightly for my good health to keep me going, and you will get more money. 
There was one condition in his offer, 
915
 Mr Russell considered $52,000 per year a considerable sum and thought he would be good 
for another 10 years or so.  
He has recently had further discussion with Inland Revenue regarding settlement. In fact he made 








Although in the first instance it may appear that Mr Russell would not seek bankruptcy this is 
actually the option he considers offers the best outcome for him and the worst for Inland Revenue. 
917
Mr Russell claims that he has been spending $1,000 per week anyway on template related matters, 
so he was sure he could keep to his offer if it was accepted. 
In Case Y8918 Judge Barber made comment in relation to the prospect of collection. His Honour 
stated:919 
Also, the disputant maintains that his total available assets do not exceed about two million 
dollars. If so, the assessments of 80 million dollars or more, with massive penalties and 
interest to be added to that, seem futile from a collection point of view. (emphasis added) 
Judge Barber, in referring to the quantum of tax avoided, continued:920 
…Even if the disputant is only assessed at one stream of income level within the template 
transactions, much more money than two million dollars must have been avoided by the 
template scheme and diverted to the disputant. Perhaps it is untraceable at this stage, and a 
substantial part of it must have been applied in litigation costs by the disputant over the past 
20 years of so. I feel there is an air of unreality in the continuance of this litigation. (emphasis 
added).  
Judge Barber further stated “I have endeavoured to steer the parties into a settlement (after about 20 
years of their litigation), but without success.”921  
It is only the parties to any settlement discussion that know what may have been offered or 
declined, but it is clear through the above comments that Judge Barber would have preferred to 
917
918 Case Y8 (2007) 23 NZTC 13,076 (NZTRA). 
919 At [114]. 
920 At [114]. 
921 At [112].
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have seen a settlement rather than have the ‘turgid saga’ continue. This comment in Case Y8922 was 
made in June 2007, over five years ago. The litigation costs are such that in an attempt to contain 
further costs Mr Russell has appeared in person at the closing stages of this litigation. However, the 
latter cases are probably the most important to him as they will produce the ‘death knell blow’ to 
any success he may have thought he had.  
Judge Barber in 2004 summed up his thoughts regarding settlement in relation to the template 
litigation.923 Perhaps indicating the necessity of a pragmatic approach in what is really a unique 
situation, Judge Barber stated:924 
At this stage any sensible person would be focusing on some type of settlement along the lines 
that the income stream made the subject of the tax avoidance scheme be taxed at the tax rate 
for material times, but only taxed once (i.e. at one level) in terms of a reconstruction under s 
99(3); and that for GST purposes only one level of income stream be looked at; and that to 
facilitate a settlement penalties be eradicated (by special Act of Parliament if necessary) on the 
basis of the core tax being paid within a reasonable period i.e. reasonable time should be given 
for payment and, probably, with interest for use of money. (emphasis added). 
This type of approach would have alleviated any of the double taxation concerns that have been 
raised over the years. Even in the Court of Appeal in February 2012925 Mr Russell raised concerns 
that certain income in respect of the template transactions had been taxed more than once. 
In relation to settlement Judge Barber continued:926 
I think it is in the national interest that a settlement of all these Russell tax avoidance matters 
be achieved; otherwise matters may drag on in the Courts for another decade or more. It seems 
unlikely that there will be relief for Mr Russell and his clients, but it must be desirable that the 
State obtain the outstanding core tax as soon as possible under a settlement which leads to the 
achieving of actual payment of that debt. 
922 Case Y8, above n 918. 
923 Case W37, above n 325, at [53]. 
924 At [53]. 
925 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 32. 
926 Case W37, above n 325, at [53].
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It is fair to say that the approach by Inland Revenue to settlement of the Russell litigation has been 
less than pragmatic. Inland Revenue’s approach to settlement has changed from the time of the 
early template decisions, especially as a result of cases. In Auckland Gas Co Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue,927 the Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the Commissioners’ insistence on 
settling tax disputes only on a principled basis, and ruled that Inland Revenue was entitled to enter 
into compromise settlements.  Richardson P stated that both the taxpayer and the Commissioner 
operating under the care and management responsibilities imposed under s 6 and 6A TAA were 
entitled to make sensible litigation, including settlement decisions.928 (emphasis added) 
927 Auckland Gas Co Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999] 2 NZLR 409 (CA); (1999) 19 NZTC 15,027 (CA). 





XI Concluding Reflections 
929
A Mr Russell’s Reflections on Procedure 
Mr Russell considers procedural issues are very important, there are reasons for procedures and 




Mr Russell stated that if his contribution was only that: 934 
you should challenge the thinking of judges on what they say, no matter what court it is, even 
the highest court of the land, if what they say doesn’t look right, then look into it and analyse 
it yourself – if that is all the contribution I make then that would be a magnificent 
contribution.  
929  





934 Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
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This comment clearly ties in with the game player theory discussed earlier in this thesis where a 
game player thinks what they are doing is fulfilling their social obligations and they think they are 
being good citizens. 
A further somewhat questionable contribution made is “look at the statute and forget judge made 
law” stating that the law is made by Parliament. He considers that judge made law can sometimes 
be contrary to statute law and is surprised that the judge made law prevails. This comment fits into 
his view of tax avoidance and fits with the conclusion that Mr Russell lives in a pre-Challenge 
world. This approach would essentially ignore the Ben Nevis935 and various case law developments 
post Challenge.   
B Any Regrets Mr Russell? 
With litigation spanning over so many years, and with the cost of the litigation only being part of 
the story, there is also of course the expense in time and worry. One may think that Mr Russell may 
be immune from psychic compliance costs,936 such as worry. It would be unfair to say that Mr 
Russell has been unaffected by the toll of the last 30 years. 
Clearly one would have to be motivated to keep going with this type of litigation. Many people 
would have simply given up. Mr Russell described the on-going litigation as “a bit like being 
pregnant…you really have to see it through.”937 
In relation to any regrets in life that Mr Russell may have he replied, after taking a moment to 
reflect, “I don’t think so…” and went on to say:938
I would have rather not have had this row with the IRD, but I don’t see how you can…the 
point is I firmly believe if it hadn’t been over the Russell template it would have been over 
something else…because the Russell template only was what they majored on in the end, and 
if they hadn’t done that…I mean…ever since then they are going on about other things 
now…you see the ‘Track E’ case is a perfect example…the ‘Track E’ case they taxed all…90 
per cent of that income that they are now assessing to me…they have already taxed to other 
people…so why would they want to tax it to me? 
From a personal time perspective Mr Russell said template related matters have taken up more than 
half of his time. This has been for a period of around 28 years. As far as a life outside of the ‘tax 
935  Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 47. 
936 John Hasseldine, “The Costs of Compliance” (September 1989) 68 The Accountants’ Journal 60.  Compliance costs 
can comprise monetary (outlay) costs; time costs and psychic costs. Psychic costs include the anxiety and stress 
caused by tax systems and whilst extremely difficult to measure are nonetheless very real for many taxpayers.  
937 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
938 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23. 
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wars’ Mr Russell still plays the organ in the local Presbyterian Church and, although in a 2005 
interview,939 he was busy learning Scottish jigs he has had to give up the Scottish country 
dancing:940 
because I am too old for it, I mean there are guys down there that can do it at 80, but I am 
quite unsteady on my feet now…I don’t know why that is but I have to be careful and watch 
where I put my feet and that sort of thing…so old age is catching up with me in that respect…
I still think the mind is okay although you get more forgetful as you get older.
Mr Russell’s intention was to try to retire within 12 months of our first interview in 2010. He said at 
the time that to do so might be a bit of wishful thinking. With regard to his greatest achievement he 
states tongue in cheek; “I think staying alive with all this…survival is probably the greatest 
achievement…”941  
When asked in 2010 when the litigation would end he replied that it was up to Inland Revenue. He 
did not think it will end within the next year or so. In fact, with regard to the Track ‘E’ litigation, he 
thought it will go on for a while yet. He stated “if I was successful in the appeal they will appeal 
it…if they are successful I will appeal it…”942  
He considers the ultimate outcome with regard to himself and Inland Revenue as being either for 
Inland Revenue to bankrupt him or get him in jail for some real or imagined offence. He considers 
that “they must be contemplating the possibility of being a guest of her Majesty…”943 
Mr Russell continues:944 
…so you have to be realistic about the prospects…but you know…I’m certainly determined to 
battle it out…because I believe that they have got no case…and if it is going to end up that I 
have a bill for $128 million [now exceeding $200 million] that they have got up to now…well, 
you know…I will have to start saving up obviously… 
939 Kelly Sinoski, ‘Meet John George Russell’, The Independent, (Auckland, 2 March 2005). 
940 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 23.  
941 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 1.  
942 One of the interview questions I had written was to discuss with Mr Russell the ‘Track A to E arguments’. I asked 
Mr Russell during our 28 July 2011 interview if a ‘Track F’ was yet to come. He replied “yeah, there might be a 
‘Track F’…they will never give up…whereas they live forever…I don’t…and the idea is to get rid of me…one way 
or another”.  Since my interview, in Case 5/2012, above n 623, a ‘Track F’ was referred to by Mr Russell. 
943 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
944 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
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Mr Russell, commenting about the prospect of Inland Revenue collecting some of the tax states that 
Inland Revenue thought that he was worth at least $80 million. He claims, however, that he is:945 
not worth anything really…in money terms…the house, the motor car for what it’s worth…I 
don’t even own them…I have never owned them…the trust has always owned them…and so 
the prospects of them  getting any more money are…[pretty remote]. 
Although an offer based on future life expectancy cannot be the basis for a settlement, it should 
have at least started the dialogue in that direction. It seems almost pointless to pursue an amount of 
money that has been ‘blown out’ by the years of late payment penalties and use of money interest. 
Mr Russell states that the amount claimed by Inland Revenue “could be a billion dollars, it wouldn’t
matter.”  
This raises an interesting point. When a tax dispute reaches the stage that figures can grow in the 
realm of $138 million in July 2010 to in excess of $180 million in 2012, one has to wonder the 
effect of this in relation to taxpayer compliance. It is clear that Mr Russell does not have anywhere 
near this level of money or access to it. It raises the point that when cases ‘go bad’ there is a tipping 
point where a taxpayer has no option but perhaps to either give up or keep litigating moot 
aspects, sometimes for delay purposes. 
Although not advocating stopping the clock in relation to this type of dispute, there clearly has to be 
a mechanism for sensible settlement in relation to these very messy tax disputes. It would be 
interesting to know the administrative costs associated with the Russell template litigation for say 
the last five years. Even though a settlement may not have been a satisfactory ‘scalp’ for Inland 
Revenue purposes, the taxpaying public may have been better served in this one occasion for 
pragmatism.      
946 A suitable 
comment for this thesis is from 2010 where Daniel Hunt writes:947 
It’s unimaginable how much money and IRD resources have gone into trying to incarcerate 
Russell, let alone the fees paid to tax lawyers in Russell’s defence. But seriously, is there 
really any benefit to be gained in continuing this battle and yet spending more and more 
taxpayer’s money? The IRD know they’re not going to get any tax money from Russell now 
but just want to prove their point that you should not mess with the IRD. In my view this was 
945  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
946
947 Daniel Hunt, “J G Russell 30 years on – is the IRD ever going to give up?” (6 August 2010) Talktax 
http://www.talktax.co.nz/index.php/2010/jg-russell-30-years-on/ (Accessed on 24/7/2011). 
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proven in the structured finance cases. Enough is enough. Let the JG Russell legend come to 
an end……one has to wonder though, what on earth happened to all that money??? If for 
many years Mr Russell’s scheme has worked then I am sure, he has a scheme or a way the 
money would not be discovered any time soon… (emphasis added) 
However, Mr Russell states that Inland Revenue will not get anything from him. He considers that 
it was never really was about the money for Inland Revenue.  
C Settling Disputes with ‘Clubs and Spears’ 
At the close of our time together I asked Mr Russell “what would you do if you had your time over 
again?” 948  Mr Russell said that he never really had a plan going through life. He never had a plan 
to do anything in particular and has tended to “roll with the punches a bit.”949 He quite strongly said 
“the main thing is you should enjoy the work you are doing, whatever it is, and if you don’t enjoy 
what you do then find something else.”950 
Mr Russell said that if he did have his time again he probably would have done a few things a bit 
different with the benefit of hindsight but went on to say that he was not unhappy with what had 
happened. Money has never been his aim in business, although he liked making money, perhaps 
more for the challenge. He stated that he liked to help people such as in the ‘doom and disaster’ 
type work stating: “you truly help people that are in big trouble, and they are very grateful.”951  
In the future, he does want to see the end of the litigation. 
 He did concede however that it is currently better 
than “settling disputes with clubs and spears.”952 
948 Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
949 Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
950 Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
951 Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 





XII Future Research 
A limitation with this thesis is the amount of material that has had to be left out of the submitted 
version of the LLM. Mr Russell has provided such a rich ‘tapestry of tales’ during our interviews 
and time together and it is clearly impossible to articulate all of the stories he presented into one 
document. I have had to be selective with the aspects that I have highlighted. Another researcher 
would have placed a different emphasis on aspects of the interviews and source documentation. 
With hindsight the story of the assessment ‘Tracks’ or the alleged vendetta could easily have been a 
complete thesis.  
Mr Russell was a well-respected management accountant in the early part of his career in 
industries that were beginning to flourish in a post-war New Zealand. It would be interesting to 
capture some of Mr Russell’s earlier business experience in the form of a narrative. Mr Russell was 
a leading figure in the establishment of the New Zealand money market and it would be a 
worthwhile aim to capture this story. I have aspects of Mr Russell’s early career success recorded 
and would like to develop this material further. Mr Russell’s stories of the New Zealand business 
environment in the 1960s were fascinating. He also has very interesting insights into today’s 
economy and its problems. 
This thesis has been unable to contain the more historical aspects of Mr Russell’s life which is 
intended to be part of a future publication project, a book looking at the life of Mr Russell. Mr 
Russell has kindly agreed to write the forward to a prospective book. 
In Appendix 13 of this thesis I have placed a table with a small number of selected cases related to 
Mr Russell’s litigation. It is a very short table compared to the amount of litigation, purely intended 
to provide an idea of what a case table may look like. The table is quite useful to gauge the volume 
of litigation happening at a particular time, and often within a short timeframe. A future project 
could be to tabulate the entire Russell related litigation into a similar format and analyse the number 
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of procedural and substantive tax issues raised, in particular gaining an insight into how often 
similar arguments were raised.  





XIII  Conclusion 
I think it is important to state that Mr Russell may have been quite different at the age of 42 when 
he left Securitibank, compared to aged 76 when I first met him in Kawakawa Bay in 2010. The 
fact that Mr Russell would have been different to have met several years ago, say in the mid-1990s 
or at the time of the O’Neil Privy Council decision, supports the notion that taxpayers can 
move along the left axis of the Compliance Model with respect to attitudes towards 
compliance.  
953
954 He would have had no idea of what would be unleashed over the next 18 
years! 
What will be gained out of ultimately being the victor? Inland Revenue have proven that the tax 
template was a tax avoidance template, confirmed in the 2001 O’Neil Privy Council decision.955 
The on-going litigation may eventually prove that Inland Revenue were ‘right’.  
The requirement to conduct a four point analysis as stated in the 1990 CPS was raised in the initial 
litigation related to the template.956  Mr Russell is still raising the same issue in 2012 stating that the 
CPS is “not a fetter on the Commissioner’s power given to him by Parliament, but rather an 
instruction on how the power should be exercised.”957 He considers that a careful and thorough four 
point analysis if not performed, disempowers the Inland Revenue Officer from invoking s 99 ITA 
1976.958 
It is clear that Mr Russell’s view of the world is very different to that of the Inland Revenue. It 
would appear that Mr Russell is an ‘outlier’ in a tax context. A comment made by Mr Russell struck 
me as being somewhat sad. He said:959 
I have spent most of my life for the last 25 years on this…well quite frankly, you would have 
to say when you look at it…it has been a complete waste of time really…well not a complete 
953
954
955 O’Neil v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 2. 
956 Case R25, above n 48. 
957 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 32, at [6]. 
958 At [6]. 
959 Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 156. 
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waste of time, but it’s largely been a waste of time because there has been an enormous input 
of energy but a very light impact has occurred… 
This thesis has attempted to serve two purposes. First, it has sought to provide the reader with an 
insight into the person of Mr Russell, by way of his background, motivation and thought. Secondly, 
it has sought to consider his impact on New Zealand tax jurisprudence. Any person attempting to 
utilise a similar tax saving device as the Russell template scheme would certainly be caught with 
taking an abusive tax position, or regarded as a tax evader,960 with substantial penalty and sanction. 
This thesis has demonstrated that although exceptionally clever and able to push to the limit the 
statute law, Mr Russell has perhaps fallen foul of the changing attitudes towards tax avoidance, that 
were clearly developing post Challenge. It is now almost unimaginable that in the 1970s tax losses 
could essentially be traded with approval from a revenue authority. The Challenge case was really 
the start of a paradigm shift961 needed to address an emerging tax avoidance problem in New 
Zealand. Similar tax avoidance issues were also becoming apparent in overseas jurisdictions such as 
the United Kingdom and Australia around a similar time. 
It is almost unfathomable to think the Inland Revenue have income tax periods still outstanding for 
any taxpayer dating back to the 1980s, yet that is precisely the position Mr Russell is in. The ‘Track 
E’ assessments date back to 1985. Mr Russell’s contribution to tax jurisprudence probably lies at 
best with the various ‘track’ assessment routes. Even though a ‘Track F’ may yet emerge it would 
appear that the issue of whether it was permissible for Inland Revenue to assess different parties via 
the different ‘track’ routes is now settled law. The application of s 99(3) and 99(4) ITA 1976 
appears to be where any contingent litigation may remain. Mr Russell remains adamant that the 
same income has been taxed in some cases twice, and in some cases three times over.  
Mr Russell’s story has not only challenged Inland Revenue but also the judiciary by alleging the 
possibility of bias.962 It is not unrealistic to see how Mr Russell perceived that his own tax ‘track’, 
960 In Glenharrow Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 116 [2009] 2 NZLR 359.  Mr D.J. 
White QC, counsel for Inland Revenue stated (at 171 of the court transcript) that “one would suggest that if Mr 
Russell’s template schemes were entered into now, the law on all of that too would be considered evasion”. 
961  See C. Elliffe and J. Cameron, “The Test for Tax Avoidance in New Zealand: A Judicial Sea Change” (2010) 16 
NZBLQ 440 for discussion regarding a ‘sea change’ in relation to tax avoidance analysis resulting in the ‘pendulum’ 
swinging in favour of Inland Revenue. This is certainly apparent in the recent major New Zealand tax avoidance 
cases. The authors suggest that although the scheme and purpose approach remains; it is modified by two factors. 
The result of these changes is an empowering of the judiciary to pursue a form of interpretation which is much less 
formalistic and necessarily involves even more of an enquiry into the commercial and business motivations of the 
taxpayer. There were significant developments in New Zealand tax avoidance jurisprudence with the Supreme Court 
judgment in Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 47. 
962  A High Court judge has recently decided his impartiality in a company dispute remains pure despite reading that one 
party had called him “a clown judge” in a taped conversation with a private eye. Judge Osborne said the “colourful” 
comment would not affect his pursuit of fairness for both parties, and, in any respect, it was his duty as a judge to set 
aside prejudices he held and be objective.  Michael Berry, “Judge ‘unbiased’ despite clown comment”, The Press, 
(online ed., Christchurch, 26 November 2012). 
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‘Track E’, could have been “predicted now”963 before the case had been heard by Judge Barber. 
Even though the number of cases decided against Mr Russell by Judge Barber was substantial, it 
is clear that case law dictates the number of decisions decided towards a particular litigant in no 
way is an indicator of bias, rather the strength of the actual case. 
 Tax 
law can be exceptionally complex and the on-going FB Duvall litigation is a case in point. A 
specialist tax judge must obviously be suitably qualified, but it is worth noting that other tax 
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom where a much wider selection of judges is present, would 
not face the same initial concern of circumspectness. It may be a justification to say that the point is 
moot in Mr Russell’s situation, as most TRA decisions were upheld on appeal.  
It would be a shame for history to consider Mr Russell merely as ‘The Master Tax Avoider’.964 
There is no doubt that Mr Russell was a competent accountant and had clearly contributed to 
the success of various entities prior to the commencement of the template litigation. This was 
clearly recognised by the various roles he had held and the esteem from his employers. 
Establishing and maintaining a tax consultancy practice with a large number of employees, 
despite being distracted daily with the compliance requirements of Inland Revenue, is indicative of 
his personal stamina that still remains intact today. 
One could perhaps surmise that if Mr Russell had entered the world of merchant banking again after 
the Securitibank fallout had quelled, he may have achieved a notable level of success once more. 
Mr Russell is certainly ‘old school’, explained best by the example that he has only had an 
email address since late 2010! Although old school Mr Russell is a very progressive thinker, with a 
depth of business experience that surprised me.  
963  Russell v Taxation Review Authority, above n 585, at [40]. 
964 Mr Grierson, acting for the taxpayers in Case R25, above n 48 described Mr Russell as “The Great Tax Mitigator” 
and “The Old Master of Tax.” Mr Ruffin, counsel for Inland Revenue suggested that “The Master Tax Avoider” was 
more apt. 
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 It would be unlikely that there would be 
another taxpayer who could ‘whip up a firestorm’ and cause grief to Inland Revenue for over three 
decades. Over the last 30 years attitudes towards tax avoidance and tax evasion have shifted. Inland 
Revenue have varying penalties, including very punitive penalties for both criminal and civil 
evasion965 in their ‘toolbox’ to discourage noncompliance.  
History has a way of repeating itself and if anything this thesis may allude to is that great care must 
be taken from an administrative perspective for any revenue authority. In Paul Finance966 it was 
clear that Inland Revenue were following correct protocol to verify a GST refund claim prior to 
releasing the refund cheque. It is unfortunate that the ‘cheque had left the building’, or at least could 
not have been stopped before leaving the confines of the mailroom. It is difficult to see what further 
action could have been taken by Inland Revenue.   
That said, there are some very unusual aspects to the stance taken by Inland Revenue in relation to 
Russell matters. It is really unacceptable to think that a revenue authority would send out so many s 
17 TAA 1994 notices to a taxpayer and expect them to comply. The current s 17 Standard Practice 
Statement provides for at least 28 days to provide information and extensions of time are granted in 
genuine circumstances, but I would doubt whether any taxpayer would be in receipt of so many s 17 
notices in one day any time soon. Perhaps this aspect has been relegated to history. It is simply 
unacceptable tax administration. There were other powers that Inland Revenue had at their disposal, 
both s 16 and s 19 TAA 1994, and one may wonder why these powers were not used to ‘speed up’ 
resolution.  
Mr Russell had luck on his side when challenging the delegation of Mrs Latimer, getting off on a 
technicality. Mr Russell has said that he has had more success in the court as a result of good luck 
than anything else. 
965  For further reading on when a deliberate arrangement to avoid income tax strays into the criminal jurisdiction see 
C. Elliffe, ‘Tax Fraud: When is Tax Avoidance a Criminal Offence?’ in Andrew Maples and Adrian Sawyer (eds)
Taxation Issues: Existing and Emerging, (The Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law, Christchurch, 2011) at 79
- 100.
966 Paul Finance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 668, at 3. 
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The FB Duvall litigation,967 the ‘tortuous saga’ as it has been aptly referred to as, was certainly by 
far the most difficult to explain in this thesis. 
With regard to Mr Russell’s template clients it was suggested by Judge Barber in Case R25968 that 
perhaps clients of Mr Russell’s may have wanted to sue him. 
 It is clear that Mr Russell’s clients placed tremendous trust in his ability and opinion in 
relation to their own tax matters. 
It has to be remembered that Mr Russell asked for a judicial settlement conference several years 
ago. If settlement had occurred Inland Revenue would have received $260,000 by now (if the terms 
had been adhered to) and saved in litigation costs since. Perhaps the last line for this thesis could 
have been from Mr Russell himself when he said “Commercial Management is a twilight 
industry…but the sun has not yet fully set!”969 
967 FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1997), above n 524; FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue, above n 507; FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1999) 19 NZTC 15,039 (HC); FB Duvall 
Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1999) 19 NZTC 15,362 (HC); FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (1999) 19 NZTC 15,515 (HC); FB Duvall Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 526; FB Duvall 
Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 532; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v FB Duvall Ltd HC 
Auckland CIV 2007-404-2708 29 February 2008; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v FB Duvall Ltd HC Auckland 
CIV 2007-404-2708, 13 November 2008; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v FB Duvall Ltd HC Auckland CIV 
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968  Case R25, above n 48. 
969  Interview with Mr JG Russell, above n 1. 
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A Retirement at last! … Not Quite! 
I did ask Mr Russell if there was a big pot of money somewhere. It is the question that perhaps 
people wish to know the answer to. He told me that he once said to Inland Revenue that if there was 
a big pot of money somewhere they should have found it by now as they have had so many people 
working on his cases for many years. He also said to Inland Revenue that if they did find a big ‘pot 
of money’ they could keep half it, because it wouldn’t be his. There are no Swiss bank accounts. 
970 Mr Russell thinks that Inland Revenue never thought there was a lot of money. It has 
simply taken on a life of its own. 
Once he retires Mr Russell has about 3,000 books stored ready to read. John Grisham novels are 
among his favourite. In 2001 he mentioned in an interview, that the reason he likes the John 
Grisham novels is because they denigrate lawyers. He would like to take a few formal professional 
lessons to play the organ because he is self-taught. He stated that both he and Melva would have no 
trouble filling in time; they would attend more plays and cultural events. In relation to the years of 
litigation he said “The litigation side is interesting – it keeps your mind going – you need something 
to keep your mind agile as you get older.”971  The litigation certainly has does that for him. Mr 
Russell in closing comments stated that “Inland Revenue have never been able to get a handle on 
me not being motivated by money.”972 
I asked Mr Russell what his main legal contribution was. He replied with a grin that his main 
contribution to the legal profession was in fact ‘monetary’.  
I was in a focus group with several tax barristers, lawyers and accountants a few weeks ago. The 
name of Mr Russell came up to which there was an almost audible shrug. 
Although the cost and expense to all parties of the template litigation was been immense, there is 
one thing for sure; Mr Russell has been a persistent and colourful character in the New Zealand tax 
landscape and I am sure that the courts and Inland Revenue have not seen the last of him….just yet! 
970
971 Interview with Mr J G Russell, above n 1. 
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Appendix 3: Interview Questions, Kawakawa Bay 
303 
Initial ‘Meet and Greet’ 
27 January 2010 at Kawakawa Bay, Papakura. 
Draft questions for Mr Russell: 
[Thank you for having me here, explain what I am researching]. 
[Do you mind if I record our conversation?] 
Template and avoidance information 
1. Would you [Mr Russell] be able to draw the template for me – take up blank paper.
2. Please explain the steps of the template.
3. Where did the template idea originally come from?
4. Please explain the template from your perspective. You [Mr Russell] maintain to your
‘dying day’ [The Independent article] it is not a tax avoidance template.
5. What is the purpose of the template? Specifically its commercial purpose?
6. The Courts have got it wrong – it is not as complicated as they say – they are interpreting
the law in a way that is not meant to be interpreted [The Independent article at page 2]. How
are the Courts interpreting the law incorrectly?
7. Was the template modified over the years? When? How? Why?
8. The tax losses – where did the losses come from?
9. The TRA estimates 3,500 people affected (up to 1,000 smaller businesses) - is that correct?
That is a lot of people! (Take up The Independent 2005 article). Is this true? If so, where did
the people come from?
10. How many companies have been affected by the template? Refer to Trevor Offen article
(2001). [Barber J made comments of 500 such companies, elsewhere 1,100 companies
affected]. I will attempt to make a full list of entities.
11. The  Challenge case from 1986 – do you have any comments? Take up this case.
12. How did you meet your clients? Advertisements? Any copies of adverts?
13. Your comments on the latest tax avoidance cases – structured finance litigation, Penny
& Hooper etc. Do you keep up to date reading the latest tax cases?
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14. Did you go to the Privy Council in London for O'Neil?
15. Did the business owners (e.g. the Millers etc) have any idea about the structure of the loss
group? Were they a ‘party’ to the arrangement? Discuss. The law prior to Peterson (and
BNZI) meeting of minds required. Any comments?
16. Inland Revenue’s Exposure Draft (2004) on s BG 1. Now out of date due to the Peterson
case – any comments? [Take up summary of legal principles].
17. The BASF principle – CIR’s jurisdiction to amend an assessment is lost once a case has
been stated to TRA/ Court. Comments?
18. What has happened to the Millers, O’Neil’s, McDougall’s etc?
Your Personal Background 
19. Your [Mr Russell’s] life prior to the template.
20. Do you think that you could have been a farmer or an engineer?
21. What field of engineering do you think you may have studied?
22. Securitibank. How did you get started? Any favourite stories?
23. The creditor settlement for Securitibank – most successful in New Zealand history.
Comments?
24. Is it correct that Securitibank creditors received back 110% in 1992 – all their money back
plus 10% interest?
25. You [Mr Russell] changed New Zealand law – regarding company directors being directors
of other companies – and no natural director liable. Law change in 1985. In Companies Act
1993?
26. You were banned from acting as a director – overturned by Privy Council. Are you willing
to discuss?
27. Unfit to be the liquidator of Skybus – convoluted network of companies were ‘contrived and
illegal’ – O’Regan J in September 1983 – Please - are you willing to discuss?
28. The Pakuranga accounting days – a lot of employees and the council complaints.
Comments?
29. Do you keep in touch with old employees?
30. What motivates you?
305 
31. Life away from tax – playing the organ twice on Sundays at the Presbyterian Church, rural
library duty, learning Scottish jigs and entertaining at the local retirement home. [Page 1 -
The Independent article].
Inland Revenue Issues 
32. The IRD Compliance Model – where do you [Mr Russell] think Inland Revenue would
place you on the IRD Compliance Model? (Take up the Model).
33. Where do you [Mr Russell] see yourself on the Inland Revenue Compliance Model and
why?
34. Why do you think Inland Revenue have a vendetta against you and the tax template?
The Courts / litigation 
35. Judges – have you always found them obliging in relation to issues you [Mr Russell] raised
–for example the vendetta issue /Barber J?
36. Where to from here? Do you think that you will retire after the latest litigation? Anything
else in the litigation pipeline?
37. Discuss the Track A to Track E arguments. Did Inland Revenue just keep coming up with
another track to tax? Track F yet to come?
38. What other issues should be discussed – what else should be considered in a thesis on Mr
Russell’s effect on tax jurisprudence?
39. What approximately is the cost to date defending the Russell template?
40. How much time are you currently spending on defending the template cases? Still about
80% of your time? [The Independent 2005 article page 2].
41. Would you be able to estimate how much time the template cases have taken?
42. Barber J decision: ‘I have been sitting on these Russell cases for more than 10 years and I
have to say that the Commissioner does seem to have some sort of hang-up as far as Mr
Russell is concerned and does funny things that are quite unbalanced really.’ What funny
things and what has been unbalanced in the past? [The Independent article 2005 at page 2].
43. Is the crux of your [Mr Russell’s] argument that the IRD owe you money?
44. Section 17 information requests – have there been many from Inland Revenue?
45. Have you found Inland Revenue officers polite in their dealings with you?
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46. IRD investigation staff? Have they conducted s16 TAA 1994 searches on your premises?
47. How do you see the tax system in terms of what you do for your clients?
48. What is your influence (in wider terms beyond your clients) on New Zealand tax
jurisprudence?
49. What is your motivation to keep going with this litigation?
50. Any regrets? I know that he said that he had no regrets in 2005 [take up The Independent
2005 article].
307 
Schedule of Questions 
Second Interview 29 April 2010 
Questions / topics for discussion with John Russell 
The Track A to E arguments: 
1. I want to get an understanding of the Track assessment changes from Track A to Track E.
The Track A to E assessments.
2. What was being taxed under the various Tracks – Track A original company, Track B
original shareholders? Track C – administration charge against parent company, track D –
some income against Mr Russell (what income at this stage?). Track E – additional
assessment against Mr Russell?
3. Who paid what? The IRD wouldn’t put everything on hold for too long as far as payments
go? Settlements from the Millers and O’Neil’s – amount paid and when. Then did the IRD
revisit or was this finality for the original shareholders under Track B?
4.
5. 
Time lines of assessments – Track A for a few months? Then Track B? Track C and D
shortly after? Initial Track E contact with you?
Did the Millers and O’Neil’s settle with Inland Revenue an amount of tax after the Track B
assessments? (Refer to Baragwanath J court case - Judicial Review stating that tax payment
was not an issue. Did they settle the whole amount that IRD were after? The Commissioner
defended the Track B cases for 43 days and they were held as valid. What then happened in
relation to Track C and D?
6. Track C was to assess the parent company – was any tax due via these assessments paid to
IRD? Did these assessments get reversed later now that Track E is being pursued?
7. Track D was to assess Mr Russell personally for some of the income stream. What was
assessed under Track D? Were these assessments reversed or affirmed and then added to
under Track E?
8. When did the IRD first raise the Track E argument to tax everything to you? What was their
justification for this?
9. Talk about the current tax case later this year in respect of the Track E argument. They are
assessing you for some of the Track B income? And consultancy fees?
10. Why did the IRD go from Track to Track? What was their justification for jumping from
one to the other? Why didn’t they just start with assessing you personally straight away after
the Track A route?
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11. Who paid what so far in respect of all of the Tracks? Refer to Judicial Review case
(Baragwanath J) with the reconstruction against the Millers and O’Neil’s.
12. How long did the Privy Council take in Court time in respect of O’Neil & McDougall? A
day? Two days?
13. The Privy Council O’Neil & McDougall case. When Mr Judd suggested that the scheme fell
outside of s 99 their Lordships called it ‘preposterous’. What was it like in Court? Was the
comment made in the Court room or only later in the judgment?
14. Why were Track C and D being pursued during the O’Neil & McDougall Privy Council
decision being heard in the United Kingdom? Was it a backup plan for the IRD if
unsuccessful in the Privy Council?
Procedural Cases: 
15. Your procedural successes in order of importance. Discuss.
Success in the Courtroom: 
16. Have you been awarded costs often? For example the 226 information’s laid for s 17
offences and then dismissed?
Vendetta Issue: 
Proof of IRD vendetta: 
17. Copies of any material supporting vendetta argument?
18. Copy of a Management Contract?
19. Get a very good copy of the template on good paper (from University Bookshop). Plus have
it signed by John. Miller and O’Neil with all detail perhaps.
20. Letters from IRD supporting vendetta?
21. You were involved in Dandelion – IRD – a noticeable change with IRD attitude once you
were involved. Improper conduct towards you. Discuss – the appointment of a witness that
was inexperienced with the case – Mr Clearkin.
22. Has Judge Willy heard many of your cases?
23. Other cases regarding conduct of IRD staff etc.




26. How many clients has Mr Russell represented? The non-template clients - How many
current clients?   (Only disclose if you wish to).
27. Money – how much money would have been made via the consulting? The assessments total
$80 million (or $128 million with penalties etc.).
28. What is the breakdown of the penalties that the IRD are ascribing to you? Post 1996 on
Track E? Do you have any copies of assessments?
29. Are you still a tax agent within the IRD system?
30. The template income in total? It was suggested that at one stage Mr Russell was worth in
excess of $80 million dollars.
Material in records: 
31. Copies of material supporting the vendetta.
32. Affidavits from the various court cases – there are lengthy affidavits for the judicial review
case heard by Baragwanath J.
33. An Accountant’s Journal advertisement seeking to purchase loss companies / seeking profit
companies etc. If available.
Miscellaneous:
34. Did you always have the same investigators deal with you? Mr Player, Mr Foy, Ms Latimer?
– any interesting stories?
35. Your interaction with the IRD staff? Was it always with the Russell Team? Did they
not allow you to communicate to anyone else within Inland Revenue? Only specific
people?Were they generally pleasant? The unusual things sometimes - could we expand on
this?
36. Securitibank location:  Photograph Queens Arcade (behind Dilworth Buildings (2 floors
there).
37. Photograph house where Justice Department conducted the raid in Pakuranga
38. Discuss the Receiverships law change due to John Russell.
39. What cases has he won? Procedural?
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40. Copies of any documents / letters supporting the vendetta argument.
41. Was Case M104 and M109 the first template cases? Case R25 an early one.
42. Was Case L85 (1989) temporary transfer of shares the first pre template case?
43. Copy of management contract – Miller and O’Neil etc.
44. GST litigation? FB Duvall? Perhaps have this as a limitation – brief comment only.
45. Your greatest achievement?
46. When will the litigation end?
47. What do you think will be the ultimate outcome with regard to the Inland Revenue and
yourself?
48. Most important cases to read – Case R25, M104 and M109, Judicial Review – Baragwanath
J, O’Neil & McDougall (PC).
49. What would you do if you were my age now? – go into a management accounting role?
Continue in tax? Merchant banking? Farming?
50. More on s 27 Bill of Rights Act 1990 and s 6 Tax Administration Act 1994.
51. Address of office on Upper Queen Street after Securitibank?
52. Any thoughts about how the Track E assessments will go for you?
311 
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Selection of Template Related Companies
(Located from www.companies.govt.nz and confirmed by Mr Russell in July 2010) 
Avenue Consultants Ltd 
Burroughs Transport Ltd 
Charity Construction Co Ltd
Commercial Appliance Repairs Ltd
Consolidated Management Ltd
Consultant Applications Ltd
Corpent Consultants Ltd 
Coronet Consultants Ltd 
Coronet Homes Ltd 
Corporate Enterprises Ltd
Corporate Transport Ltd 
Douglas & Henwood Ltd 
FB Duvall Ltd 
Fuel Haul Management Ltd
Fuel Haulers (1990) Ltd
Highman Holdings Ltd 
J M Webster Ltd 
K J Cummings Ltd 
Managed Fashions Ltd 
Managed Hotels Ltd 
Motor Dealers Ltd 
Mountforts Pharmacy Ltd 
Murray Mason Electrical Ltd 
New Zealand Property Care Ltd
Panmure Consultants Ltd
Paul Finance Ltd  
Property Drainage Services Ltd  
Ron West Motors Otahuhu Ltd 
Roma Properties Ltd 
SLIOC Enterprises Ltd 
TC Large Ltd 
Thoms Brothers Ltd 
Trade Enterprises Ltd 
Twig Meats Ltd 
Waikato Brokers Ltd 
Waikato Brokers Management Ltd 
Winter Signs Ltd 
Wire Supplies Ltd
Zinc & Brass Foundries Ltd 
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314 
Redacted Template Documents – an explanation 
In the early 1980s Mr Russell began to acquire profitable companies and businesses through agents 
which purchased those companies on attractive terms for both purchasers and vendors. The vendors 
were required to provide 100 per cent vendor financing and they were persuaded to do this by 
offering special terms which provided for a modest premium on the share price, and by receiving an 
option to purchase the assets of the business conducted by the company at some later stage if they 
wished to do so.  The purpose of the option was to give the vendors an assurance that they would 
not lose their livelihood if things did not work out well in the new venture. Should they wish to part 
company with Mr Russell’s group, they could purchase the assets on a fair and reasonable basis at 
some subsequent time. 
The impugned transaction was purportedly a commercial venture designed to earn an assessable 
income for the parent company and the consultant. At the time of the purchase of the business and 
subsequent formation of the subsidiary company the parent company provided a restructuring 
service to the business and the subsidiary and subsequently provided financial services during the 
period of business association. The parent company was a member of a group of companies that had 
associated tax losses available to be carried forward. After the shares of the subsidiary company 
were purchased that subsidiary became a member of the tax loss group. 
Document Analysis 
Documents E1 to E5 are an ‘Agreement for Sale and Purchase of a Business’ where the original 
vendor sold the business ‘PROFIT BUSINESS’ to a JG Russell controlled company, Commercial 
Management Limited. Commercial Management Limited was acting on behalf of a JG Russell 
controlled loss company ‘LOSS COMPANY’. 
Documents E6 to E7, and Documents E8 to E10 are ‘Declarations of Trust’ between Commercial 
Management Limited and the LOSS COMPANY. The Declarations confirmed that Commercial 
Management Limited was acting on behalf of LOSS COMPANY in respect of the agreements and 
contracts entered into concerning the PROFIT BUSINESS. 
The original vendor advanced the amount of the purchase price to Commercial Management 
Limited. No money changed hands. In a separate Declaration of Trust, Documents E11 to E12, the 
original vendor declared that Downsview Nominees Limited was to act as the original vendor’s 
Trustee in respect of the advance and repayment. 
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A Deed of Mortgage of Business, Documents E13 to E16, was entered into between Commercial 
Management Limited acting on behalf of LOSS COMPANY LIMITED and Downsview 
Nominees Limited acting on behalf of the original vendor. The Deed secures an on-demand 
mortgage over the PROFIT BUSINESS. 
A Repayment Agreement, Documents E17 to E18, was executed between Commercial 
Management Limited and Downsview Nominees Limited. The terms of repayment required 
Commercial Management Limited to pay the Mortgagee a sum of not less than 77.5 per cent of any
income in cash received from PROFIT BUSINESS.  Commercial Management Limited was 
required to do this within 7 days of the receipt of any income. 
The original vendor entered into a Management Contract, Documents E19 to E23, with 
Commercial Management Limited and a JG Russell partnership called Commercial Management. 
The original vendor was employed as Manager of the business. Commercial Management Limited 
and Commercial Management were appointed with the Manager to administer and manage the 
PROFIT BUSINESS. Commercial Management and Commercial Management Limited had no 
input into the day to day operation of the business. The original vendors continued to control and 
operate the business as if still owned by them.  Under Clause 1 of the Management Contract the 
original vendor was given full and unfettered control of the operation, conduct and management of 
the business. Under Clause 11 of the Management Contract the Manager would be remunerated for 
their services. The amount of the payments would be decided between the company and the 
Manager. 
Pursuant to Clause 12 of the Management Contract the profits of the PROFIT BUSINESS were 
distributed as an administration charge to Commercial Management Limited as nominee for LOSS 
COMPANY.  Commercial Management Limited would be paid an administrative charge equal to 
the net surplus arising from the business operation of the PROFIT COMPANY after payment of all 
costs including payment to Commercial Management and the Managers. As LOSS COMPANY had 
losses to carry forward there was no tax paid on the income received as an administration charge. 
LOSS COMPANY retained 22.5 per cent of the administration charge as recompense for the 
PROFIT BUSINESS taking advantage of its losses. The percentage was calculated at half the 
applicable company tax rate for the particular year. The administration charge less a 22.5 per cent 
gain for LOSS COMPANY LIMITED was passed back to ORIGINAL VENDOR as part payment 
of the loan created to purchase the business. Pursuant to Clause 10 of the Management Contract 5 
per cent of the administration charge would be paid by the business to Commercial Management for 
the provision of business consulting services.  
In the redacted documents the original vendor acquired 999 ordinary $1.00 shares and her husband 
acquired 1 ordinary share in a newly incorporated company NEW COMPANY LIMITED. The 
formation of NEW COMPANY LIMITED was several months after the sale from the original 
vendor had been made. The shares were acquired by the original vendor and her husband on behalf 
of Commercial Management Limited who was acting as nominee for LOSS COMPANY LIMITED.  
The arrangements made by the original vendor and her husband with Commercial Management 
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Limited are reflected in the Declarations of Trust E24 to E26 and E27 to E29. Commercial 
Management Limited and LOSS COMPANY LIMITED also entered into a Declaration of Trust, 
Document E30 to E31. The Declaration contained the terms under which Commercial Management 
Limited acted as trustee for LOSS COMPANY LIMITED in respect of the holding of the shares in 
NEW COMPANY LIMITED.  
Although NEW COMPANY LIMITED purportedly acquired the PROFIT BUSINESS from 
Commercial Management Limited acting on behalf of LOSS COMPANY LIMITED, the mechanics 
of the arrangement remained the same as before. Commercial Management Limited received a 
20/21th share of annual profits of NEW COMPANY LIMITED as an administration charge to the 
parent company. Commercial Management received a 1/21th share of the profits as consultancy 
fees. The administration charge less the 22.5 per cent gain was paid back to the original vendor as
repayment of the original advance. 22.5 per cent was retained by Commercial Management
Limited on behalf of LOSS COMPANY LIMITED for recompense for the utilisation of its losses.   
The profit had effectively been utilised for paying administration and consulting charges. By way of 
example from a practical perspective the administration charge was calculated every six months and 
was based on the profits derived by NEW COMPANY LIMITED for that six month period. The 
payments made to the ORIGINAL VENDOR were also made every six months. The draft six 
monthly trading accounts of the NEW COMPANY were prepared by the original vendor’s local 
accountant. The accounts showed the net profitability of the company. They were later referred to 
Mr Russell who calculated the administration charge and the consultancy fee for the six months, 
utilising all the profit from the trading company. Mr Russell would then post to the local accountant 
a Commercial Management Limited Trust account cheque for 77.5 per cent of the administration 
charge for the loan repayment to the ORIGINAL VENDOR, invoices for administration charges 
and consulting fees, and pay-in slips to receive the administration charges payable to Commercial 
Management Limited and consulting fees payable to Commercial Management. The Commercial 
Management Trust Account cheque was then banked into the local accountant’s trust account. The 
original vendor would pay an amount equivalent to the consulting fee and the loan repayments and 
GST on administration charges and consultancy fees out of the companies’ bank account, to the 
local accountant’s trust account. The local accountants used the pay-in slips to pay the full 
administration charge to the Commercial Management Trust Account (for the benefit of LOSS 
COMPANY) and the full consulting fee to Commercial Management. 
The consulting fee was paid for value received from consulting advice provided as and when 
required, by Mr Russell. No other fee was charged to the subsidiary company apart from the 5 per 
cent fee. The vendor (in this particular case) had no knowledge of Mr Russell’s business and was 
not aware of any arrangement he had made in respect of taxation matters with the parent company. 
The vendor never received the income of the subsidiary company. The objector entered into these 
transactions in order to make a capital gain on the sale of the business and to obtain continuing 
administrative and financial assistance thereafter.  
In essence the template documents were the same for any business entering the Russell template 
scheme from 1980 through to 1986.  These redacted documents are dated 1985 and 1986 being 
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Understanding the ‘Mechanics’ of ‘Track E’ 
Commercial Management Ltd sold Russell template arrangements as part of its business. In 
December 1982 this business was taken over by a partnership formed by Mr Russell, with partners 
comprising Commercial Management Ltd and Business Properties Ltd, (another company 
controlled by Mr Russell). The partnership traded successfully and at times employed up to 59 staff. 
Much of Commercial Management Ltd’s income was derived from the sale of the Russell template 
arrangements. Further income was generated from the payment (every six months) of consulting 
fees both by the trading company and the parent company involved in a template transaction. The 
Commissioner alleged that, in the income years 1978 to 1984 inclusive, Commercial Management 
Ltd was involved in tax avoidance that benefited Mr Russell. For various reasons the 
Commissioner proposed no adjustment for that period.973  
In May 1984, Commercial Management Ltd sold its business to a new partnership, the Commercial 
Management Partnership.974 The Commercial Management Partnership conducted the business 
which continued to earn substantial income from fees and other earnings received principally from 
the sale and use of the Russell template arrangements. There was a significant increase in this 
income from 1981. 
The partnership business was managed by Commercial Management Ltd and it was appointed as 
agent by the partnership for the purpose of entering into contracts on behalf of the business.975 
When Mr Russell incorporated Commercial Management Ltd in 1977, at the same time he 
incorporated Corporate Securities Ltd. Mr Russell controlled both entities and pursuant to a 
business consultancy agreement, Commercial Management Ltd was managed by Corporate 
Securities Ltd. Corporate Securities Ltd had no staff.  
The net effect of this structure was that Mr Russell controlled the Commercial Management 
Partnership through the consulting arrangements between Commercial Management Ltd and 
Corporate Securities Ltd and between Corporate Securities Ltd and himself personally. Mr Russell 
not only controlled the Commercial Management Partnership but also both Commercial 
973  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] NZCA 128, (2012) 25 NZTC 20,120 (CA) at [16]. 
974  The partners were Marketing Agencies Ltd and Business Properties Ltd. 
975  It seems there were similar management and control arrangements between the two partners and Commercial 
Management Ltd. Marketing Agencies Ltd appointed Commercial Management Ltd to manage and control it. Wylie 
J was unable to make firm findings on this point with respect to Business Properties Ltd due to an absence of 
documentation:  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2010) 24 NZTC 24,463 (HC) at [20].  
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Management Ltd and Corporate Securities Ltd and all of the associated entities via the complex 
ownership structure.976 
The next step involved the introduction by Mr Russell of companies with accumulated tax losses. 
The loss companies were also controlled by Mr Russell. Agency and management agreements and 
declarations of trust were entered into by both the partners with a loss company.977 The legal effect 
was that the loss companies became the beneficial owners of the income that came to the partners. 
Given that the loss companies had accumulated tax losses, they were able to offset the tax losses 
against the income of the partners. The result was that no tax was paid on any income earned by the 
partners.  
This methodology could only last as long as the loss companies had available accumulated losses to 
offset against the respective partner’s income. The available losses first ran out in the 1987 tax year. 
Only part of the income for that year could be assigned to the original loss companies. Mr Russell 
established new agency and management agreements and new declarations of trust between both 
partners and new loss companies. Each of these companies took an assignment of the remaining 
portion of the respective partner’s income which was offset against the accumulated losses of the 
replacement loss company.978 As time moved on, the losses were used up. New loss companies 
needed to be introduced again in the 1992 tax year. 
Mr Russell also controlled finance companies including Money Market Securities Ltd.979 Where the 
partners advanced funds (which they did on a regular, if not daily basis) to a finance company such 
as Money Market Securities Ltd, no interest was paid to the partners. The partners were able to, and 
did, draw down money from Money Market Securities Ltd when they required funds. The partners 
did not pay interest on the monies received.   
The income of the Commercial Management Partnership comprised of two sources. Firstly 
approximately 90 per cent of the income of the partnership came from Russell template sources, 
namely the consulting fees of 5 per cent and other fees paid from the 22.5 per cent administration 
charges to the Russell template trading companies. The remaining 10 per cent comprised income 
from other sources including consulting fees and professional income generated by Mr Russell. 
976  All of the various agreements between the parties were signed by Mr Russell either personally or as director or duly 
authorised signatory on behalf of these entities. 
977  Mr Russell acquired control following liquidation or receivership of the loss company. Mr Russell appointed 
himself receiver and in that capacity signed the agency and management agreements with the parties. 
978  Assignment of income to the replacement loss companies continued from 1987 until the 1990 tax year. Two further 
replacement loss companies were then introduced. 
979  The shareholders in Money Market Securities Ltd were Commercial Management Ltd and Business Properties Ltd. 
It provided funds for the extensive corporate group controlled by Mr Russell. Other finance companies also 
controlled by Mr Russell were used as a repository of the net income generated by the Commercial Management 
Partnership. 
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The total net profit for the Commercial Management Partnership over the 1985 to 1995 period was
$13,611,973. Over the same period the net advances to the finance companies by the partners 
amounted to $13,725,315.980 From the net profit of the Commercial Management Partnership in 
any given tax year, 50 per cent was allocated to the partners at the relevant time. By virtue 
of the agency and management agreements, and declarations of trust, the loss companies 
linked to the partners then became the beneficial “owners” of the income.981
As surplus funds became available from the income (minus any expenses incurred by the 
Commercial Management Partnership), they were forwarded from the Commercial Management 
Partnership to either Money Market Securities Ltd or one of the other finance companies controlled 
by Mr Russell.982 The funds were for the credit of the relevant partners of the Commercial 
Management Partnership and the partners were able to draw down on their accounts with Money 
Market Securities Ltd whenever they required funds. Cash surpluses were sent from the 
Commercial Management Partnership to Money Market Securities Ltd almost on a daily basis. This 
was treated as net profit of the Commercial Management Partnership “advanced” to the partners by 
way of circular transactions.983  
Throughout the period 1985 to 2000 Mr Russell allocated to himself a modest income for the 
provision of consulting services to Corporate Securities Ltd. The amounts of income treated as 
salary varied from a low of $14,015.70 in the 1988 year, to a high of $29,015.70 returned in the 
1987 year. This is contained in the summary table ‘Summary of income attributed to the disputant’. 
The following table also shows the income attributed to Mr Russell from the 1985 to 2000 income 
years.  
980  These figures were both stated in Case Z19 (2009) 24 NZTC 14,217 (NZTRA) at [257] and [258]. 
981  The amounts allocated to the partners in each tax year and the assignments to the loss companies are described in 
Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2010) 24 NZTC 24,463 (HC) per Wylie J at [25] to [58]. 
982  Charity Finance Ltd was one of the other finance companies. Its shareholders were Charity Construction Ltd and 
Downsview Nominees Ltd. 
983  By way of example, see Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2010) 24 NZTC 24,463 (HC) at [28] where 
Wylie J refers to a transaction on 3 January 1986 whereby Money Market Securities Ltd advanced $290,000 to the 
Commercial Management Partnership. On the same day, the partnership paid $141,978.93 to each of the partners, 
and they in turn advanced the money back to Money Market Securities Ltd.  
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In January 1989 Mr Russell settled the Russell Family Trust with the primary beneficiaries being 
Mr Russell’s children and grandchildren.984 Mr Russell at times received nominal remuneration 
from the Russell Family Trust. In August 1996, Mr Russell settled the Kawakawa Trust; again the 
primary beneficiaries were members of Mr and Mrs Russell’s family.  
During the 1994 tax year Charity Finance Ltd, a Russell controlled finance company, advanced 
$197,844.46 to Kawakawa Bay Properties Ltd to enable it to purchase a property at 1439 Clevedon-
Kawakawa Bay Road, which became Mr Russell’s residence since shifting from 6 Downsview 
Road, Pakuranga. 
The trusts also purchased property for Mr Russell’s children. In 1997 an amount of $20,000 was 
withdrawn by the Russell Family Trust from Charity Finance Ltd. The balance in the Russell 
Family Trust’s account with Charity Finance Ltd of $1,190,391 was transferred to another Russell 
controlled finance company, Downsview Finance Ltd. The Russell Family Trust then withdrew four 
payments each totalling $128,083.52 from Downsview Finance Ltd. A further payment of $30,000 
was noted as being the payment of a deposit on a house being purchased by Michelle Lowndes. A 
984  John and Melva Russell were not beneficiaries of the Russell Family Trust. In their capacity as trustees they entered 
into a loan agreement as borrowers with Mr Russell being the lender. Mr Russell advanced unspecified sums of 
money to the Russell Family Trust, such advances being made for a period of 20 years and not bearing any interest. 
Following establishment of the Trust there were examples of funds being advanced from the current account of Mr 
Russell with Money Market Securities Ltd to the Trust. Having received the advance, the Trust in turn put the funds 
on term investment with Money Market Securities Ltd. By way of example in September 1989 and November 1989 
respectively, sums of $250,000 were advanced from Mr Russell’s current account with Money Market Securities 
Ltd to the Russell Family Trust. 
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further $30,000 was paid in relation to the purchase of a property at 3-165 Great South Road, Drury 
by a Mr and Mrs Henry. Mrs Henry is one of Mr Russell’s daughters.  
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Truncated Summary of Track ‘E’ loss entities/partnerships 
1972 Mr Russell a chartered accountant. From 1972 to 1977 was managing director of 
Securitibank. Mr Russell carried out some accountancy and advisory work on his own 
account while employed at Securitibank. 
1977 On 1 April 1977 Commercial Management Ltd and Corporate Securities Ltd were 
incorporated. Mr Russell held 9,999 shares in Commercial Management Ltd, the other 
share was held by Money Market Securities Ltd, another company he controlled. Mr 
Russell was director and company secretary of Commercial Management Ltd. Mrs 
Russell was also a director. 
Mr Russell was director and company secretary of Corporate Securities Ltd. Mr Russell 
held 9,999 shares, the other share was held by Downsview Nominees Ltd, another 
company controlled by Mr Russell. 
1980 Commercial Management Ltd began to sell what became known as ‘Russell template’ 
arrangements as part of its business. 
1982 December 1982 - Partnership formed – between Commercial Management Ltd and 
Business Properties Ltd. The shareholders and directors of Business Properties Ltd 
were Commercial Management Ltd and Money Market Securities Ltd. At the time a 
company could be a director of another company. 
The Partnership took over the business of Commercial Management Ltd. Employed up 
to 55 staff at various times.    
The officers of Corporate Securities Ltd were Commercial Management Partners and 
Commercial Management Associates. Mr Russell was a partner in both partnerships
and both were Russell controlled entities. 
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1984 May 1984 Commercial Management Ltd sold its business to a new partnership known 
as Commercial Management Partnership. The partnership business was managed by 
Commercial Management Ltd and it was appointed agent for the partnership for the 
purpose of entering into contracts. In July 1984 partnership took over existing 
management contracts of Commercial Management Ltd. 
Commercial Management Partnership partners were Marketing Agencies Ltd and 
Business Properties Ltd. Marketing Agencies Ltd’s shareholders were Commercial 
Management Ltd and Downsview Nominees Ltd. 
Marketing Agencies Ltd’s directors were Commercial Management Partners and 
Commercial Management Associates. In October 1984 Marketing Agencies Ltd 
appointed Commercial Management Ltd to manage and control it. It seems that there 
was a similar arrangement involving Business Properties Ltd, although no documents 
have been produced to confirm this. 
1985 The first two loss companies were Glamour Accessories NZ Ltd and Valencia Licensed 
Restaurant 1974 Ltd. Mr Russell appointed as receiver of both companies. Agency and 
management agreements and declarations of trust entered into. 
In April 1985 Commercial Management Ltd appointed Charity Construction Ltd to 
manage it. Charity Construction Ltd was majority owned by Corporate Securities 
Ltd. Not all contractual arrangements were carried into effect – unclear whether the 
agreement with Charity Construction Ltd was implemented. 
Monies received by Business Properties Ltd and Marketing Agencies Ltd forwarded 
on a daily basis to Money Market Securities Ltd, a finance company. Money Market 
Securities Ltd was controlled by Mr Russell. Its shareholders were Commercial 
Management Ltd and Business Properties Ltd, and its officers were Commercial 
Management Partners and Commercial Management Associates.  
1987 New loss companies introduced – Quality Knitwear NZ Ltd and J & P Harding Ltd 
1988 Agency and management agreements with the first loss companies, Glamour 
Accessories NZ Ltd and Valencia Licensed Restaurant 1974 Ltd not relied upon to 
assign income. Letters sent terminating the agreements. Agreements with Quality 
Knitwear NZ Ltd and J & P Harding Ltd remain in force.    
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1989 Russell Family Trust established. 
1990 New loss company introduced – Billy-Joe’s Nite Spot Ltd. 
Judgment entered against Downsview Nominees Ltd and Mr Russell personally in the 
sum of $638,709.33. 
1991 New loss company introduced – Davill Shoes Ltd 
On 1 July 1991 Marketing Agencies Ltd retired from Partnership. Replaced by 
Downsview Debt Collections Ltd. The shareholders were Mr and Mrs Russell. The 
shares are held for the Russell Family Trust. Commercial Management Partners and 
Commercial Management Associates were the company officers. On 2 July 1991 
Business Properties Ltd retired from the Partnership. Replaced by Personal Loans Ltd. 
The shareholders were Mr and Mrs Russell holding the shares for the Russell Family 
Trust. Mr Russell and Commercial Management Associates were the officers of the 
company. 
1992 New loss companies introduced – Plim Builder Ltd. Downsview Debt Collections Ltd 
entered into agency and management agreement and declaration of trust with Plim 
Builder Ltd. 
Personal Loans Ltd entered into an agency and management agreement and a 
declaration of trust with a company known as Paul Finance Ltd. 
1994 The Commercial Management Partnership comprising Downsview Debt Collections 
Ltd and Personal Loans Ltd continued.  
1439 Clevedon-Kawakawa Bay Road purchased by Kawakawa Bay Properties Ltd. Mr 
Russell was a director of Kawakawa Bay Properties Ltd. Its share capital comprised 
1,000 shares held by Equity Capital Investments Ltd. The shares in Equity Capital 
Investments Ltd were in turn owned by Commercial Administration Ltd. Glen Eden 
Holdings Ltd held the shares in Commercial Administration Ltd in trust for the 
Russell Family Trust. Commercial Management Ltd owned all of the shares in Glen 
Eden Holdings Ltd. Mr Russell was a director of Commercial Management Ltd, and at 
the time Commercial Administration Ltd held all the shares in Commercial 
Management Ltd. 
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Second partnership formed by Mr Russell on 6 April 1994. Partners were Hamlin 
Facilities Ltd and The Tag Gun Company Ltd. At the time the shareholders in Hamlin 
Facilities Ltd were Commercial Administration Ltd and Glen Eden Ltd. Mr Russell 
and Commercial Management Associates were the controlling officers. The Tag Gun 
Company Ltd had the same shareholders and officers. Commercial Administration Ltd 
was a Russell controlled company. Mr Russell was a director of the company and the 
shares were held by Glen Eden Holdings Ltd on trust for the Russell Family Trust. 
Commercial Management Ltd held all of the shares in Glen Eden Holdings Ltd. 
The partnership agreement recorded that Hamlin Facilities Ltd and The Tag Gun 
Company Ltd were to purchase the consulting business conducted at 6 Downsview Road 
under the name of Commercial Management. There does not appear to have been an 
agreement for sale and purchase of the business, and Mr Russell advised the 
Commissioner in correspondence that Downsview Debt Collections Ltd and Personal 
Loans Ltd continued trading in partnership under the trade name Commercial 
Management.  
1995 Orders made by Taxation Review Authority to disclose documents. Documents were not 
disclosed by Mr Russell. The Commissioner did not have information as to which 
particular loss companies the profit was allocated to. The Commissioner proceeded on the 
basis that the same process of assignment of the income to loss companies occurred. This 
was not disputed. 
The first partnership, Downsview Debt Collections Ltd and Personal Loans Ltd 
received consulting income (and depreciation recovered). The second partnership, 
Hamlin Facilities Ltd and The Tag Gun Company Ltd also received consulting fees.  
1996 Kawakawa Trust formed. Trustees of the trust were Mr Russell and a company called 
Trustman Services Ltd. Mr Russell was the settlor and the primary beneficiaries were 
members of Mr and Mrs Russell’s family. Loan agreement entered into between Mr and 
Mrs Russell as trustees for the Russell Family Trust and Mr Russell and Trustman 
Services Ltd as trustees, recording an agreement in relation to future advances between 
the Russell Family Trust and Kawakawa Trust. 
Both partnerships (Downsview Debt Collections Ltd and Personal Loans Ltd, and
Hamlin Facilities Ltd and The Tag Gun Company Ltd) received income. The 
Commissioner assumed that the arrangements continued with net profits attributed to loss
entities and cash surpluses forwarded to finance companies. This was not disputed. Mr 
Russell received nominal remuneration from the Russell Family Trust. 
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1997 $20,000 was withdrawn by the Russell Family Trust from Charity Finance Ltd. The 
balance in the Russell Family Trust’s account with Charity Finance Ltd of $1,190,391 
was transferred to another Russell controlled company – Downsview Finance Ltd. The 
Russell Family Trust withdrew four payments each totalling $128,083.52 from 
Downsview Finance Ltd. A further payment of $30,000 was noted as being the payment 
of a deposit on a house being purchased by Michelle Lowndes, Mr and Mrs Russell’s 
daughter. Further $30,000 paid in relation to the purchase of a property at 3-165 Great 
South Road, Drury by Mr and Mrs Henry. Mrs Henry is also a daughter of Mr and Mrs 
Russell. Russell Family Trust also transfer $73,096.11 to a branch of ANZ Bank in 
Queensland to an account in the name of Downsview Nominees Ltd. 
Further change in the partnership entities. The partners in the second partnership (Hamlin 
Facilities Ltd and The Tag Gun Company Ltd) sold the Commercial Management 
Partnership business owned by them to Mahalo Ltd. The purchase price was $10,000. 
The shareholders in Mahalo Ltd were Commercial Management Ltd and Downsview 
Nominees Ltd. The officers were Mr Russell and Commercial Management Associates. 
1998 Mahalo Ltd returned consulting income of $32,141, financial services income of $51,000 
and interest of $588. Claimed expenses and returned a net loss of $44,532. 
Mr Russell received a nominal income from the Russell Family Trust of $20,179.10. 
Mr Russell withdrew $100,000 from Downsview Finance Ltd. He advanced this money 
to the Russell Family Trust. 
First partnership (Downsview Debt Collections Ltd and Personal Loans Ltd) made a 
net profit of $28,498.65 which was apportioned between the partners as to 50 per cent 
each. The second partnership (Hamlin Facilities Ltd and The Tag Gun Company Ltd) 
continued to trade. It had a net profit of $56,822.58 which was apportioned between the 
partners as to 50 per cent each.   
The Russell Family Trust withdraws $541,085.75 from Downsview Finance Ltd. 
$195,000 paid to the Kawakawa Trust. Kawakawa Trust purchases a property in 
Meola Road. Russell Family Trust also pays $389,085.75 into Downsview Nominees 
Ltd’s account with ANZ Bank in Queensland. 
Four payments totalling $444,320.92 from Downsview Nominees Ltd account with ANZ 
Bank in Queensland to an account with the Bank Of Queensland. The account was in the 
name of Mr and Mrs Russell as trustees of the Russell Family Trust. 
An amount of AUD $300,000 transferred from the Russell Family Trust account with 
the Bank of Queensland to a second account with the Bank of Queensland in the name of 
Mr Russell and Trustman Services Ltd as trustees of the Kawakawa Trust. 
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1999 Mr Russell officially ‘retired’ in 1999. 
Mr Russell’s nominal income was $18,149.25 from the Russell Family Trust. 
The Russell Family Trust withdrew $100,000 from Downsview Finance Ltd. 
Commercial Management Partnership arrangement continued. Mahalo Ltd received 
consulting income of $79,312, financial services income of $5,868 and $342 by way of 
interest income. It claimed expenses and returned a net loss of $38,508. 
The first partnership (Downsview Debt Collection Ltd and Personal Loans Ltd) did not 
trade during the year. 
The second partnership (Hamlin Facilities Ltd and The Tag Gun Company Ltd) 
received a net profit of $1,428.28 apportioned equally between the partners.  
2000 Mr Russell receives New Zealand superannuation 
Mr Russell received a nominal income of $19,735.01.  
Mr Russell’s’ self-employed income returned was $10,000. 
The Kawakawa Trust withdrew $20,000 from Downsview Finance Ltd. 
Mahalo Ltd returned consulting income of $154,737, financial services income 
of $5,065, and interest income of $572. It claimed expenses, and returned a net
profit of $42,426. The net profit was offset against its carry forward losses. 
The first partnership (Downsview Debt Collection Ltd and Personal Loans Ltd) did not 
trade. 
Second partnership (Hamlin Facilities Ltd and The Tag Gun Company Ltd) received a 
net profit of $464.18, which was apportioned equally between the partners.  
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Table of Selected Cases in Chronological Order 
  Date/ Case/Judge         Issue 
08/08/1984 
Challenge Corporation 
Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [1986] 
2 NZLR 513 (HC); 
(1984) 6 NZTC 
61,807; (1984) 8 
TRNZ 1. 
Barker J 
High Court agreed with the taxpayer that s 99 cannot apply in 
circumstances where comprehensive provisions in the statute itself 
cover the particular topic tax losses and grouping, and where the




Inland Revenue v 
Challenge Corporation 
Ltd [1987] AC 155 
(PC); [1986] 2 NZLR 
513 (PC); (1986) 8 
NZTC 5,219 (PC). 
Lord Keith of Kinkel, 
Lord Brightman, Lord 
Templeman, Lord 
Oliver of Aylmerton, 
Lord Goff of Chieveley 
Majority judgment for the CIR. Section 191 was intended to give 
effect to the reality of group profits and losses and in those 
circumstances was not an instrument of tax 
avoidance. In Challenge the reality was the taxpayer had never
made a loss. The loss was made by Perth and had fallen 
on Merbank before the taxpayer had contracted to buy Perth. 
Section 191 ITA 1976 in these circumstances was an 
instrument of tax avoidance and had fallen foul of s 99 ITA 
1976. 
28/03/1988 
Case K28 (1988) 10 
NZTC 257 (NZTRA). 
Judge Bathgate, TRA 
Legal representative 
for the CIR was Mr M
Ruffin. 
Purchase of tax loss shell company. Contemporaneous purchase 
by shell company of property development company. Shell 
becoming parent company and charging administration fee to 
subsidiary property development company. The 
subsidiary property development company claimed a 
deduction under s 104 ITA 1976 (now s DA 1 ITA 
2007). Issue was whether the purpose of the 
arrangement was tax avoidance and whether the subsidiary 
had incurred expenditure in gaining assessable income. The 
taxpayers were concerned with a 4 March 1980 law 
change in regard to tax losses. Case distinguished from 
Challenge – consideration was paid for the transfers, issue was 
the legitimacy of the deduction.  
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Case L85 (1989) 11 
NZTC 1,485 
(NZTRA). 
Temporary share transfer to manipulate shareholding requirements.
23/08/1990 
Case M104 (1990) 12 
NZTC 2,660 
(NZTRA). 
First ‘Track A’ case (K. J. Cummings Ltd). Judge
Barber agrees with Mr Grierson that the transaction was 
“commercially ingenious” but rejected the submission that it 
was “commercially realistic”. Challenge case considered. 
This is not a case of tax mitigation; it is a clear case of 
avoidance in terms of s 99. False date of arrangements alleged.
04/09/1990 




‘Track A’ (Ron West Motors (Otahuhu) Ltd).
This was the second template case heard in the TRA, (Cases 
M104 and M109 were heard at the same time).
No nexus between administration charges and income 
earning capacity of taxpayer.
13/06/94 
Paul Finance Ltd v 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (1994) 
16 NZTC 11,257 (HC). 
Master Anne Gambrill 
Computer generated cheque dishonoured, Mr Russell argued he 
was the only person authorised to commit the company, not his 
staff. Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 and Bills of Exchange Act 
1908 referred to. 
13/07/1994 




Consultancy services provided to the objector company from the 
Commercial Management Partnership (Mr Russell) were both 
normal commercial advice and advice as to the tax avoidance 
scheme. TRA found that advice totalled 15 hours per month. The 
TRA’s conclusion was that the part of the consultancy fee which 
represented half of that, i.e. 7.5 hours per month at a reasonable 
hourly rate for Mr Russell’s services (at $250 an hour) was 
deductible. While the figures differ, similar findings have been 
made in other template cases. Hence, rather than the company 
having to pay tax on the quantum of the 5% consulting fee, a 
deduction has been allowed by the TRA for the hours spent on the 
non-tax avoidance advice at $250 per hour. 
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6/10/1995 
Paul Finance Ltd v 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [1995] 
3 NZLR 521 (CA); 
(1995) 17 NZTC 
12,379 (CA). 
Richardson J, Henry J, 
Thomas J 
Computer generated cheque issued to Paul Finance Ltd. 
Cheque dishonoured.
8 /11/1996 
Miller v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue 
(1997) 18 NZTC 
13,001 (HC). 
Interim judgement of 
Baragwanath J 
Plaintiffs advanced the argument that s 191 ITA 1976 (in 
the amended form enacted in 1980 following the Challenge  
decision) to advance an argument that had failed in the Privy 
Council, that s 191 provided a code distinct from s 99. Plaintiffs 
emphasised in particular new subsection (7C) which gave the 
Commissioner a limited anti-avoidance power in the context of 
grouping accounts.  
23/01/1997 
Miller v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue 
(1997) 18 NZTC 13, 
127 (HC). 
Baragwanath J 
Second judgment on application for judicial review.
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29/05/1997 
Miller v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue 
(1997) 18 NZTC 13, 
219 (HC). 
Judgment of 
Baragwanath J on 
Limitation and on 
Appeal 
Mr BM Grierson for 
Applicants and 
Appellants 
FB Bolwell for 
Commissioner on 
judicial review 




CPS not complied with, tax avoidance, administration
charge deductibility, consulting charge deductibility, the 
1980 amendment reverses the effect of Challenge; whether s 
191(7C) provides a complete code and recourse to s 99 is 
excluded, CIR ‘following the money’, statute bar and discovery
issues. 
29/09/1998 
Miller v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue (Alt 
cit Managed Fashions 
Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue) [1999] 
1 NZLR 275 (CA); 
(1998) 18 NZTC 13, 
961 (CA). 
Gault J, Henry J, 
Thomas J, Blanchard J, 
Tipping J 
Mr BM Grierson
counsel for taxpayer 
Mr MJ Ruffin counsel 
for CIR 
Judgment provides a summary of the history of the litigation to 
date, the CIR's CPS on s 99 discussed; Track C. Part 2 was 
a judicial review considering ‘going where the money is’; failure 
to follow the CPS; tentative or provisional assessments; 
concurrent Track A and Track B; additional tax; time bar; 
vendetta; failure to comply with natural justice; unfair 
discrimination; arbitrary or capricious conduct of the CIR; and 
issues of privilege. 
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04/05/1999 
Judge AAP Willy 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v 
Dandelion 
Investments Ltd 
[2000] 2 NZLR 548 
(CA); (2000) 19 
NZTC 15, 585 (CA) 
Mr Willox for CIR 
Mr JG Russell for 
objector company 
Discussion regarding s 99 CPS, comment from Committee of Tax 
Experts recommending to immediately withdraw the CPS due to it
being unsatisfactory and inadequate. Improper purpose or 
motive mentioned, statute bar and sham. Assessment vitiated, 
allegations of lack of impartiality, and unnecessary obstruction of 
the objector by the Commissioner to be proved. The ‘feuding must 
stop’. 
14/07/1999 




Decision of Judge PF 
Barber 
JG Russell, Financial 
Consultant for Objector 
CK Wood and RJ 
Willox, Counsel for 
Respondent 
Deductibility of expenses, Special Audit case. 1991 
entertainment expenses of $2,000 – it eventually became clear 
that the $2,000 was not spent on food for a staff Christmas 
function but on massage parlour services for buyers at the 
objector’s car auctions.  Judge Barber states: “Presumably, only a 
small number of buyers received that perceived benefit from sex 
industry workers at the particular massage parlour. Unless the 
services needed to be somehow provided as an inducement to 
purchase at car auction, one wonders about deductibility; but the 
item has been conceded and the link between the service and the 
objector’s income earning process did not need to be explained 
to me.” Taxpayer’s records were quite inadequate and in rather a 
mess well before Mr Russell became involved. Mr Russell did 
his best to reconstruct matters, but naturally in a manner 
favourable to the taxpayer. Mr Russell “appears to be no friend 
of the respondent.” 
Judge Barber comments “I record that Mr Russell made extensive 
submissions along the lines of improper purposes and motives of 
officers of the respondent and alleged a general vendetta of 
the respondent’s department towards him and his clients. I 
noted, in the course of the hearing, that I felt that the 
attitude of the respondent’s department to Mr Russell ‘lacks 
maturity and need polishing’. I have often felt that officers of 
the IRD are quite unhelpful to Mr Russell – sometimes 
hostile to him and sometimes flippant. Such attitudes do not 
assist resolution of tax disputes whether between the department 
and Mr Russell or his many clients. I appreciate Mr Russell’s 
interpretation of revenue laws, particularly, in terms of tax 
avoidance, and his general strategies and the extent of his tax 
advisory business, are thorns in the side of the department and 
relate to enormous unpaid taxes overall; but treating him as 
an enemy of the State does not expedite resolution”.   
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17/05/000 
FB Duvall Ltd v 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (2000) 
19 NZTC 15, 658 
(CA). 
Richardson P, Gault J, 
Keith J 
BM Grierson for 
Appellant 
JHC Coleman and MJ 
Ruffin for Respondent 
GST objection proceeding that has had a tortured history. Appeal 
allowed. CIR will recognise input tax credits and make 
appropriate refunds without further notice. Duvall entitled to costs 
on the appeal fixed at $5,000.    
17/08/2000 
Paul Finance Ltd v 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (2000) 
19 NZTC 15,863 (HC). 
Reserved judgment of 
Glazebrook J 
Claim for exemplary damages,  defendants’ actions malicious, 
defendant acted to inflict economic injury on the plaintiff.
10/04/2001 
O’Neil v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue (Alt 
cit: Miller v 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue) [2001] 
UKPC 17; [2001] 3 
NZLR 316 (PC); 
(2001) 20 NZTC 
17,051. 
Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead, Lord 
Steyn, Lord Hoffman, 
Lord Millett, Dame 
Sian Elias 
An appeal by the taxpayers against the Court of Appeal’s 
dismissal of application for judicial review. Distinction between 
tax mitigation and tax avoidance unhelpful. Limits of judicial 
review considered, s 99(4) with regard to reopening under the 
time bar, the effect of non-compliance with the s 99 CPS, an 
allegation that assessments were clearly wrong on the face, so 
must be irrational and therefore void was met with the response 
that “Their Lordships consider that this submission can only be 
called preposterous”. Track A to Track B change an abuse of 
process raised, s 99(4) inconsistent assessments raised, as well as 
whether assessments were tentative. 
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20/08/2002 
Russell v Taxation 
Review Authority 
(2002) 20 NZTC 17, 
832 (HC). 
O’Regan J 
All references to the Commissioner acting “fraudulently and 
dishonestly” replaced by references to the Commissioner 
acting “in breach of an obligation to act honestly and fairly”. 
Section 27(1) Bill of Rights Act 1990 and s 6 TAA 1994 raised. 
20/08/2003 
Miller v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue 
(2003) 21 NZTC 
18,243 (HC). 
Baragwanath J 
Costs judgment relating to Miller and O’Neil. Mentions that Mr 
and Mrs Miller had paid full amounts undertaken to pay. Mr and 
Mrs O’Neil paid 42% then emigrated leaving the balance 




Inland Revenue (2003) 
21 NZTC 18, 272 
(HC). 
Gault P, Blanchard J 
and Anderson J 
GJ Judd QC for 
appellant 
AC Beck for 
Respondent 
Section 27(1) Bill of Rights Act 1990 section 6 TAA 1994 and 
Scally principle. Appeal dismissed. 
29/08/2003 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v Ron 
West Motors (Otahuhu) 
Ltd (2003) 21 NZTC 
18,281 (HC). 
Master Faire 




Case W37 (2004) 21 
NZTC 11,360 
(NZTRA). 
(hearing on an on-
going basis since 
February 1999) 
Ruling of Judge PF 
Barber on legal 
professional privilege 
for minutes of certain 
meetings 
Mr MJ Ruffin counsel 
for CIR 
Mr GJ Judd QC and Mr 
JG Russell 
Various names of ‘monthly meetings’ identified. Legal privilege 
and litigation privilege examined in detail, including fraud 
exception. Minutes were held to be privileged from discovery. 
Section 6 TAA 1994 and Bill of Rights Act 1990 referred
to. Alleged vendetta raised, Judge Barber allowing 10 days 
for a hearing on this issue before him. 
08/03/2005 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v FB 




Reserved Judgment of 
Priestley J 
A Beck for Appellant 
GJ Judd QC for 
Respondent
Under s 26 of the Taxation Review Authorities Act 
1994. Priestley J states at [5] ‘In my view this is a totally 
unsatisfactory state of affairs in respect of taxation obligations 
which are 10 to 15 years old. It puzzles me such a state of 
affairs can co-exist with “the integrity of the tax system”, 
enshrined as policy in s 6 TAA 1994. It is not the Authority’s 
statutory function to exercise the Commissioner’s s 33(2) 
discretion. Nor is it a function of the Authority to usurp the 
Commissioner’s statutory responsibility to exercise that 
discretion in an appropriate but reviewable way by weighing 
the various factors stipulated by the Court of Appeal in CIR v 
Wilson (supra). Fundamental jurisdictional matters cannot be 
sidestepped by the Authority claiming “curative” powers or 
functions?’ In respect of costs, Priestley J stated at [64] 
‘Although the applicant has been successful I am profoundly 
uneasy about the way in which the central issue of the proper 
assessment for the respondent’s GST liability between 1 
March 1990 and 31 December 1994 has been handled. 
Although costs are predictable, the Court nonetheless retains 
some overriding discretion which must be informed by 
considerations of fairness and justice.’ At [65] stating ‘Given 
that the Commissioner initially invoked the procedure stating 
a case to the Taxation Review Authority, and also 
given that the threshold discretion of the 
Commissioner conferred by s33(2) was triggered in March 
1998, but some 7 years later has yet to be exercised, 
I might require some persuasion to award costs in the 
appellant’s favour. At counsel’s suggestion costs are reserved.’
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15/03/2005 
CIR v Russell (2005) 
22 NZTC 19,664 (DC). 
Oral judgment of Judge 
PF Barber 
Mr MJ Ruffin for CIR 
(Informant) 
Mr GJ Judd QC and Mr 
S Judd for Mr JG 
Russell  
Originally 226 prosecutions for breach of s 17 of the 
Inland Revenue Act 1974. Many were withdrawn, ultimately 
106 informations. Mr Russell challenged the validity of the 
informations. Section 5(1) Interpretation Act 1999 referred to. 
Procedural win for Mr Russell. The proceedings were a nullity 
and could not be overcome. An appropriate delegation 
needed to sign the informations. Mrs Denise Latimer did not 
fit into that situation. At all material times, Mrs Latimer’s 
actual work did not fit her departmental title; she also did not 
fit the slightly complicated but sophisticated system of 
delegations.    
27/07/2005 
Case Z3 (2009) 24 
NZTC 14,027 
(NZTRA). 
Ruling of Judge Barber 
GJ Judd QC for 
disputant 
Mr MJ Ruffin for CIR 
This case was seeking to disqualify Judge Barber from the 
‘Track E’ litigation. It was respectfully submitted that was 
inevitable to bring prior views (from the template 
cases) into this proceeding involving Mr Russell personally. 
One comment referred to was from Case R25 where Judge 
Barber stated ‘It seems to me that a prime JGR strategy is to 
use due process for the purposes of delay and confusion’.  
Judge Barber stated at [12] ‘I believe that every nuance of
my findings in Case R25 has been consistently upheld in 
appellate Courts (including that I was not obliged to allow 40 
or 50 more hearing days), so that I would be bound to 
those findings’. Judge Barber also stated ‘I do not think I
have any particular predetermined views about the present 
case which, quite frankly, I do not yet quite understand 
at this early stage’. Vendetta issue discussed. Judge Barber 
stated at [63] ‘These template cases have been dealt 
with by me in a specialist jurisdiction and, as he is entitled to, 
Mr [Russell] ensures that all that I do and state is scrutinised by 
appellate Courts. This is the key reason for such cases having 




Wire Supplies Ltd v 
Taxation Review 
Authority (2005) 22 
NZTC 19,395 (HC). 
Courtney J 
GJ Judd QC / J 
McCartney for 
taxpayers 
M Ruffin for the 
Commissioner 
Unsuccessful application by Wire Supplies Ltd and Waikato 
Brokers Ltd for judicial review quashing TRA decision. The 
judicial review sought on ground that TRA failed to hear evidence 
of IRD officer Mr McDermott before delivering final decisions. 
CIR used various modes of assessment regarding the Russell 
template companies. Mr McDermott was the architect of modes of
assessment known as Tracks C and D, and assessments at issue 
before TRA were Track A and B assessments.  
07/04/2006 
FB Duvall Ltd v 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (2006) 
22 NZTC 19,866 (CA).   
William Young P, 
Glazebrook and 
Robertson JJ 
GJ Judd QC for 
Appellant 
AC Beck and R 
Wallace for Crown 
Appeal from decision of Priestley J of 8 March 2005. Bill of 




Ltd v Registrar of 
Companies (2006) 22 
NZTC 19,971 (HC). 
Judgment of Ellen 
France J 
RJ Warburton for 
plaintiff 




Application to restore companies to the Register of Companies.
Companies Act 1955 and Companies Act 1993.  
In weighing the balance overall, the merits of restoration were not 
particularly strong. Just and/or equitable to allow the majority of 
the companies to pursue the litigation and resolve it. 
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11/06/2007 
Case Y8 (2007) 23 
NZTC 13,076 
(NZTRA). 
Further Rulings of 
Judge PF Barber 
Mr GJ Judd QC for 
disputant 
Mr MJ Ruffin for CIR 
A case considering discovery. The Kemp litigation referred to. 
‘Track E’ case. Good discussion regarding legal privilege and the 
members of the Russell Team. Mr Russell’s counsel submitted
that a member of the Russell Team who was a solicitor could
not be a legal advisor to the Russell Team of the IRD. It was
submitted that a person cannot be both solicitor and the 
solicitor’s client at the same time. Dispensed with, entitled to 
legal privilege when they are acting as lawyers. Tax 
assessments put forward as being ‘intellectually offensive’. 
15/06/2007 
Wire Supplies Ltd v 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [2007] 
NZCA 244; [2007] 3 
NZLR 458; (2007) 23 
NZTC 21,404. 
Glazebrook J, O’Regan 
& Ellen France JJ  
Excellent summary of ‘Tracks’.
Three appeals CA 206/05, CA 207/05, CA 208/05.
11/10/2007 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v 
Panmure Consultants 
Ltd (2008) 23 NZTC 
21,665 (HC). 
(Oral) Judgment of 
Associate Judge Faire 
[on application to 
liquidate company] 
C Wood for plaintiff
(Meredith Connell) 
No appearance for 
defendant 
Mr Russell sought to represent Panmure Consultants Ltd in the 
High Court arguing inter alia that the CIR was acting in disregard 
of s 6 TAA 1994 and the Bill of Rights Act 1990, that the CIR 
was committing a fraud in refusing to give effect to s 99(4) ITA 
1976 arguing the same income was assessed to him personally in 
1996 and 2003. A company has no right of audience in the 
Superior Courts (re Mannix [1984] 1 NZLR 309). It must appear 
by a person who is admitted as a barrister or solicitor of the High 
Court under the Law Practitioners Act 1982. The Court does have 
a residual discretion reserved for use primarily in emergency 
situations where the assistance of counsel is not needed by the 
Court, or where it might be unduly technical or burdensome 
to insist on counsel. No proper basis for exercise of the 
discretion. Panmure Consultants Ltd was unable to be 
represented by Mr Russell.  
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26/11/2007 
Case Y20 (2008) 23 
NZTC 13,207 
(NZTRA). 
Interim decision of 
Judge PF Barber 
Submission that Inland Revenue consistently put forward the 
wrong witness in breach of s 6 TAA 1994 and Bill of Rights Act 
1990. No obligation based on the rules of natural justice requiring 
a litigant in a civil proceeding, whether or not a public authority, 
to identify and make available witnesses considered by the 
opposing litigant to be the ‘correct ones’. On record in this
case that Mr Russell and his various counsel have been given 
massive latitude by Judge Barber in the conduct of these 
hearings. The suggestion made by the objectors that, in the 
template cases, they have not received a full and fair hearing 
of their ground of objection is, in Judge Barber’s view
preposterous. Regarding Mr Russell’s conduct in the hearings, 
Mr Russell has ‘almost created a filibuster situation by 
prolonging cross-examination in the hope that some 
favourable item might materialise for objectors.’ Judge
Barber noted that Mr Russell ‘is a very experienced,
most intelligent, and able advocate and, clearly, has many 
strategies; and it was up to him to use wisely the very 




Inland Revenue v FB 
Duvall Ltd (2009) 24 
NZTC 23, 135 (HC). 
Judgment of Associate 
Judge Doogue 
Mr Wood for Plaintiff 
Mr SRG Judd for 
Defendant 
Companies Act 1993. Statutory demand served. Defendant 
opposed liquidation order on two grounds – bank cheque 
made out to Ministry of Justice for full amount of 
$30,076.23. Issue of solvency. The need to establish solvency is 
not discharged by showing that the defendant can pay one of its 




Russell v Taxation 
Review Authority 
(2009) 24 NZTC 
23,284 (HC). 
Cooper J 
Mr Russell appeared in 
person 
Mr Russell’s own case – ‘Track E’. Tax debt at this stage 
was around $100 million. Mr Russell was seeking to have his
case determined by a different Taxation Review Authority 
than the Authority that had embarked on the task, Judge 
Barber. An application was made to Judge Barber to recuse 
himself, and when that application was declined Mr Russell 
commenced this application for review under the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972. The claim was based on bias and alleged
that because Judge Barber had consistently held against Mr 
Russell over the many years in which the arrangements 
designed by Mr Russell have been the subject of litigation before 
the Authority, there must be a reasonable apprehension that the 
Judge will not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the 
case. Judge Barber was the only appointed Taxation Review 
Authority. Bill of Rights Act 1990 (s 27) and s 6 TAA 
1994 in Cause of Action. Bias at common law, Muir and 




Inland Revenue  
(2009) NZTC 23, 331 
(HC). 
Reserved Judgment of 
Courtney J 
GJ Judd QC for 
Applicant 
CK Wood for 
Respondent  
Final decision in relation to assessments. Amended assessments 
confirmed, SLIOC assessable income reduced for each relevant 
year by $22,500 to reflect consultancy fee. Amended assessments 
to be issued if several companies are restored to Companies 
Register. 
17/09/2009 




Judge Barber  
Heard in Auckland over 64 days between 3 October 2005 and 30 
April 2009. Mr Russell appearing on his own behalf. The 
essential issue was the correctness of assessments against the 
disputant for the years 1985 to 2000 inclusive exceeding $80 
million dollars taking into account penalties and interest. Track E.
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25/02/2010 
FB Duvall Ltd v 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (2010) 
24 NZTC 24,053 (HC). 
Judgment of Allan J 
SRG Judd for plaintiffs 
M Ruffin and RJ 
Wallace for defendant 
Under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. Duvall (along with 
some 21 other plaintiffs claiming a similar interest) initially 
pleaded four causes of action, including that the CIR had acted 
unlawfully, unfairly and unreasonably in refusing to amend 
assessments for both income tax and GST. Case discusses 
procedural history of the FB Duvall litigation. First cause of 
action survives with respect to Duvall only but will 
require significant re-pleading (tenable argument for review) 
of the Commissioner’s decision not to accept (as distinct from 
allow) its late objections. Second and third causes of action are 
struck out, fourth cause of action stayed by consent. Due to recent 
liquidation of Managed Fashions Ltd no order was required in 




Inland Revenue (2010) 
24 NZTC 24,181 (HC). 
Judgment of Wylie J 
SRG Judd for the 
Appellant 
MJ Ruffin for the 
Respondent 
Mr Russell sought an adjournment of a hearing. Wylie J was not 
persuaded that it was in the interests of justice to adjourn the 
hearing of the appeal. Rehearing would render otiose the assertion 
by Mr Russell that Judge Barber had a bias, whether actual or 
apparent, against him.  
15/12/2011 
FB Duvall Ltd v 
Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (2011) 
25 NZTC 20-101 (HC). 
Reserved judgment of 
Ellis J 
SRG Judd for the 
plaintiffs 
MJ Ruffin for the 
Defendant 
Judicial review application under the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972 of the Commissioner’s refusal to accept late objections from 
the taxpayer in relation to GST assessments made in the early 
1990s. 
Commissioner ordered to reconsider his decision to refuse to 





Inland Revenue [2012] 
NZSC 73, (2012) 25 
NZTC 20,140.  
Elias J, Tipping and 
William Young JJ 
Applicant in person 
MSR Palmer and MJ 
Ruffin for Respondent 
The ‘final chapter’ in the Track E litigation. The Supreme Court 
declined leave to appeal on the basis that the statutory criteria had 
not been made out. 
No basis for concern that a substantial miscarriage of justice 
might occur if leave was not given. 
